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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis provides a moral analysis of micro-regional forces in Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire, using the framework of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA).  It presents an 
original contribution to the field through the addition of the Ghanaian-Ivoirian case 
study, as well as a unique application of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to 
the NRA.  In an attempt to counter the view that borders in Africa are artificial, 
arbitrary and the result of colonial imposition, this research employs the Capabilities 
Approach, providing a narrative of both positive and negative impacts resulting from 
the opportunity created by borders in West Africa. 
 
The way in which the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border is used by individuals in their security 
strategies in the face of economic deprivation and physical threats represents a 
positive impact of borders. Conversely, the role of borders in the continued prevalence 
of human trafficking in West Africa is also questioned in this piece, providing a 
balanced account of the impact of borders. 
 
This research concludes that the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border presents opportunities that 
can be exploited to both positive and negative ends at the micro-regional level. This 
interpretation suggests that any complete account of borders in West Africa more 
broadly ought to employ a moral framework in addition to a multi-levelled scale of 
analysis.
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Chapter One:  
The Good, the Bad and the Pan-Africanist Dream 
Using a micro-regional analysis to inform macro-level processes 
 
At the beginning of the summer of 2007, an African Union summit was held in Ghana, 
the organisation’s ninth such meeting in five years.  At the top of the agenda, once 
again, was the issue of a pan-African government.  The dream of African unity had its 
zenith in the optimism of independence, however it is still seen by many as the best 
way to deal with the ills that seem to plague the African continent. In 2005, K.Y. 
Amoako, the executive secretary of UNECA, addressed a group of students at Addis 
Ababa University by saying, “one of the best strategies for overcoming our challenges 
is still the same [as it was at the time of independence] - the political and economic 
integration of our continent.” 
 
However, in this new century with the continued proliferation of regional 
organizations like the AU, SADC, ECOWAS, NEPAD, which path will Africa embark 
upon?  Will it be one particular path, or divergent courses for different parts of the 
continent?  
 
One strategy that African states have been less adverse to, in terms of real action, has 
been the gradualist approach of regional integration, to be followed by a continental 
government at some unspecified time in the future.  But looking at the process of 
integration from a macro-perspective, certain questions immediately come to mind: 
integration for whom, for what purpose, and to what end? 
 
In terms of the political rhetoric, institutional regionalism is frequently seen as a good, 
an assumption that rarely seems to require elucidation or justification.  The reasons for 
this are probably easy enough to explain: the globalization of the world economy and 
the fear of being “left out”, recent successful integration in other regions such as the 
EU or ASEAN, and a desire to remove borders often seen as artificial.  The symbolism 
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of the removal of boundaries, one of the most visible legacies of colonialism, is an 
issue which seems to crop up in the political rhetoric of African leaders.     
 
However, the path of continental integration has the danger of merely transplanting a 
Eurocentric understanding of regionalism onto a continent replete with distinguishing 
characteristics.  Replicating an EU-style region has many challenges and any serious 
move toward integration in Africa must take into account the realities on the ground.   
 
Are borders the fabrication of colonial imposition, hampering development in Africa? 
Would their eradication lead to growth, prosperity and security for a continent that 
has been fraught with violence and insecurity for much of the latter half of the 20th 
century?   
 
In order to begin these higher-level debates, I would argue that we first need to 
examine the way in which borders impact upon the everyday lives of Africans.  We 
require a tool that allows for such an analysis, prior to any substantive move towards 
real macro-regional integration. 
 
One such tool for grassroots research is the localized focus offered by micro-regional 
analyses.  Using a micro-regional level analysis brings to the fore a different set of 
questions and potential answers. If a micro-region relies on the existence of the 
border, and social, economic, cultural and security interactions thrive in this 
borderland, what is the impact of the removal of the border itself?  How are 
individuals currently impacted by borders? In its mature state, institutional regionalism 
would have all internal borders eradicated, creating a truly integrated socio-economic 
zone, with borders then only existing on the fringes of the zone as a whole.   It is 
arguable that a further investigation of the relationship between institutional 
regionalism, and grassroots micro-regionalism is a crucial undertaking for the question 
of pan-African unity, as well as African regionalism. 
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Situating the Research Project 
Prior to leaping into the argument of this piece, it would do well to provide a scope of 
enquiry, examining the limitations of current research, and outlining what this work 
aims to accomplish.  Currently, the prevailing literature in the field of African 
regionalism has weaknesses in three main areas, which I outline below. 
 
A need to apply the New Regionalism Approach to other geographical 
case studies 
The New Regionalism Approach (NRA) is a broad school of thought that aims to 
account for the modern reality of regionalism in a post-Cold War world. Regionalism is 
not a static phenomenon, and arguments have been made that it has gone through 
several ‘waves’, each with its own distinctive characteristics (Söderbaum F. , 2003, p. 
3).  The most recent wave arose following the end of the Cold War, manifesting new 
patterns of globalization and regionalization. 
 
Rather than being a prescriptive, homogenous approach to the study of regionalism, 
the NRA encourages a multi-disciplinary, multi-level study, transcending traditional 
state-centric accounts of regionalism.  With its roots in the late 20th century, the NRA 
grew out of a United Nations University / World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU/WIDER) sponsored project, which was led by Bjorn Hettne (Söderbaum 
& Taylor, 2008, p. 19). This project then brought about a global network of NRA 
researchers, who came from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, with various 
geographical scholastic foci.  
 
Although the NRA is not uniform in its application, new regionalist scholars agree on 
certain central understandings in this approach.  The NRA is situated in the reflectivist 
school of International Relations (IR) and conceives of ‘regions’ as being socially 
constructed (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, p. 20). Regions are in no way ‘natural’; they 
are fluid, and subject to evolution. 
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Interestingly, there have been several new regionalist scholars that have given 
attention to Africa1, a continent not generally the focus of regionalist scholarship in 
previous waves of regionalist study.  There are probably multiple contributing factors 
as to why Africa is now a continent receiving such scholastic attention, but one key 
reason is that the NRA allows for an at once broader and deeper understanding of 
what constitutes ‘regionalism.’  Therefore, our ability as researchers to unpack and 
capture the reality of regionalism in Africa is permitted, encouraged and enhanced.  
We are no longer confined to the Westphalian, state-centric understanding of 
regionalism. 
 
However, it must be remembered that the NRA is evolving, and in terms of scholarship 
is still relatively new.  Despite the many researchers working under this umbrella, the 
NRA itself would benefit from a wider range of geographical case studies.  For 
example, there are several micro-regional analyses that focus on the southern portion 
of Africa, but comparatively fewer studies in sub-Saharan West Africa.  Although they 
share a continent, the history, culture, economies and state structures in these two 
‘regions’ do differ in significant ways.  This thesis will employ a new regionalist lens 
with which to study micro-regionalism in West Africa, and more specifically in Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire.  This case study will add to the growing scholarship within the NRA, 
and may demonstrate similarities and perhaps discrepancies with other geographical 
case studies. 
 
The inappropriateness of macro-regional theoretical frameworks in the 
study of African micro-regionalism  
When examining the benefits or disadvantages of regionalism in Africa, too often there 
is an assumed account of what constitutes a benefit or disadvantage, without any real 
effort to establish a theoretical framework for these value judgements.  For example, 
                                                     
1
 Studies have included both formal and informal regionalism on the continent, its “regions” (West 
Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa) and micro-regions (Bach, 1999; Shaw, 2000; Grant & Söderbaum, 
2003; Taylor, 2002; Bach, 2005; Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008). 
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some might assume that ‘financial gain’ as a result of a cross-border commercial 
venture must be beneficial; but beneficial for whom, at whose expense, and according 
to what moral framework? 
 
Moral judgements of a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ effect must be made within a defined 
theoretical framework, elaborated at the outset of one’s research, in order to provide 
a robust understanding of the outcomes for those persons involved in the micro-
regionalization process.   
 
Moreover, many regionalism studies focus on macro-level phenomena, and therefore 
the determination of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes is often set against the economic, 
political or strategic gain (or loss) by the state (or a regional grouping of states).  This 
type of analysis does have merit, but, as we will touch on below, the absence of micro-
regional studies in Africa distorts the picture of the true nature of regionalism on the 
continent.  The macro studies ought to be complemented by lower-level, micro-
regional studies that focus on what is really happening on the ground.   
 
In order to conduct a micro-regional study of cross-border movement in West Africa, 
another framework for moral analysis is required.  The state-centric, politico-strategic 
outcomes that are analyzed in macro-regional research cannot capture the 
phenomenon of micro-regionalism, which must be necessarily agent-centred. 
Therefore, in this thesis, the moral framework I am proposing to use is the Capabilities 
Approach, as understood by Martha Nussbaum.  Relying on a classical Aristotelian 
account of eudaimonia2, one can navigate the thorny field of a moral analysis for cross-
                                                     
2
 The concept of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, comes from ancient Greek philosophy and is tied to 
the field of virtue ethics.  Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics, presents the concept of eudaimonia, 
which is most commonly translated “as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ and occasionally as ‘well-being’” 
(Hursthouse, 1999, p. 9). This concept will be treated to a greater extent in the second chapter of this 
thesis. 
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border micro-regionalism by attempting to structure actions and their outcomes in 
relation to how they enhance or detract from human flourishing. This theoretical 
framework is elaborated in the second chapter of this piece. 
 
An overall neglect of non-institutional, micro-regionalism in Africa  
African regionalism provides unique considerations and challenges, which are not 
always effectively understood within the framework of the Eurocentric, Westphalian 
account of regionalism.  If African states do not conform to our traditional, Western 
understanding, then it stands to reason that the geographical divisions between states 
might function in unexpected ways.  The presence of “the state” at political borders in 
Africa is inconsistent and sometimes non-existent, providing opportunities for 
subversion, self-enrichment, abuse and self-preservation. 
 
The extraordinary contribution of the NRA is that it allows the researcher to expand 
what is considered a worthy element of study in the area of regionalism.  A regionalist 
actor does not have to be ‘the state’ or even an agent of ‘the state’.  We are not 
confined to analyzing cross-state institutions or international treaties.  Regionalism can 
be both macro and micro3. It can encompass a geographical unit that crosses multiple 
states or it can be confined within a single state.  The NRA opens up and allows for a 
fuller account of the study of regionalism. 
 
Micro-regionalism can be understood as existing between the local and the national 
levels, in contrast to macro-regionalism which accounts for regionalist units between 
the national and the global levels (Söderbaum F. , 2005, p. 87).  Obviously, this 
dichotomy is not as simplistic as it appears, nor is the division between these levels 
                                                     
3
 This introduction employs a variety of contestable concepts, which are defined at great length within 
the second chapter of the thesis.  The omission of robust definitions at this stage should not be taken as 
an assumption that these terms are perfectly understood and used consistently among international 
relations scholars. 
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precise.  A common way to differentiate these ‘levels’ of regionalism is to view them as 
originating “as either ‘from above ‘(macro) or ‘from below’ (micro)” which Söderbaum 
(2005, p. 87) sees as unhelpful and misleading.  All regions, whether micro or macro, 
can be the product of downward or upward forces. 
 
In this work, micro-regionalism is conceived as a “process of growing regional 
interconnectedness” (Breslin & Hook, 2002, p. 8) occurring at the sub-national (and 
sometimes cross-national) level.  It is an important piece of the regionalist puzzle, 
because “micro-regional processes are not only about micro-regions but also reflect 
greater processes at the macro-level, but which can perhaps be more easily seen at the 
micro-level” (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, p. 14).  
 
Therefore, contributions to micro-regional studies can, in fact, inform our 
understanding of the macro-region.   Furthermore, the prevalence of informal micro-
regionalist activity in Africa compels us to the study, in order to grasp the full nature of 
regionalism on the continent.  One cannot expect to comprehend regionalism at the 
macro-level in the absence of micro-regional forces.  By filling this gap in regionalist 
scholarship, this thesis contributes to a broader understanding of African regionalism. 
 
Case Study 
This thesis aims to reconcile these limitations in the current literature through a two-
pronged approach: firstly, in respect of the theory, the use of the Capabilities 
Approach to provide a moral framework for the analysis of cross-border micro-
regionalism; and secondly, through the addition of a case study involving the 
borderland that separates Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.   
 
The geographical area around the Ghanaian-Ivoirian borderland has many advantages 
in terms of a case study, as historically it has served as an attractive comparison of 
colonial, and then governmental structure. Ghana (or the Gold Coast, as it was known 
during the colonial period) was under the control of the British Empire, whereas Côte 
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d’Ivoire was a part of French West Africa.  Due to the vacillations in fortune and 
stability over the past centuries, movement across this border has varied direction.4 
The comparative literature of these two states provides a wealth of historical 
information to draw upon, however much of regionalist research has been state-
centric in focus.   
 
My approach will be micro-regional, primarily examining the Ghanaian-Ivoirian 
borderland, but also incorporating migratory patterns that extend beyond this area to 
include Burkina Faso and West Africa more broadly.  
 
Challenges in the Research Project 
There were many challenges in terms of data for this project.  The first was simply the 
difficulty in determining what were viable data, and obtaining said data. Sources were 
difficult to discover, and not easily accessible, sometimes due to the research in 
question.  Information on subversive activity (for example smuggling) is by its very 
nature couched in secrecy and reliable statistics are not possible to obtain. This has led 
to reliance on many secondary sources and official estimates where appropriate.   
 
Another obstacle was simply the security issues surrounding the upheaval in Côte 
d’Ivoire, hence my decision not to attempt to enter the country. Consequently, the 
focus has shifted to a much greater emphasis on Ghana.   
 
This work was been greatly informed by a field study in Ghana (2007), where I had the 
opportunity to conduct several unstructured interviews with local officials.  The field 
study was based in the area surrounding Sunyani, Ghana, chosen specifically due to 
the fact that it is the capital of the Brong-Ahafo region. Brong-Ahafo is located in the 
                                                     
4
 The border is in no way immutable, and when discussing ‘the border’ across many centuries, quite 
apparently it has not been in the same place, or used in the same sense.  A greater analysis of borders 
and boundaries will be undertaken in the second chapter of this thesis. 
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western region of Ghana, and borders Côte d’Ivoire.  I made contact with a local civil 
servant named Daniel Korkor, who facilitated introductions to other officials more 
involved with the border itself.  Although the field study did involve several 
unstructured interviews, there were challenges in obtaining government interviewees 
willing to discuss issues of border security.  Commenting on the inadequacy of 
resources and issues of smuggling is not always a topic that government officials are 
eager to discuss. 
 
The field study involved visits to several markets, including the market at Techiman.  
Data was also gathered at the border post at Sampa, although due to security 
concerns, I did not enter into Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Ghana is a relatively prosperous and stable African state, and the field study did not 
present many safety concerns.  I did feel that being an ‘outsider’, as well as a woman, 
may have restricted my ability to gather certain types of data or secure interviewees 
that may have been more willing to disclose information regarding subversive 
activities.  Particularly in Sunyani, I was frequently approached by Ghanaians 
interested in knowing my reason for being so far from the capital city.  Although not 
unexpected, it was apparent that my visual differences made it so that I was unable to 
conduct observations (in areas like the markets) without being conspicuous.   
 
I was also privileged to be able to undertake research at the library at the Centre 
d’étude d’Afrique Noire (CEAN) Bordeaux in 2006.  This access to French Africanist 
scholarship was very useful to the research on Côte d’Ivoire in particular.  As many of 
these sources have not been translated into English, I would have been somewhat 
restricted without the ability to read sources in French. 
 
I was invited to present a paper on what became the theoretical underpinning of this 
thesis at the African Borders Conference in Leuven in 2007.  This conference provided 
excellent feedback and greatly informed the direction of the thesis as a whole. 
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In terms of other sources, the bulk of information has been obtained from the 
literature (books, articles), unstructured interviews, and electronic sources (newspaper 
articles, other internet sites).  There has been perhaps a slight language limitation, 
although all official sources in French and English were easily comprehensible. 
 
Research Question 
The aim of this project is twofold.  The first is to add to the growing literature in the 
area of New Regionalism, by applying the NRA in a micro-regional analysis of the 
borderland between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. The second is explicitly one of 
questioning the prevailing ‘borders as negative’ assumption, which has been sprinkled 
throughout African political rhetoric even before much of the continent achieved 
independence.  The Pan-Africanist movement was particularly critical of the divisive 
and arbitrary nature of African borders, viewing them as an imposition of European 
colonial powers that have since led to the balkanization of the continent.  
 
Conversely, it is not my intention, however, to charge into the fray in defence of 
African borders.  By incorporating a tool for moral analysis, I hope to change the 
language of the debate to one centred on human functioning, thereby shifting the 
definitions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ as they pertain to African borders to ones that relate 
directly to the impact on Africans themselves.   
 
My hypothesis is that borders cannot be conceived in simplistic terms; they are the 
(sometimes unintended) tool through which individual agents attempt to achieve 
personal, political, economic, social, and security ends.  Therefore, the impact of 
borders can be both positive and negative. Borders can be both divisive, as well as 
points of convergence. Borders can be used to guard against violence and oppression, 
and can also be the method through which one is abused and exploited. 
 
Until we understand what is happening ‘on the ground’, the wider debates 
surrounding African regionalist integration at the macro-level will be lacking a real 
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depth of understanding. Rather, as Söderbaum and Taylor have suggested, by altering 
our ‘level’ of study towards the micro-region, we can perhaps inform and reflect those 
macro-regional processes.   
 
Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is broken into six chapters, the second of which engages the Capabilities 
Approach and its applicability to the study of micro-regionalism in Africa.  It will 
attempt to define the concepts used throughout this thesis and marry the NRA with 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach.  It concludes that her reliance on an Aristotelian 
conception of human flourishing is an appropriate framework with which to examine 
the positive and negative effects of West African borders. 
 
The historical background to modern African borders is examined in Chapter Three. A 
discussion of the history of African migrations undertaken, as well as a comparative 
look at British and French colonial rule and the subversion of the colonial state.  
Contrary to the view that Africans were the inactive inheritors of outside forces in the 
development of borders on the continent, this chapter will demonstrate that Africans, 
even during the colonial period, were very involved in the process of boundary-
making. Africans have had a long history of political engagement, and their interactions 
with the various colonial powers provided them with new opportunities to exercise 
that political power.  A general narrative of the history of the Ghanaian-Ivoirian region 
will also be outlined, in order to provide the historical context for subsequent 
chapters. 
 
The fourth chapter analyzes the way in which African borders provide positive avenues 
for self-preservation and economic survival, particularly in regions that may have very 
little in the way of ‘official’ economic opportunities.  The porous nature of the 
Ghanaian-Ivoirian border allows for the (sometimes illegal) transportation of goods, 
which can at times serve as a positive outcome for those with little choice.  In addition, 
the existence of the border (albeit with an inconsistent presence) is a key tool for 
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achieving safety from violence and political upheaval. Particularly in recent years, the 
flow towards Ghana during periods of escalating violence in Côte d’Ivoire has 
demonstrated a key use of borders as a means of sanctuary.  These positive uses will 
be explored in depth throughout this chapter. 
 
Chapter Five examines the way in which African borders can be used to oppress and 
abuse, particularly through the prevalent practice of human trafficking for the 
exploitation of women and children.  Child labour is an unfortunate feature of West 
Africa, and at the state-level many political agreements and international instruments 
have been recently employed to eradicate this practice, with little success.  By looking 
to the micro-level, we can see the pressures that continue to persist and encourage 
these practices, providing a possible explanation as to the failure of macro-level 
policies.  We will also challenge Martha Nussbaum’s piece in defence of the sale of 
bodily services, by demonstrating that in situations of desperation, true consent to 
exploitation is impossible to discern.  
 
The final chapter will provide an introduction to the rise of new technology and 
question its potential impact on West African regionalization more broadly.  The 
proliferation of wireless communications across the entire continent has begun to 
change the way in which Africans interact.  From criminal networks, to benevolent 
donations of money, wireless technology is opening up avenues for cross-border 
interactions that require no physical movement.  How likely it is to redefine the impact 
of physical borders is yet to be seen.   
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Chapter Two:  
The NRA and the Capabilities Approach 
Developing a moral framework for the study of African borders 
 
Political theory, as it is applied to Africa, continues to be a topic of debate in and of 
itself, and therefore it would be an injustice to undertake any large study of African 
politics without first acknowledging this reality, in order to come to terms with the 
theoretical framework of one’s own research.  Are the concepts and conclusions within 
political theory universally applicable or does there exist something theoretically 
distinctive about the nature of African politics, which sets it apart from other societies?  
Has the African reality of the 20th century been, on the whole, a creation of outside 
actors, or is it inherently the product of self-creation in the face of exterior forces?  
These types of questions are not an aside to the study of a given political situation in 
Africa, but are inextricable from any such endeavour, as the answers will set the 
parameters wherein the focus of enquiry is set. 
 
Many of the writings on the subject of African borders tend toward the bleak and are 
all too ready to dispense blame (Dowdon, 2009).  In contrast to the question of 
borders in other areas of the world, the studies on Africa seem more despondent than 
most.  Borders are seen as impediments to free movement, they divide peoples, even 
families.  They are the source of corruption and greed, and “are the sites and symbols 
of power” (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 1). What is curious is not that scholars take this 
position when discussing Africa, but rather, that frequently they do not justify their 
stance or ground the nature of their value judgement in a moral framework. 
 
Of late, there has been growing scholarship on the utility and function of borders, 
though generally still set in macro-level or state-centric approach (Donnan & Wilson, 
1999, p. 45). The setting up of boundaries between communities normally has the 
intended function of dividing peoples, and yet the outcome is not always congruent 
with the intention. Nugent’s (1996, p. 2) characterisation is very apt; he states, “while 
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the purpose of a border is to corral sets of people, creating either citizens or subjects, 
the reality is frequently that it sets up a zone of interaction rather than representing a 
genuine partition.” 
 
This zone of interaction is utilized by not only economic agents such as smugglers and 
traders, but also by families and communities.  For the individual entrepreneur, a 
border is an extremely functional tool, especially if it divides two distinct monetary 
systems.  In times of economic downturn in Ghana, for example, cocoa farmers were 
able to subsist by selling their crops across the border in Côte d’Ivoire, and vice versa 
(Nugent P. , 1996, p. 7). Without the border, separating not only the differing 
currencies but also the marketing boards, the individual farmer could not in many 
cases, have survived.  
 
Traders have been utilising a variety of routes in West Africa for centuries, though with 
the concretisation of boundaries these routes generally began to alter in order to take 
advantage of the variety of monetary systems, as well as banned or rare items.  In 
many cases, commodities such as alcohol were prohibited in certain colonies by the 
European power which controlled the area, whereas a neighbouring power did not.  
This lead to a huge opportunity to take advantage of supply and demand.  Many 
traders began and currently maintain routes along the coastal countries in West Africa, 
from Abidjan to Lagos. 
 
Borders, from colonial times to the present, are also used strategically by individuals in 
order to escape conscription, taxation and forced labour.  In the French Colonies, 
labour taxation (préstation) and forced labour (corvée) were two of the most loathed 
practices of the colonial government, whereby African subjects were required to leave 
their crops or jobs in order to participate in public plantations (champs administratifs), 
private plantations or road works (LeVine, 2004). Those who lived in borderlands had 
the opportunity of escaping the harsh directives of the colonial administration.  From 
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an example of the border between Zambia and Mozambique, we can see clear 
evidence of this type of strategy: 
Here was a place from which a choice of two sets of services, markets and 
sources of commodities would ensure a better deal, and indeed here was an 
area where the tax man had no sting.  In the borders people described 
membership to a community that transcended in a controllable manner their 
social networks in Mozambique and Zambia, and in which they had governance 
less subject to the strictures of the states on either side (Ken Wilson as cited in 
Nugent, 1996, p. 11). 
 
In Africa, perhaps more poignantly so than in other areas of the world, the role of 
borders assumes a significant function in the day-to-day existence of the individual 
faced with the predatory and neo-patrimonial state.  State disintegration usually hits 
hardest those furthest from the seat of power, normally these are the populations in 
the borders.  Aside from the individual entrepreneur, however, states and the state 
apparatus also utilize borders to their own ends.  This can take the form of turning a 
blind eye toward corruption of state officials at border crossings, to the promotion of 
smuggling networks for personal or public gain.  “States use boundaries as a tool in 
economic policy whether they are located in Europe, North America or Africa, and 
whether they are in the stage of developed industrialisation or in a period of economic 
under-development” (Svendsen, 1969, pp. 36-37). 
 
This thesis will attempt to dispel the view that African borders are inherently artificial 
and necessarily negative.  However, in order to make moral judgements on the effects 
of borders in Africa, one must develop a theoretical framework which can allow for 
such judgements. Moreover, traditionally questions of regionalism have been analyzed 
in a state-centric fashion, without reference to the informal regionalization which can 
occur at a grassroots level.  If this thesis is to examine local regionalization in Africa, 
and its positive or negative impact upon the lives of individuals, than a new framework 
of analysis must be developed which can tackle these types of questions. 
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In the discussion that follows we will raise questions regarding the neutrality of social 
science and the universalism of political theory. We will then examine the rise of the 
New Regionalism Approach (NRA), highlighting its advantages and disadvantages.  I will 
then contend that for the purposes of this thesis, the addition of Martha Nussbaum’s 
Capabilities Approach within the scope of the NRA provides for an appropriate moral 
analysis of borders in Africa.    
 
The Neutrality of Social Science  
As an aside, it seems auspicious to discuss briefly the (possible) neutrality of social 
scientific enquiry at large, prior to engaging the specifics of this project.  
Epistemological assumptions abound in any scientific investigation, whether 
consciously recognised or not.  Prior to any undertaking, we make various postulations, 
firstly, as to what there is to observe, and secondly, how we go about observing it.  The 
great debate between Empiricism and Rationalism still resonates today, and although 
Logical Positivism (the descendant of Empiricism) has come under heavy fire (Hollis, 
2000, p. 67) if one examines closely the projects of modern social scientists, perhaps it 
still has some foothold.  This debate does present some interesting questions, 
however: Is knowledge gained through the faculties of reason in the human mind, or is 
truth discovered through observation of exterior phenomena?  Should one approach 
the subject of enquiry with theory in hand, or rather does one develop a theory 
following the enquiry itself?   
 
Such musings have a decided tendency toward perpetual circularity – chicken or egg? – 
and perhaps it is more edifying to question what the two main approaches have in 
common.  Martin Hollis’ discussion (2000) of the reliance of both Empiricism and 
Rationalism on the objectivity of truth, provides an interesting query.  Is there an 
objective reality that we can perceive, and must philosophy rest on such firm 
foundations?  Hollis provides a convincing rejoinder, with the assistance of various 
theorists such as Karl Popper, W.O. Quine and Thomas Kuhn, and finds that the 
objectivity sought in both Empiricism and Rationalism is somewhat of a myth.  In truth, 
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the investigator approaches the observed with preconceived concepts, and employs 
such concepts based on human judgement (Hollis, 2000, p. 71). 
 
This leads nicely into a subset of the greater question of whether social science can be 
“neutral”, for this question of objectivity is, in fact, two-pronged. First, as discussed 
above, there is a claim of neutrality concerning the epistemology and methodology of 
social science.  However, the secondary, and interrelated debate rests on a supposed 
linguistic objectivity.  The notion that political words and ideas can be employed in a 
neutral sense, that in some way these words possess a ‘natural’ meaning, is an almost 
impossible position to defend.  And yet, many social scientists bandy political words 
about, without first acknowledging their imperfect definition or attempting to clarify 
their usage.  Moreover, those who tend toward a positivistic approach, might naturally 
assume that there does exist an objective meaning for a given political concept. 
 
There are many works which provide a counter to the positivist view of political 
terminology, mostly relying on the relationship between political ideas and the context 
in which they are used.  Miller’s critique of Burnham’s ‘rationalization’ of political 
concepts, wherein the latter attempts to distinguish ‘real’ from ‘formal’ meaning, 
states emphatically that political ideas cannot be understood independent of politics 
itself (Miller, 1965, p. 178). However, William Connolly’s work on the Terms of Political 
Discourse (1993) is perhaps the most poignant critique of the passive usage of political 
words and ideas, as it maintains that politics is at its core a debate over meanings, 
imperfectly shared.  To employ a given term (e.g. murder) in lieu of another term (i.e. 
manslaughter) is to make a judgement of a given phenomenon.  Therefore, political 
language is in fact intersubjective, with the articulator as the biased judge, employing a 
meaning that is socially-negotiated.  Yet, the interesting twist in Connolly’s thesis is 
that he does not perceive the subjectivity of political discourse as a problem.  The 
debate over meaning is the business of politics, not a precursor, an antecedent or an 
aside to it.  In attempting to convince you of my use of terminology to describe a 
particular phenomenon, I am essentially trying to obtain your agreement of my 
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viewpoint.  To describe is inherently to make a judgement.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, Connolly’s most poignant warning would have to be the following: “to 
adopt without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is to accept the terms of 
discourse loaded in favor of established practices” (1993, pp. 1-2). One must remain 
wary when employing highly-charged political terminology, and must endeavour to 
make explicit their usage, where possible. The definition of such essentially 
contestable concepts will be treated in this chapter. 
 
Universalism vs. Third-Worldism: Some initial thoughts 
Whether done deliberately or unconsciously, all analyses of politics are at minimum 
informed by a series of prior assumptions, even if they do not rely on an explicit 
theoretical paradigm.  It is, therefore, a grave oversight not to lay bare one’s own 
biases and political leanings with the overt concretisation of first, a theoretical 
framework in which to place one’s study, and second, an outline of one’s conceptual 
approach.  The clarification will ultimately serve a dual function: to deal honestly with 
one’s own predispositions as much is possible, and to demarcate the boundaries of 
investigation.  The latter of these functions is crucial, for there cannot be any effective 
observation in the absence of a clarification of what you already – albeit perhaps 
incorrectly – expect to find.  As stated above, the claim that the social scientist has the 
ability to approach a subject of political enquiry with complete neutrality is a 
somewhat untenable position to take.  In order to observe, one must first, at least to 
some degree, delineate the subject of observation. 
 
In undertaking a study of African politics in particular, it quickly becomes apparent that 
almost all works seem to rely on one of two theoretical assumptions, namely what I 
will demarcate as Universalism and Third-Worldism. The latter is the purview of many 
development scholars, and those who defend the position that the developing world 
cannot be understood through a Eurocentric, Western lens.  Traditional political 
science, having its roots in the evolution of Western thought from Plato to NATO, is ill-
equipped to comprehend the unique political reality of sub-Saharan Africa.  Indeed 
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there is a fair point in these claims of the Third-Worldism approach, and perhaps the 
leading International Relations (IR) paradigms of realism and liberalism leave much to 
be desired. 
 
However, there is another question related to this debate, regarding the investigator 
and the agents of investigation.  Who has the right to study whom?  Particularly with 
regard to African politics, we are faced with the question of where non-African 
researchers fit in the scheme of investigation.  This, I contend, ties into the debate 
surrounding Third-Worldism, as again, it can be seen to be the imposition of a Western 
focus, on what is uniquely an African subject.  Most useful to my own research, is a 
paper written by Marlize Rabe on the role of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in social 
research.  In her paper, Rabe (2003) begins by examining the counter arguments for 
use of outsiders as researchers and the disadvantages of not possessing local, insider 
knowledge.  Not being aware of one’s position as outsider, and not attempting to 
understand local conditions through local eyes, can result in extremely skewed results.  
Rabe discusses the inequality of power relations between outside researcher and 
those being researched, in that the investigator has the upper-hand.  It is the 
researcher’s account of the situation which is published, and not necessarily the 
account of the individual being researched.   
 
However, Rabe makes an interesting point with regard to the role of the insider as 
researcher, in that at times this can work to one’s disadvantage, as there are certain 
social norms and practices which may inhibit the insider from finding answers.  In the 
end, Rabe concludes that if one makes a conscious effort to take into account his or 
her own shortcomings as researcher – whether insider or outsider – then either 
perspective can provide a narrative which furthers our knowledge of the subject of 
enquiry (Rabe, 2003). 
 
The second of our theoretical paradigms is what I have classified as Universalism.  This 
is the view that politics, regardless of the idiosyncrasies of continent and state, can be 
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studied under the rubric of common theoretical approaches.  In this respect, I draw 
much from the framework devised in Patrick Chabal’s edited piece on Political 
Domination in Africa (1986). In the introduction to the book, as a theoretical exposition 
to underlie the subsequent contributions by a variety of Africanists, Chabal states that 
Universalism is better suited to the understanding of African politics, rather than 
restricting oneself to the confines of narrower theories. In this way, he and the other 
scholars, prefer “an approach grounded in universal political theory rather than in the 
theory of political development (or dependence) devised for Third World countries 
today” (Chabal, 1986, p. 1).  It is a strategy that combines common political theory, 
with the growing knowledge of African history, which previously was not readily 
available.  In this way, a Universalist epistemological and methodological toolset can 
be applied to local contexts, without resorting to Third-Worldism. 
 
One final note to this brief discussion is the underlying condescension which 
inadvertently seems to accompany Third-Worldism, whether or not applied by African 
scholars themselves.  To claim that African politics is theoretically distinct from politics 
the world over, I contend, does a serious injustice to the reality of sub-Saharan Africa.  
It is not that the politics are inherently different, but rather that the context and 
history of the political arena in Africa may not always correspond to the Western 
reality.  Therefore, this thesis will employ a more Universalist approach to political 
theory, in the examination of regionalism in West Africa, while attempting to be as 
explicit as to the possible biases held by its author. 
 
A Defining Moment 
In furthering the attempt to contend with possible biases, it would do well to tackle 
the definitions of many of the concepts employed within this piece.  For instance, the 
term ‘region’ itself is a contestable concept, and can be casually employed (along with 
its various derivations).  But what is a region? How is it defined? How permanent is any 
characterisation?  What is the exact differentiation between the terms ‘regionalism’ 
and ‘regionalization’?  These are questions whose answers are essential to any 
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discussion of regionalism, in that the ill-defined usage of the terminology will only seek 
to unravel one’s argument.  In this section, we will endeavour to make explicit the 
definition of these concepts. 
 
Region and Regionness 
Of the three, ‘region’ seems at first to be the most obvious in definition, if only that the 
noun presents quite a clear image in our minds.  A region is necessarily geographical in 
some sense and the delineation of its borders outlines its members and those outside 
of it.  It “can be distinguished as a territorial subsystem (in contrast with non-territorial 
subsystems) from the rest of the international system” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 
10).  However, further to this basic understanding, there lies a deeper appreciation of 
‘region’, of which the NRA distinguishes further characteristics.  Firstly, a region is 
neither natural nor given, rather it is a socially-constructed entity, the product of a 
given context and perspective (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 10).  Moreover, regions 
can overlap, and their borders may be more or less fluid, with varying levels of 
‘regionness’.  Regionness is analogous to concepts such as ‘stateness’ and ‘nationness’ 
(Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 10) and can vary in increasing and decreasing degrees.  
The relationship between region (the noun) and regionness (with the suffix ‘–ness’ to 
indicate a state or degree of the noun) is an important one for the NRA.  The purpose 
of the NRA is not to concretise the various global regions, but rather “to determine the 
role of regions in the current global transformation and analyse the origins, dynamics, 
and consequences of regionalism in various fields of activity: this is, increasing and 
decreasing levels of regionness” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 10). 
 
Unlike earlier definitions, the NRA does not view regions as mere collections of states, 
and indeed regions can cut across any given state.  For example, there are various 
parts of China which could be classified as part of the East Asian region, to the 
exclusion of mainland China (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 15).  
Furthermore, it can be argued that regions can only be identified post factum, that 
along the regionalization process they are simply ‘potential’ or ‘emerging’ regions.  
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This leads to a rather protean definition of region, the fluidity of which is sometimes 
advocated.  “It is therefore fruitful to maintain eclectic and open-minded definitions of 
regions, particularly in the lower stages of regionness and as far as their outer 
boundaries are concerned, which often tend to be the most blurred” (Hettne & 
Söderbaum, 1998, p. 10).  Due to the fact that there can be more or less regionness, 
the delineation of any given region is thus an inexact art. 
 
Regionalism 
Semantically, regionalism is perhaps the most difficult of our concepts to grapple with.  
The suffix ‘-ism’ presents many interpretations and meanings, which is probably the 
primary reason for the innumerable ways in which the concept of ‘regionalism’ is 
employed.  Firstly, our suffix can indicate a quality or condition, in the simple sense 
that regionalism is a phenomenon.  Secondly, the suffix can signify a doctrine, so that 
regionalism is understood as an ideology.  And lastly, regionalism can imply an action, 
process or practice, or rather the “urge for a regionalist order” (Hettne, Inotai, & 
Sunkel, 2000, p. xxii).  Generally, this last interpretation allows for a certain moral 
undertone, and typically sees regionalism as a good.   
 
The complexity and convolution of meaning does promote a certain obfuscation of the 
discussion at hand, particularly with the differentiation between ideology and process.  
For the purposes of this work, therefore, regionalism will be employed to indicate 
either the condition or the ideology of regions, and not the action nor processes of 
increasing or decreasing regionness.  This will fall under the concept of 
‘regionalization’. 
 
Regionalization 
Regionalization is quite straightforward as a term, the rub of which seems only to be 
its overlap with ‘regionalism’.  The word itself possesses an “activist element” (Hettne, 
Inotai, & Sunkel, 2000, p. xxii), and quite obviously suggests a process. What is 
essential to note, is that the regionalization process is not teleological and that the 
various forces which impinge upon it may propel a region toward greater or lesser 
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cohesiveness.  Bringing our definitions together, therefore, our consideration of this 
concept will conform to the general usage, which understands regionalization to be 
the process by which a given geographical unit (or region) follows the trajectory of 
regionalism, with increasing or decreasing degrees of regionness.   
 
Globalization  
Globalization is not only a contestable concept; it is one that is, strangely, not applied 
globally (Moore, 2001, p. 909). Taylor (2005) contends that the use of the term 
globalization in scholarly research tends to reflect the bias of the author, and that 
these attempts to understand globalization do so in a way that ignores much of the 
global community.   Africa in particular has been ignored in the globalization discourse, 
and Taylor notes that this omission (among others) results in a concept that is not truly 
‘global.’ 
 
Globalization is a term that is frequently employed in the absence of robust 
conceptualization.  This is not entirely surprising given the wide range of processes and 
phenomena that this single term is said to encompass.  Broadly, however, as Taylor 
notes, globalization “might be said to capture those processes that underpin 
contemporary global economic integration and the political, social, cultural, ecological 
and gender outcomes that this engenders” (2005, p. 1026).  
 
This global process of integration can subvert or transcend the traditional divisions 
among the domestic, regional and international. And although many studies of 
globalization may ignore Africa, Moore (2001) argues that this process “affects Africa 
profoundly” (p. 910).  He goes on to state that “colonial boundaries and their states 
are falling apart, but they are not disappearing” (Moore, 2001, p. 910).   
 
Globalization in this work is understood as a non-linear process marked by increased 
economic and social linkages among states (and non-state actors). In the Ghanaian-
Ivoirian borderland, globalization is not merely an abstract concept. As will be 
24 
 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, to paraphrase Moore, these macro-level 
processes have a real impact in Africa.  
  
Borders, Boundaries and Frontiers...oh my! 
To discuss the phenomenon of regionalism in the absence of a clear account of the 
role of borders is almost to put the cart before the horse.  In order to understand the 
variety of interactions between peoples, it would first be useful to outline the division 
between them, whether that is a physical boundary or a symbolic one.  Communities 
of people may define themselves in opposition to others, and demarcate the limit of 
its ‘same-ness’ through cultural artefacts, shared histories, language, and physical 
space.  The debate as to whether nations are in some way objective and timeless, or 
essentially ‘imagined’ (Anderson B. , 1991) is not really the issue at hand. What is at 
the crux of this discussion is not the objective reality of communities, but rather the 
view that because the community imagines its collective to be real it takes on a reality 
and expresses itself in contrast to other communities. They believe, therefore they are. 
 
Once this community defines itself, the question of how it physically controls the 
interaction of its members and members of neighbouring communities brings to the 
fore the role of borders.  In this section, we will commence with an attempt to define 
the various contestable concepts which are haphazardly used with reference to 
borders.  
 
As with all political discourse, the multitude of terms, and the subsequent waves of 
their individual usage provides a myriad of possible concepts one could employ, with a 
corresponding flood of interpretations on the part of the reader.  Thus, our attempt to 
clarify the usage of these terms will also serve to make plain the argument of this 
piece.  Employing a method similar to that of Malcolm Anderson (1996) we will begin 
with the broadest of terms, that of frontier. 
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The concept of frontier has its roots in military usage, meaning the “front line or 
foremost part of an army,”5 and many of its varied definitions combine two main 
aspects, firstly, the notion of line or barrier, and secondly, and perhaps most 
significantly, the concept of ‘facing’ or ‘fronting’ another entity, whether country or 
army.  Then again, there are definitions which seek to overcome previous 
understandings and cast frontier in a new light.  Allot (1969, p. 9) sees the frontier not 
only a physical concept, but a functional one:  “a frontier is a boundary at which inter-
state functions are applied.”   
 
Another derivation the concept of frontier is tied to the notion of expansion and 
empire, as was the case with the American myth of the western frontier.  The frontier 
is therefore never a permanent delineation of space, though it may not move for 
decades or even centuries, but rather is the outer-most demarcation of the 
community, with the inherent assumption of further expansion.  “Thus the frontier 
was not the end…but rather the beginning…of the state; it was the spearhead of light 
and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown” (Kristof, as 
cited in Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 48).  Kristof sees frontiers as inherently outer-
oriented, “with their attention directed to those areas of friendship and danger which 
exist beyond the state” (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 48).  Although frontier is 
commonly used synonymously along with terms such as border to indicate the precise 
line of demarcation between two states, in its widest meaning it can also refer to a 
region, such as the zone between France and Germany of Alsace-Lorraine (Anderson 
M. , 1996, p. 9).   Hence, the term can create a great of deal of confusion due to, not 
only the depth of its meaning (military, political, cultural), but also the breadth of its 
meaning (fine line, wide region, symbolic zone). 
 
The next concept is that of border, and the related term of borderland.  Usually 
understood as the line of delimitation between states, it (as with frontier) is also 
employed to encapsulate the area of interaction surrounding the line.  Therefore, we 
                                                     
5
 From the Oxford English Dictionary 
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can conceptualise the Canada-U.S. border as a clearly defined line along the 43rd and 
49th parallels, but are just as easily able to grasp the notion of the Scottish borders as a 
small region which neighbours England (Anderson M. , 1996, p. 9). A border thus 
becomes both a concrete line, as well as the zone surrounding it.6  The term 
borderland has been developed to encapsulate more clearly the latter definition, 
though the two have been used synonymously.  Unlike frontier, however, border does 
not possess an expansionist element, or a necessarily outward-orientated quality.   
 
Boundary is our last and most narrow of terms, although it too has been applied to 
wider phenomena. Malcolm Anderson (1996, p. 9) defines boundary as, “the line of 
delimitation or demarcation” but notes that it also has been used to “refer to the 
frontier of political and administrative authorities below the state level” (1996, p. 10).  
Most conceptualisations of political boundary do encompass the idea of the extent of 
authority and sovereignty, as well as a spatial limit.  Kristof further defines boundary, 
in contrast to frontier, as innately inner-oriented (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 48).  
 
For our purposes, usage of these various terms will be confined to the following.  In 
order to circumvent the complexities of the frontier debate, this piece will favour the 
concepts of border and borderland to depict the region of interaction which occurs 
along the boundary that divides communities and/or states. The etymology and 
military heritage of the term frontier, along with its expansionist undertones, does not 
seem an apt description of the phenomena this research aims to study.   And although, 
the term boundary can be construed as useful in the sense that it is narrow, I will also 
                                                     
6
 A further abstraction of the notion of borders has been elaborated in the concept of border 
landscapes.  Donnan and Wilson (1999, 46-47) refer to a continuing research interest of Rumley and 
Minghi who note that the definition of border areas remains relatively ignored. Border landscapes are 
“those areas contiguous to the state boundary which are moulded by the human and physical 
environment, including the boundary itself” (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, 47).  This concept appears almost 
synonymous with borderland, though it does seem to go further than mere definition and possesses the 
underlying current of propelling the research agenda.  
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tend to prefer the terms border and borderland for the reasons listed above, but also 
to maintain a relative consistency with the prevailing literature this area of study. 
 
I am aware that these characterizations are neither perfect, nor wholly distinct from 
one another, and that especially in African politics, the apparatus of the state does not 
always feature on the border itself. 
 
Out with the old: Old Regionalism and the NRA 
The slippery concept of ‘regionalism’ has been conceptualised in the past in very stark 
contrast to many current definitions prevailing in social scientific research.  Modern 
regionalism is said to have occurred in two fairly distinct waves in the post-World War 
II era (Farrell, Hettne, & Van Langenhove, 2005, p. 7), the first of which can be 
understood as the paradigm of Old Regionalism.  Prior to engaging the subject of Old 
Regionalism, it would be wise to note that the use of the adjective ‘old’ should not be 
interpreted as the complete passing of the previous paradigm, superseded by the 
‘new’ regionalism.  Perhaps one day the paradigmatic shift will occur, but as with all 
changes to a body of theory there exists a time – sometimes centuries in duration – 
where two competing paradigms co-exist (Hollis, 2000, p. 84).  Old Regionalism still 
maintains supporters (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 5), and therefore use of 
the New Regionalism cannot be summarily employed without discussion of the 
shortcomings of the former and advantages of the latter. 
 
Old Regionalism  
The study of regionalism following the Second World War began in the 1950s, in light 
of the growing cooperation in Europe with the development of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) (Farrell, Hettne, & Van Langenhove, 2005, p. 7).  As with all 
politics of that era, one cannot understand the first wave of regionalism without 
reference to the global context in which it arose, namely the bipolar structure of the 
Cold War international system.  Indeed, many authors of the New Regionalism point 
toward the inextricable link between regionalism and global politics (Farrell, Hettne, & 
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Van Langenhove, 2005); (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003).  Hettne et. al. states emphatically 
that, “regionalism is one approach to deal with various global problems, but its content 
will be conditioned by the nature of these problems” (2000, p. xx). Invariably, Cold War 
politics influenced not only the manner in which regionalism began to emerge, but also 
coloured the academic analysis of the phenomenon.  Hence, the realist vein becomes 
very apparent in the characteristics of Old Regionalism discussed below. 
 
The first feature of Old Regionalism is its state-centric approach, with regionalism 
falling within the purview of state actors.  As with most depictions of international 
politics during the Cold War, regionalism was understood as integration among states, 
through the medium of government-led treaties and the formation of inter-state 
institutions.  There existed a variety of theories to account for regionalism during this 
era, for example, IR realists could interpret regionalism as a strategic choice, which 
states would employ to garner increased security and power.  Neo-functionalists, 
however, could see integration as a series of economic spillovers, “with actors 
transferring their expectations and loyalties to a supranational central authority” 
(Farrell, Hettne, & Van Langenhove, 2005, p. 7). Even though in this latter theory the 
state is seemingly more passive, in that the theory has a teleological undercurrent, in 
both neo-functionalist and realist theory, the primary actor is still the state.  “In 
essence, integration was an intergovernmental phenomenon” (Farrell, Hettne, & Van 
Langenhove, 2005, p. 7). 
 
The second characteristic of Old Regionalism is its circumscribed applicability due to its 
dependence on the European experience, or rather that it is Eurocentric.  The 
assumption that regionalization is a process which possesses a particular trajectory, of 
which the EU model is the epitome, leaves a huge void of political phenomena 
unaccounted for under the framework of Old Regionalism.  Regionalization outwith 
formal political and economic channels does not even appear on the radar and is thus 
ignored.  In the case of Africa, where informal economic channels sometimes outweigh 
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the ‘formal’ economy, the narrow confines of Old Regionalism provide quite a skewed 
image. 
 
Hegemonic influence and imposition from above is another key feature of the Old 
Regionalism (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 4).  The reality of US hegemony 
throughout the Cold War meant that the various forms of ‘new’ regionalism did not 
have as much space to develop.  The characteristics of New Regionalism (which will be 
discussed below) were not given “room-for-manoeuvre….This type of regionalism 
would not have been consistent with the Cold War system since the ‘quasi-regions’ of 
that system tended to reproduce the dualist bipolar structure within themselves” 
(Hettne, Inotai, & Sunkel, 2000, p. xx).   
 
The last of the main features of the first wave of regionalism, is its introverted and 
protectionist quality.  As the first wave was primarily economic in nature, regional 
institutions had a neo-mercantilist aura about them; a bulwark against the 
globalization of markets.  The European experience, with its agricultural policies and 
industrial endeavours provides a perfect example.  
 
Obviously, many of these characteristics were a product of the global political reality of 
the Cold War, and this is not to claim that analyses of Old Regionalism were off-the-
mark.  Indeed, academic accounts of regionalism during the first wave may have 
provided a fairly accurate depiction of a budding phenomenon.  However, with the end 
of the Cold War, and the rise of the second wave of regionalization, the drawbacks of 
the old paradigm begin to show. 
 
The New Regionalism Approach (NRA) 
Starting in the 1990s, though accounting for a phenomenon which had its roots in the 
1980s, research into the ‘new wave’ of regionalism has provided a very distinct 
account of integration.  If regionalism is understood “within a particular historical 
context,” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998, p. 6) and it “needs to be related to the current 
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transformation of the world” (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 3), it stands to 
reason that the collapse of the bipolar world order would have had a huge impact on 
the structure of international relations.  This has manifested itself not only in the 
academic approach to the study of regionalism, but also to the phenomenon of 
regionalism itself.  Spearheaded by scholars like Bjorn Hettne, this new paradigm has 
been dubbed the New Regionalism Approach, or NRA.  
 
One of the primary underlying characteristics of the NRA is the expansion of what 
constitutes an agent for the purposes of regionalism, or rather that it is multi-actor and 
multi-level (Hettne, Inotai, & Sunkel, 2000, p. xx).  In Old Regionalism, we noted that 
the processes were the purview of states and state-actors alone, leaving analyses with 
a very distinct and narrow lens.  In the NRA, regionalization is a process actively, and 
passively, promoted or discouraged through the actions of states, as well as the private 
cross-border entrepreneur, not to mention the multitude of group actors in between 
(Grant & Söderbaum, 2003, p. 5).  Regionalization can be encouraged by trans-state 
organisations, charities, religious groups and even families, thus opening up the 
academic study of integration, and allowing for a greater depth of understanding.  The 
process can therefore be at once more ‘formal’ (i.e. multi-national trade organisations, 
ECOWAS) as well as ‘informal’ (i.e. cross-border smuggling), but it is the sum of these 
interactions which accounts for the rise or decline of regionalism in a given 
geographical unit. 
 
Hence, in relation to this first characteristic, we find that the NRA naturally provides a 
multi-disciplinary approach (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 4). Due to the fact 
that regionalization occurs at so many levels, between a variety of actors, scholars in 
fields other than IR are provided an arena to investigate the causes and impacts of this 
second wave.  The role of the transmission of diseases, the consequences of 
borderland familial ties, the importance of religious pilgrimage are all topics which 
have been studied in other disciplines, but which are now able to engage with 
regionalism itself.  This depth is one of the most stark contrasts with Old Regionalism, 
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which sees integration in very politico-strategic or economic terms, but ignores the 
informal, and sometimes more poignant modes of regionalization. 
 
Rather than being imposed from above, the third characteristic of the NRA is that 
regionalism becomes a product of the responses to pressures from both within and 
without.  At the risk of sounding platitudinous, the NRA is very much a “grassroots” 
process, while at the same time still encompassing the formal actions of states.  If any 
private actor engaging in trans-state activity can impact on the trajectory of 
regionalism in the area, then indeed regionalism ceases to be confined within the 
ambit of ‘high’ politics.  The unique method of the NRA allows for the sometimes 
competing, sometimes complementary forces of regionalization to be examined 
contiguously, encompassing “’formal’, top-down, state-driven or…’real’ bottom-up, 
market- and society-induced processes” (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 16). 
 
Also, in opposition to Old Regionalism, this new breed is much more extroverted in 
character, and seems, for the most part, to have abandoned its neo-mercantilist edge 
(Schulz, Söderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 4).  The origin of the first wave regionalization 
was very much rooted in a protectionist foundation, whereas the increasing degree of 
inter-regional trade displays something distinctive and unique in this new form of 
regionalism.  Schulz et. al. sees this growing trend as a reflection of “the deeper 
interdependence of today’s global political economy” (2001, p. 4). 
 
Inextricably linked to all of these characteristics is the indelible and interdependent 
relationship between this new regionalism and globalization (Bach, 2004, p. 70).  Some 
scholars see the increased regional integration as a form of protection against the 
globalization process, still others see the impact of the opening of the global market on 
informal markets and the criminalisation of trans-border trade. And despite the fact 
that there are a plethora of definitions of globalization, and therefore some divergence 
of meaning, almost all scholars who employ the NRA paradigm acknowledge this link.  
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As Schulz et al. succinctly states, “if globalization is the challenge, the new regionalism 
can be a response” (2001, p. 16). 
 
The NRA is a radical overhaul of the way in which regionalism is approached from an 
academic standpoint, although it has very real implications for policy-makers and 
governments.  Obviously, the opening up of the field has provided a greater scope of 
enquiry, the possible questions and answers multiplying exponentially, and hopefully 
this will encourage a greater depth and breadth of understanding.  With what we gain 
in the increased scope of the NRA, we must also acknowledge that the greater 
complexity can also be a burden.  It is therefore even more imperative to outline with 
precision the focus of investigation, for if one had the inclination, he could really get 
quite carried away with the extent and scale of questions and answers. 
 
Options for a Moral Analysis  
Although the NRA allows for a study of African borders, which is broader in scope and 
cross-disciplinary in nature, alone it does not necessarily provide a robust analytical 
tool for all elements of new regionalist study.  The focus of this thesis questions the 
morality in the use of African borders more broadly, and in particular the borderland 
area of interaction between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  The NRA provides a framework 
which acknowledges a grassroots, micro-regionalization process, but does not 
inherently possess a means of evaluating whether that regionalization is good or bad.  
What is necessary, I maintain, for the purposes of this study, is to incorporate a moral 
analysis within the NRA.  
 
There are a variety of moral approaches that one can bring to the question of borders 
in Africa; however, one persuasive argument comes from Martha Nussbaum, with a 
starting point focused on the quality of life.  Certainly, in this attempt to analyze the 
utility of African borders, a moral judgement on their positive or negative aspects must 
include their impacts upon people.  As an alternative, Nussbaum first enumerates 
three primary methods of moral analysis, from a development standpoint, which she 
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groups under three headings: resource-, preference-, and human rights-based. She 
finds all of these approaches lacking (Nussbaum M. , 2002). 
 
One common approach in examining the quality of life in a given geographical location 
is to base the analysis on economic factors, such as the GDP per capita.  Although the 
health of an economy can provide insights into the overall development of a nation, 
Nussbaum argues that what resource-based approaches offer is much less significant 
than what they omit (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 126).  GDP per capita cannot inform us 
as to the distribution of wealth, political liberties, nor really provide information about 
the quality of life of a given socio-economic group within the nation.  Furthermore, 
simplistic resource-based approaches, such as GDP per capita, are essentially state-
centric and limit studies based on regional analyses that cross state boundaries and do 
not conform to political-geographical divisions. 
 
Most importantly for Nussbaum, however, is that resource-based approaches cannot 
account for the fact that “individuals vary in their ability to convert resources into 
functionings” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 127).   By ‘functionings’, Nussbaum is referring 
to those capabilities that individuals are able to exercise. That is to say, that even given 
identical resources, needs may dictate that Person A requires greater resources to 
achieve a certain functioning in contrast to Person B. For example, “women’s literacy 
will prove more expensive than men’s literacy in many parts of the world. If we 
operate only with an index of resources, we will frequently reinforce inequalities that 
are highly relevant to well-being” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 127).  This issue of 
capabilities will be dealt with, in depth, in the section which follows.  
 
The second common approach is what Nussbaum dubs ‘preference-based’.  Despite 
that fact that this approach has certain advantages over the resource-based 
approaches, Nussbaum still finds that overall it is faced with many difficulties.  
Preference-based analysis tends to extrapolate the effect of resources on people’s 
lives by asking individuals “about their satisfaction with their current preferences” 
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(Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 127). Nussbaum notes a serious flaw in this approach, as it 
assumes that preferences are somehow exogenous, when in reality preferences can be 
constructed by socio-economic conditions. For example, a woman who has no 
conception of herself as having equal worth, might prefer to be excluded from political 
activity.  Simply asking her to rate her degree of satisfaction with reference to political 
engagement, may reinforce socially-embedded inequalities, rather than demonstrating 
a need for change.   
 
Finally, the last of the approaches in the field of development studies comes from 
human rights discourse.  Nussbaum recognizes the gains made by human rights 
approaches, and yet finds that they possess certain flaws due to contested definitions 
and lack of success in tackling pertinent questions of social justice owing to their 
circumscribed purview.  To employ the language of ‘rights’, according to Nussbaum, 
brings with it a great deal of definitional baggage:  what are rights, how do they relate 
to duties, what are they rights to etc.  Moreover, human rights discourse has flowed 
from a particular tradition of political philosophy linked with “negative liberty, and 
with the idea of protecting the individual from state action” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 
129).  This state-based focus of ‘rights’ limits the applicability to other areas of human 
well-being that have traditionally not been within the public realm. For example, 
Nussbaum points to the lack of action on areas such as domestic violence and bodily 
threats suffered by women.   
 
Nussbaum concludes her survey of approaches by putting forward a new account of 
social justice based on human capabilities. And it is to this approach that we now turn. 
 
Capabilities Approach Presented 
Developed alongside Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has in the past twenty years 
brought her unique neo-Aristotelian focus to the areas of international development 
and social justice.  In response to the primarily economics-based literature in these 
areas, Nussbaum and Sen proposed a shift of focus from preference-based, rights-
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based or resourced-based approaches to one that is embedded in human capabilities.  
It was not, they argued, enough to simply take the GNP per capita and then rank states 
based on the ‘freedom’ of their citizens. This economic focus does not take into 
account the distribution of that wealth, and takes no interest in other impediments to 
freedom (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 126).  Moreover, preference-based approaches, 
although more agent-centred, are not satisfactory in gauging human flourishing in that 
an individual’s preferences may be themselves socially-constructed.  And finally, rights-
based approaches have conceptual difficulties, and are too often “linked with the idea 
of negative liberty” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, pp. 128-129). 
 
Nussbaum begins her study of international development through a feminist lens, 
although her approach is universally applicable to both genders. The argument 
commences with an array of statistics regarding the relative vulnerability and poverty 
of women in relation to their male counterparts in almost all parts of the world.  
“*Women+ are less well nourished than men, less healthy, more vulnerable to physical 
violence and sexual abuse.  They are much less likely than men to be literate, and still 
less likely to have preprofessional or technical education,” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 
124) and so on.  On the whole, Nussbaum claims that women “lack support for the 
fundamental functions of human life.” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 124).  And it is this 
conception of the ‘functionality’ of human life that becomes the focus for the rest of 
her argument.   
 
Essentially, the question of social justice more specifically, and international 
development more broadly, boils down to a conception of ‘the good life’.  What 
underpins Nussbaum’s approach is an Aristotelian account of the purpose of human 
life, and of eudaimonia (or human flourishing).  It takes the subject of study back a few 
steps, and begins with the question of what we are as human beings. This might seem 
a strange and perhaps unnecessary aside, but in fact any real attempt to tackle the 
questions of the positive or negative impact of borders in West Africa should require 
an understanding of the human condition. 
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Most people would agree that as living creatures we require certain necessities such as 
food and shelter.  However, is this where the provision ends? To answer such a 
question, we must first understand what type of animal humans are.  For Nussbaum, 
humans are replete with abilities, and it is the possession of these abilities which 
“exert a moral claim” for their development.  
 
What do we mean by human capabilities?  
For Nussbaum, it is a false start to question social justice by tallying the resources one 
is able to possess, or to ask individuals how they feel about their situation. Instead, the 
primary question must be, “what is [the agent] actually able to do and to be?”  The 
Capabilities Approach focuses on potential human functionings, and the extent to 
which humans are able to flourish in a truly human way. 
 
This subsection was explicitly titled to emphasise the ‘human’ aspect of capabilities. 
Nussbaum makes it quite clear that her approach relies on two interrelated ideas: 
firstly, “that there are certain functions that are particularly central in human life, in 
the sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the 
presence or absence of human life” (Nussbaum M. , 2002, p. 130). Secondly, turning to 
a Marxist interpretation of Aristotle, that the performance of these functions must 
occur in a human way, namely that these functions are imbued with a certain 
reasoning and sociability. Marx gives an example of a starving man, whose relationship 
to food might be more akin to that of an animal in his desperation for sustenance. His 
feeding might lack that second criterion of the fully human element of functioning. In 
the end, for Nussbaum, “the core idea seems to be that of the human being as a 
dignified free being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively shaped 
or pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal,” (Nussbaum 
M. , 2002, p. 130). 
 
This concept of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, is at the crux of the Capabilities 
Approach. 
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Eudaimonia explored 
The concept of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, comes from ancient Greek 
philosophy and is tied to the field of virtue ethics.  It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
delve into ancient philosophy or propose a modern use of virtue ethics. However, it 
would do well to draw at least a rudimentary depiction of the Aristotelian 
understanding of eudaimonia, as it forms the basis from which Nussbaum has 
developed the Capabilities Approach. 
 
Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics, presents the concept of eudaimonia, which is 
most commonly translated “as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’ and occasionally as ‘well-
being’.” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 9)  This is related to virtue, in that the purpose of 
acquiring and developing any set of virtues is that they are essential to human 
flourishing (eudaimonia).  Whatever the contestations of what constitutes the virtues 
themselves, the value of virtues is that they allow us to pursue the good life (however 
understood). 
 
The second concept to grasp is that of phronesis, or rather practical wisdom, without 
which the virtues cannot lead to flourishing.  Phronesis, which can only be properly 
developed through experience and the course of time, allows one fully to appreciate 
the intricacies of practical situations and the action required therein.  “For it is practical 
reason that integrates the different ends of character, refining and assessing them, and 
ultimately issuing in all considered judgements of what is best and finest to do” 
(Sherman, 1989, p. 5). For example, the virtue of benevolence can run counter to 
eudaimonia, when phronesis is lacking. Hence, we have persons who are described as 
‘too generous’, unable to see when they are being preyed upon and abused. Thus, this 
virtue seems to cease being a virtue in absence of this practical wisdom. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre, a leading modern figure in the semantics of virtue, has 
distinguished its many incarnations over history and has found that it has had a 
plethora of meanings.  Our inability to grapple with the notion of virtue lies in the fact 
that we have lost our moral language and in the complexity of seemingly simply words 
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like virtue.  Virtue in the Homeric age, the Greek aretē (αρετη), had a very unique 
meaning in that it was inextricably related to one’s social role.  Indeed, one could not 
be described as agathos (αγαθόs), loosely translated as ‘good’, unless he possessed the 
aretē of his allotted function. “The aretē of a king lies in ability to command, of a 
warrior in courage, of a wife in fidelity, and so on” (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 8). However, 
this definition did not remain unaltered, and the Sophists had a reinterpretation of 
aretē, which was defined as one’s “functioning well as a man.” (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 14)  
At that time, ‘functioning well’ referred to a man’s ability to exude the knowledge of 
citizenship, and specifically the laws of a given city-state.  Indeed, many other 
interpretations of aretē would follow, not the least of which Aristotle’s view which 
tended to set the aretē of men above that of women.   
 
Aristotle himself formulated a list of virtues, corresponding to ‘spheres of experience’, 
seemingly shared by humans alike.  For example, the shared experience of death has, 
according to Aristotle, the corresponding virtue of courage.  Martha Nussbaum (1993) 
investigates the question of the non-relativity of Aristotle’s list of virtues, saying that 
although these virtues are not definitive, their study should allow for an evolution of 
understanding not unlike that in the sciences.  The utility of elucidating these shared 
human ‘spheres of experience’ (or grounding experiences as she calls them), allows for 
a point of departure, as it “fixes a subject for further inquiry.” (Nussbaum M. , 1993, p. 
247).   
 
Elaboration of Capabilities 
In her seminal work, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 
Nussbaum gets down to the nitty gritty business of elaborating a list of capabilities she 
deems to be central to human functioning.  Although not without caveats, the ten 
items on the list provide a great starting point from which to examine the extent to 
which one can be said to be free and flourishing.  As separate components of human 
flourishing, the ten capabilities are nonetheless interrelated.  Nussbaum emphasises 
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that all ten capabilities are equally important, and therefore one cannot exchange 
some of one element for more of another (Nussbaum M. , 2000, p. 81).  
 
Taken directly from Nussbaum’s piece, Women and Human Development (2000), the 
ten capabilities are as follows: 
 
1. Life 
2. Bodily Health 
3. Bodily Integrity 
4. Senses, Imagination and Thought 
5. Emotions 
6. Practical Reason 
7. Affiliation 
8. Other Species 
9. Play 
10. Control over One’s Environment 
a. Political 
b. Material 
 
Nussbaum makes a clear distinction between the conceptions of capability versus that 
of functioning, dispelling the interpretation of this list as being autocratic.  She claims 
that the ultimate aim of this list (in terms of public policy) must rely on human 
capabilities in order to provide space for those who freely choose to abstain from 
certain elements.  Nussbaum gives the example of the person who might undertake 
‘strenuous fasting’ for religious reasons, willingly forgoing a degree of bodily health. 
Although this person’s functioning might not be at a level of robust nourishment, she 
does have the capability to be adequately nourished. This leaves intact the important 
element of individual choice and personal freedom. 
 
Framing the Question 
In an attempt to bring the various currents of the previous discussions together, this 
last section will focus on the elucidation of the precise subject of enquiry which will 
guide the subsequent chapters.  Threading together the outcomes of the theoretical 
debates provides the raw material for the task at hand, and a solid base from which to 
frame one’s question.  Guided by a Universalist framework, the NRA seems a useful 
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approach in both its theoretical grounding, as well as the insights it has the potential to 
provide.  The depth and breadth of investigation that it allows is uncharacteristic of 
previous approaches to the study of regionalism, particularly with reference to the 
political realities of the Africa sub-continent. 
 
My focus will be given to a sub-regional unit, as such attention to date has been slim.  
Rather than repeating attempts to characterise the process at the macro-regional 
level, that of Africa or West Africa, choosing but one sub-regional entity allows for a 
completely unique lens through which to view the subject.  Although, one could argue 
that this approach may tend toward a statist account of regionalization, my use of the 
border between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire will not be in the strictest of territorial terms.  
Particularly in the colonial context, the sub-regional unit may encompass a wider area 
than that which the two states currently possess, due to the fluctuating boundaries of 
French West Africa, as well as the cultural links which transcend those boundaries.  
However, in choosing a state-based sub-unit, I do not feel necessarily confined to an 
account of regionalization which relies purely on statist concerns and motives.  The 
role of borderland cultures, trans-state actors, and non-governmental regional 
organisations can still be accounted for in this approach.  And, perhaps conversely, the 
role of government and its agents, does have a place in the NRA, and I believe that to 
understand regionalization in West Africa one cannot discount their influence 
completely. 
 
Yet, our concentration will not be on the overarching formal accounts of institutional 
regionalism, but rather the ‘low’ politics of regionalization. Despite the growing 
number of works on the New Regionalism, as Schulz et. al.  (2001, p. 5) notes, “the 
great majority of studies maintain a focus on regionalism and/or state-initiated 
regionalization: regional projects, regional organizations, and instrumental state 
policies, rather than the processes of regionalization.”  This piece will attempt to 
address this issue, as its focus will be the trans-state networks, the borderland 
realities, and grassroots regionalism.  As Fredrik Söderbaum states, “too little attention 
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has been awarded to the multitude of vibrant, multidimensional and dynamic 
processes of de facto, ‘soft’, market and (civil) society regionalization in West Africa” 
(2001, p. 75). 
 
Moreover, our examination of the role of borders and the various ways in which they 
can be studied ties in quite well with our use of the NRA.  In order to study the 
integrating forces at play in any given ‘region’, one must be able to depict the 
furthermost reaches of the region, and thus is outlying boundaries.  However, and 
most significantly in the context of this study, the role of intra-regional borders can 
arguably have a much greater impact upon the course of regionalization, both 
integrating and disintegrating.  The incorporation of borderland studies is something 
which has be relatively ignored in the social sciences,7 and in particular there has been 
a “relative dearth of research on the cultural construction of interstate borders” 
(Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 11).  One novel aspect of this study will be its acceptance 
of, and its attempt to contribute to the under-researched area of boundaries in Africa.  
Taking my cue from scholars such as A. I. Asiwaju, this piece will be an attempt to 
redress the “inadequately explored borderlands alternative perspective to 
scholarly…research on African boundaries” (1996, p. 253).  
 
However, as beneficial as the NRA is, particularly in allowing for the study of previously 
ignored phenomena, on its own it does not necessarily allow for moral judgements.  
The incorporation of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach adds a robust tool for 
the study of cross-border micro-regionalism in West Africa.  This fusion of the NRA 
framework with moral philosophy will provide the backbone of the theoretical 
approach employed throughout this piece, and will allow for possible answers to the 
question of whether borders in West Africa have a positive or negative impact upon 
the lives of Africans. 
                                                     
7
 Donnan and Wilson (1999) have noted the lack of borderland studies among anthropologists, although 
there exist many good reasons as to why this should be so, particularly the variety of problems and 
dangers which surround this type of research. 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented differing perspectives on West African borders, contrasting 
their divisive quality with the argument that their presence actually compels 
interactions among individuals.  This was followed by a more general discussion of 
biases inherent in social scientific research and the contestability of political concepts.  
The terminology used throughout this thesis was then defined.   
 
An examination of the traditional understanding of regionalism preceded a more 
robust presentation of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), which provides the 
framework for the thesis as a whole.  The chapter suggests that one omission of the 
NRA is its inability to provide a moral account of micro-regionalism, and therefore 
Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach was presented as an option to fill this gap.  
The Capabilities Approach allows for a moral analysis based on a neo-Aristotelian 
conception of eudaimonia (or human flourishing), which coupled with the framework 
of the NRA will be used to study the question of the positive and negative impact of 
the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border. 
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Chapter Three:  
Wielding the Weapon of the Weak? 
African Diplomacy, Migrations and the creation of borders in West Africa 
 
Too often in Africanist scholarship there is a tendency, when analyzing the effects of 
European colonialism, to attach all modern ills to that significant period of history, 
while not according the requisite degree of agency to Africans themselves.  While 
colonialism undoubtedly shifted the course of history in West Africa, it was the 
interactions among colonial powers and indigenous peoples that are overlooked, for a 
more simplified, exogenous interpretation of modern African history. 
 
This over-simplification is no more apparent than in the misinterpretation of African 
non-involvement in the creation of borders in West Africa.  The imposition of borders 
can be seen as one of the starkest examples of colonialism still evidenced in Africa 
today.  These ‘artificial’ and ‘arbitrary’ lines, it is argued, have balkanized the 
continent, resulting in many unviable states and leading to war, violence, poverty and 
underdevelopment (Dowdon, 2009, p. 267).   
 
Alternatively, African history can be seen as a varied and thriving, replete with 
signification population migrations and sophisticated political systems. And it is 
important to emphasize the impact of African agency in the creation of the modern 
continent. 
 
Therefore, as a necessary precursor to our discussion of the positive and negative 
effects of West African borders, this chapter will have a three-pronged aim. Firstly, it 
will allow for the requisite historical background for our understanding of West Africa 
more broadly and Ghana more particularly.  Secondly, we will attempt to demonstrate 
that pre-colonial, as well as colonial, Africa was littered with vibrant migratory 
societies in contrast to the image of a “continent mired in timeless immobility” 
(Kopytoff, 1987, p. 7).  Lastly, this chapter seeks to dispel the erroneous vision of the 
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exogenous imposition of West African borders on the part of colonial powers by 
highlighting the political acumen of both pre-colonial as well as colonial African agents. 
 
Pre-colonial Africa “On the Move” 
 “The spirit of a man is without boundaries” – Akan maxim (Danquah, 1944, p. 191) 
 
The assertion that pre-colonial Africa was devoid of any concept of territory or border 
cannot be effectively maintained in face of evidence to the contrary (Allott, 1969; 
Nugent, 1996).     Much of what we know about early African society indicates a history 
of what John Iliffe dubs ‘frontiersmen’ (1995). This conception of frontier is not quite 
equivalent to the American ideal of a linear progression, rather “Africa’s colonisation 
was mainly an internal process, with innumerable local frontiers, and its cultures were 
chiefly formed on frontiers” (Ilffe, 1995, p. 3).  Igor Kopytoff’s argument concurs with 
this view, in what he elaborates as the African Frontier Thesis, which views the 
continent as a “stage for many population movements of many kinds and dimensions, 
ranging from such sub-continental proto-historic dispersion as that of the Bantu or 
Nilotes to the local movements preceding the colonial era” (Kopytoff, 1987, p. 7).  
Kopytoff further states that the term ‘frontier’ itself is the reconciliation of two 
concepts, that of region and boundary8.  As will be discussed below, the notion of 
territoriality is inextricably linked with African history. 
 
Early forms of movement 
The frontiers expanded by migration in Africa have varied widely from the Neolithic 
period to modern times.  Although most of our concentration in this chapter will be on 
the more localised movement of peoples, one startling example of a mass migration 
dates from the fourth millennium B.C., when it is thought that many of the ancestors 
of the current population of sub-Saharan Africa began to move southward from the 
                                                     
8
 As discussed in Chapter Two, this thesis will avoid the usage of the term ‘frontier’, however its 
application in this sense is used to reinforce the territoriality of pre-colonial Africa. 
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northern part of the continent.  The theory is based on the desiccation of the once 
fertile Sahara (Levtzion, 1973, p. 5), pushing populations further south and west 
toward more fruitful lands.  Africans, then, are no strangers to migration. 
 
Rushing forward several millennia, by the eighth century A.D. recorded accounts of 
Ghana – that is the Kingdom of Ghana whose territory was located to the north and 
west of the current state of Ghana – as the Land of Gold, began to appear in the 
writings of the Islamic world as far east as Baghdad (Levtzion, 1973, p. 3).   This 
political entity was highly regarded in the Muslim world, as one of the great kingdoms 
and the trans-Saharan trade route brought these two divergent peoples into closer 
contact. 
 
This began centuries of not only the trade of goods, but also the bridging of cultures 
and religion.   Both Islam and Christianity were brought to various societies in West 
Africa through a number of routes.  Across the Sahara, Muslim and African traders 
conducted economic transactions at several growing commercial centres, such as 
Timbuktu and Jenne.  As salt, slaves and gold traded hands, so too did the language 
and ideas of the people involved.  These cities themselves grew into large 
communities, with the region of Jenne encompassing “7077 villages close together” 
(Levtzion, 1973, p. 160).  The trading profession was dominated by certain ethnic 
groups, the “western parts were controlled by the Mande and Soninke *of which 
Ghana was a member+….*and+ east of the Mande sphere of commercial influence the 
Hausa were in control” (Sundstrom, 1965, p. 45). Moreover, there were traders from 
North Africa (Tripolitanians) as well as Muslim traders to the east. 
 
Trade encouraged the spread of Islam to West Africa and the “formation of states 
[and] their integration in large-scale empires” (Levtzion, 1973, p. 174).  Indeed, 
although the King of Ghana was a follower of traditional beliefs, many of his “ministers 
and advisers were Muslim and he permitted a mosque to be built inside his palace for 
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their use” (Wingfield, 1957, p. 10).  This led as well to the introduction of literacy in the 
Arabic script (Smith R. , 1973, p. 613).  
 
Much like Europe in that same era, West Africa underwent significant changes 
throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, with the fall of Mali (the kingdom which 
succeeded Ghana in pre-eminence, and was centred on Timbuktu) and the rise and fall 
of Songhai, centred on the city of Gao (Wilks I. , 1961, p. 1).  The latter fell to an 
invading Moroccan army possessed of superior gunpowder weaponry; however, 
finding it impracticable to rule from so great a distance, the Moroccans departed 
leaving the former kingdom to splinter into smaller political entities. 
 
Asante and Regional Interactions 
Travels by strangers to the Gold Coast began as early as 600 B.C., starting with 
Phoenicians in the employ of Pharaoh Necho (Reindorf, 1996, p. 17).  Indeed, this 
circumnavigation of West Africa is said to have been imitated by the Carthaginians 
some 40 years later, in a colonising expedition led by one Hanno, who appears to have 
landed on the Gold Coast (Reindorf, 1996, p. 18).  These explorations did not result in 
any longstanding settlements, or if they did then the traces of such communities have 
long since been lost to the depths of history.   
 
Culturally, there exists a wide variety of linguistic groups in the modern state of Ghana, 
with the Akan-speaking peoples forming a majority (Fynn, 1971). This group includes 
the Asante, the Akwamu, the Fante, and the Twi.  The origins of the Akan-speaking 
groups are as varied as the groups themselves, and the unwritten accounts provide a 
myriad of narratives.  The Akwamu state owes its foundation to frontiersmen from 
Kong, “the Mande [Dioula] town on the medieval trade route between Begho and 
Bobo-Dioulasso” (Fynn, 1971, p. 2), whereas the Fante claim to have settled on the 
coast from Tekyiman in the Brong-Ahafo region.  Other groups such as the Ga and Ewe 
are said to have arrived from southern Nigeria.  Fynn notes that the interesting aspect 
of these accounts is “that all these traditions of origin indicate movements en masse.  
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The Akan, the Ga, the Adangbe and the Dagomba all claim that their ancestors 
occupied a previously uninhabited country” (1971, p. 2).   
 
Due to its wide scope and sheer dominance, examination of the grand changes in 
migratory flows in and around what is now Ghana, would not be complete without a 
thorough account of the Asante Empire, and its zenith in the 19th century.   With its 
historical capital in Kumasi, the Asante Empire at its apogee spanned a wider area than 
that of the current state of Ghana (Fynn, 1971, p. 125).   This section will provide an 
historical account of the Asante kingdom, in particular its diplomatic relations with 
other groups both within Africa and without. 
 
Friends and Foes: Dealings with Immediate Neighbours  
The Asante empire arose at a time of great upheaval, with not only the fall of the 
Songhai kingdom, but the “decline of power of the pashalik of Timbuktu and the 
general collapse of central authority *which+ was clearly not conducive to trade” (Fynn, 
1971, p. 4).   The origins of the Asante kingdom lay in the migration inland to Kumasi, 
undertaken by migrants from Adanse and Amanse within the former Akanny state, 
through fear of economic and political hardship (Fynn, 1971, p. 27-29).   
 
The customs which governed the interactions between various indigenous 
communities prior to colonisation has been an overlooked subject.  However, political 
exchanges were very commonplace, and in this section we will utilize Irwin’s rubric for 
the study of the variety of diplomatic relations at this time.   Irwin maintains that 
African diplomacy can be understood under three headings: indigenous, Afro-
European and Eur-African, of which the first two are indicative of the pre-colonial 
period (Irwin, 1975, p. 83). 
 
As may be surmised, indigenous diplomacy is that which characterises interactions 
among African states themselves, and which Smith (1973) describes as ‘African 
customary law’ not unlike its European counterpart.  Some characteristics of such law 
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are as follows: the exchanging of ambassadors and frequently those close to the king, 
economic interdependence through trade, a rudimentary form of diplomatic 
immunity, third-party negotiation, the observance of protocol, and diplomatically-
negotiated alliances (Smith, 1973). 
 
The primary hero of Asante history is Osei Tutu, nephew of the kwamanhene, said to 
be the creator of the Asante kingdom (Fynn, 1971, p. 22).  Relations between Asante 
and her neighbours are exemplified in the tale of Osei Tutu, though specifics of the 
account differ. It is said that in the latter half of the 17th century the Asante were 
under the rule of the Denkyira, then the greatest power in the area, and the former 
were to send tribute in the form of palm oil and a relative of the leader who would live 
in the Denkyira court (Wilks I. , 1995, p. 103).  Osei Tutu, as envoy of his uncle, was to 
undertake this role, however this is where the story bifurcates.  In one account, Osei 
Tutu seduces the sister of the denkyirahene, and when she is discovered pregnant he 
flees to Akwamu, and the protection of the akwamuhene solidifies the friendship 
between the two nations (Fynn, 1971, p. 29).  In the alternate telling, Osei Tutu 
marries a Denkyira woman, and following a dispute over the spoils of war, the 
denkyirahene seduces his wife.  Osei Tutu demands a sworn oath at knife-point from 
the denkyirahene, then flees back to Kumasi (Wilks I. , 1995, p. 104).  In this account, 
Osei Tutu only travels to Akwamu following the divination of the priest Anokye, who 
implores him not to fight in a battle against the Domaa, rather to take refuge with the 
akwamuhene.  Osei Tutu remains in Akwamu until he is requested to return to Kumasi 
as leader, following the demise of his uncle in the unsuccessful war against the Domaa 
(Wilks I. , 1995, p. 105).  
 
As one of his initial acts as King, Osei Tutu formed a military alliance with various 
neighbours at a war council to gain independence from the denkyirahene (Gocking, 
2005, p. 22).  By November 1701, victory was attained by the Asante, and it is here 
that the first account of this nation is found in the writings of European traders.  From 
this point, Osei Tutu, along with his adviser Anokye, laid the foundations of the 
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kingdom with a plethora of symbols and concrete institutions, sophisticated as any 
western governmental system.  The union of nations was embodied in the symbol of 
the Golden Stool, “conjured down from the sky” by the priest Anokye himself (Fynn, 
1971, p. 152).  These two nation-builders “endowed the nascent Asante state with a 
national capital [Kumasi], a national festival, a national army and a flexible 
constitution” (Fynn, 1971, p. 152).  The chiefs of the individual divisions were known as 
amanhene, and sat with the asantehene in the Asanteman Council, which was not 
dominated by the former, but functioned as an egalitarian forum with the asantehene 
as a ‘first among equals’. 
 
We can extract from this narrative a few key indications of the diplomatic 
characteristics elaborated above.  For instance, Osei Tutu was sent as ambassador to 
the Denkyira court, as he was a relative to the kwamanhene.  Although subjugated by 
the denkyirahene, these two peoples were political and economically linked.  When 
Osei Tutu fled, he sought council with the akwamuhene, and when appointed king 
drew on the support of such neighbouring Akan states to overthrow the power of the 
Denkyira, at a diplomatically-negotiated war council.  Following his enstoolment, Osei 
Tutu concretised this war council into a fledgling nation in a loose federation, with a 
constitution.  However, it is only following the rise of the Asante kingdom that we find 
increased evidence of growing diplomatic norms, as historical accounts become 
increasingly available with the introduction of written text, from both Muslim and 
European traders. 
 
Following the reign of Osei Tutu, his successor Opoku Ware expanded the kingdom 
into a veritable empire in a series of conquests, annexing a host of neighbouring states.  
These were kept at arm’s-length from the administration in Kumasi and were overseen 
by Asante Wing Chiefs (Fynn, 1971, p. 153).  This form of distant control led to a rather 
uneasy relationship between subjected nations and Kumasi, until “the reforms of in 
Asante government initiated by Osei Kwadwo” (Fynn, 1971, p. 153).   The Asante sent 
officials to reside in these other states, and this provides an example of a type of 
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ambassador in the host tributary.  Moreover, trade representatives were also sent to 
locations such as Accra and Akyapem (Smith, 1973, p. 618).  The role of the 
representatives on the coast will be dealt with at greater length when this piece treats 
the nature of Afro-European diplomacy later in the chapter. 
 
Asante, Islam and Northern Trade 
From the earliest incarnation, the Asante kingdom had economic ties to the northern 
trade centres on the Niger bend, such as Jenne and Timbuktu (Wilks, 1961, p. 13).  Of 
the four trading routes running north from Kumasi, this particular path was created by 
Mande Dioula traders who penetrated south from Jenne, settling in Bobo-Dioulasso 
and Kong.  Some scholars have even gone so far as to credit the northern trade with 
the development of the Asante Empire, encouraging the interest in gold and kola nuts, 
and the acquisition of slaves from the north (Gocking, 2005, p. 21).  The surplus labour, 
supplied by the slaves, allowed for the clearing of forested areas for the further mining 
of gold, “so that the original settlers who controlled the mines became the founders of 
new Akan chiefdoms” (Gocking, 2005, p. 22). 
 
With the expansion of empire, Asante eventually encompassed several areas which 
were primarily Islamic, such as the city of Bondoukou (just over the Ghanaian border in 
present-day Côte d’Ivoire).  The northern borders of the kingdom in the late 19th 
century ran alongside the Muslim state of Kong, and the vibrant and rather 
unrestricted trade to the north (primarily in kola nuts) had a great impact by way of 
relations between these two powers.  Islam became a profound force in the latter half 
of the 19th century, with quite a significant, growing population of Muslims in Kumasi 
itself.  So sympathetic was the asantehene Osei Kwame to the religion that he gave 
permission for a Muslim school to be built within the city, run by Mohammad-al-
Ghamba (Wilks, 1961, p. 20).  The formation of this institution led to the increased 
interactions between Muslims from Kumasi and those form as far afield as Cairo, who 
made the long trans-Saharan trek to visit with Mohammad-al-Ghamba.   
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Seen as too favourable to Islam, Osei Kwame was destooled in 1803, to be replaced by 
Osei  Tutu Kwame (hereafter Osei Bonsu), “an avowed enemy to the religion of Islam” 
(Wilks, 1961, p. 24).  However, due to the advantages offered by cordiality with the 
Muslim community, Osei Bonsu turned from persecutor to patron, and surrounded 
himself with several Islamic advisers.  Due to his profuse respect and awe of the Islamic 
religion, the reign of Osei Bonsu possessed a flourishing northern trade in slaves and 
gold.  Moreover, “it would appear significant that it was only in this period that the 
greater North African merchants began to show sufficient interest in Kumasi to come 
to visit there in person” (Wilks, 1961, p. 24). The flourishing trade aside, the use of 
literate Muslims in the capital led to the creation of a chancery to record “the greater 
political events” (Smith, 1973, p. 614).  Indeed, the growth of empire and interaction 
with the north are inextricably linked in the rise of Asante. 
 
Afro-European Diplomacy: Asante & European Trade to the South  
Just as trade to the north was a feature of the Asante kingdom from its earliest 
inception, so too were its relations with European traders to the south.  The 
Portuguese, the first Europeans in modern times to settle on the Gold Coast, 
established the fort of Elmina (Castle of Săo Jorge da Mina) at the mouth of the Benya 
River in 1482 (Gocking, 2005, p. 25). The Portuguese dominated commerce in the area 
until the early 17th century, initially trading in gold and later in slaves.  Following a 
wave of attempts by other European powers to break this monopoly, “in 1643, the 
Dutch managed to expel the Portuguese entirely from the Gold Coast” (Gocking, 2005, 
p. 26). This point in history saw the influx of a host of European traders, and the 
construction of numerous fortifications along the coast; a number so great that in fact 
“of the roughly 110 fortification that Europeans erected on the coast of West Africa, 
about 100 of them were located on the Gold Coast” (Gocking, 2005, p. 26).  The most 
significant of these were Elmina (captured by the Dutch), Christiansborg constructed 
by the Danes near Accra, and Cape Coast Castle, taken from the Swedes by the English 
in 1665.  
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Relations between Asante, a huge military as well as trading power in the area, and 
these European entrepreneurs were dictated largely by the diplomatic norms of 
Asante itself (Irwin, 1975, p. 95).  Irwin dubs this as Afro-European diplomacy, in that 
“a European diplomatist, who might be a trader, missionary, hunter or traveller as well 
as an official, sought benefits from an African ruler” (Irwin, 1975, p. 83).  In this sense 
the European must conform to the practices of its host, as with the adage ‘when in 
Rome.’   
 
i. Asante Diplomacy 
Many accounts of the European diplomatic experience with the Asante in the pre-
colonial period come from the era of Osei Bonsu in the early 19th century.  His reign 
was immensely colourful as it also coincided with the abolition of slavery in 1807, one 
of Asante’s chief trading industries.  At the beginning of Osei Bonsu’s reign, several 
missions were sent to the court of the asantehene in Kumasi on the part of the British 
and the Dutch, all seeking some form of concession or favour from the king (Irwin, 
1975, p. 84).    Moreover, “diplomatists from Asante regularly visited the British at 
Cape Coast and the Dutch at Elmina Castle” (Irwin, 1975, p. 84).  Despite the fact that 
the latter form of interaction took place on seemingly European territory, it is argued 
that these relations in the pre-colonial period whether at Cape Coast Castle or in 
Kumasi were governed by the norms of the Asante.   
 
What were the characteristics of this Afro-European diplomacy?  Our conclusions can 
been drawn from the accounts left behind by those travellers to Kumasi, as well as 
official European records.  Irwin (1975) provides a detailed description taken from 
these sources and sketches a typical diplomatic experience during the reign of Osei 
Bonsu.  Above all else, it seems that protocol had to be strictly observed; it was 
paramount to all other details.  Upon entry into Asante territory, foreigners would be 
stopped at the frontier and would wait until the king had given order for them to be 
received, which could take “from a day or two, to several weeks.” (Irwin, 1975, p. 87).  
These delays were not arbitrary, and were vitally important, as it allowed the 
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asantehene to gather his advisers and chiefs, in order that he would be “properly 
briefed” (Irwin, 1975, p. 87).  Once having reached the capital, visitors were usually 
detained once again until a particular time had been decreed for their reception. 
 
Foreign envoys were usually received with a degree of splendour and grandeur far 
surpassing their station.  Some accounts described thousands of people lining the 
streets, music and much fanfare.  As one visitor, Huydecoper, stated “a king could not 
have expected more honor than was done to me today” (Irwin, 1975, p. 88).  These 
displays of ceremony had dual purpose: to impress and to intimidate.  An audience 
with the king was many times public, however, as with modern diplomacy, secret 
negotiations were also employed, with only the foreign envoy, the king and his 
linguists present (Irwin, 1975, p. 90).  
 
While the foreigner was officially the guest of the king, with his accommodation and 
sustenance being provided free of charge, he was also subject to his whim.  The 
asantehene frequently ‘requested’ his foreign guest to perform a variety of tasks while 
in Kumasi, including the writing of letters.  Huydecoper went so far as to “arrange for 
the king’s silver to be cleaned” (Irwin, 1975, p. 90).  Visitors were also at the mercy of 
the asantehene when wishing to take their leave, which was not so easy to secure.  
 
Relations also took place while Asante envoys were sent to the coast, to conduct 
business with European traders.  Indeed, envoys “paid frequent visits to the 
headquarters of the European traders and occasionally to Europe (Smith, 1973, p. 
615).  However, when in the host territory, ambassadors from Asante frequently 
gained support from local populations in order to increase their bargaining capability.  
In 1819 when an ambassador arrived at Elmina he had with him about 1,200 people.  
“Only half were Asante, for the remainder had been recruited from the local 
population” (Irwin, 1975, p. 94).  Although the coastline was not officially in Asante 
territory, it was made quite obvious through display of force exactly whose authority 
was more potent. 
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Ambassadors were to be respected in all other territories, and lack of such respect was 
harshly dealt with.  In order that one might recognise these officials, they were given 
symbols of state power, with the highest officials garbed in costly and elaborate 
costume (Smith, 1973, p. 604).   Lower ranking messengers would carry some form of 
staff or cane to distinguish themselves.  What is most interesting about these 
diplomatic missions, in contrast to later times, is the oral culture.  Messengers in 
particular who, unlike ambassadors, were not at liberty to negotiate but rather to 
merely state the position of the asantehene, had no recourse to written 
documentation.  Therefore, it was required that these officials be possessed of great 
memory and oratory skills.  An Asante envoy is recalled during a meeting at Elmina to 
have “made a speech lasting for about an hour without having to pause to search for a 
single word” (de Maree in Irwin, 1975, p. 95).  
 
Afro-European diplomacy seems to have been sophisticated, coherent and well-
developed in this pre-colonial era.  The comings and goings of ambassadors and 
envoys, both to and from Kumasi indicate a vibrant interaction with the southern 
traders, most of whom were European. 
 
ii. Asante Trading Patterns 
Separating the subject of trade from that of diplomacy may seem at first glance to be 
misguided, however in isolating the one from the other, one might be able to better 
elucidate both halves of the interrelated whole.  Dickson (1966) describes three 
primary trading patterns in the 18th century in this region: southward to the sea, and 
onward toward Europe and the New World; southward to the sea and along to a 
variety of coastal destinations; and lastly, by land, northward to the Sahara.  We have 
already touched on the importance of the northern trading pattern, and the Mande 
Dioula, in the rise of the Asante Empire.  Therefore, in this subsection our 
concentration will be on the southward European trade.   
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One of the first and certainly the most significant forms of trade began with the 
Portuguese and Castilian interest in slaves (Gocking, 2005, p. 26).  It was not long 
before other European traders jostled for advantage on the coast, and the slave trade 
soared.  Although a lucrative business, it was highly unpredictable, as slaves were 
much easier to obtain in times of war than in times of peace.  “When there had been a 
serious war between the Akwamu and Ga, a French man-of-war had collected three 
hundred slaves…within a matter of days” (Dickson, 1966, p. 427).  Eventually the slave 
trade was outlawed in 1807, though other commodities, such as gold, ivory and later 
rubber, continued to be traded quite extensively.  “It is estimated that as much as 
seven thousand marks’ worth of gold was exported annually” (Dickson, 1966, p. 426).  
 
As goods left the shores of the Gold Coast, items of European manufacture also 
entered, and arguably had a profound effect on African society.  These commodities 
ranged from fabrics to metals, and alcohol and weaponry such as guns (Dickson, 1966, 
p. 428).  Asante, however, had strict controls over guns and ammunition and did not 
permit such goods to be carried through their land toward the north (Dickson, 1966, p. 
424).   
 
Due to the enormous strength of the Asante Empire, it has been described as the 
“nerve center and focal point of the country’s trade and trade-route network” as they 
“brought their organizing genius to bear on trade” (Dickson, 1966, p. 431).  Indeed 
their controls on weaponry and the state involvement in trading operations has led 
scholars to the conclusion that the Asante governmental apparatus held a virtual 
monopoly on trade, to the detriment of the common entrepreneur.  It is said that the 
southern trade in gold and slaves was highly regulated (Iliffe, 1995, p. 143).  Moreover, 
trade in Asante was apparently a state-led enterprise, “under the management of the 
Gyasewahene, who was ‘overseer of the King’s trade’, and ‘was at liberty to send the 
trade where he [pleased]’” (Fynn, 1971, p. 117).   This view, touted by Ivor Wilks and 
subsequently adopted many other historical scholars of the Asante period, has been 
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denounced as overly-simplistic and outright inaccurate through the findings of Gareth 
Austin, in his piece which examines private ownership during the 19th century. 
 
Contrary to the overarching statements by Wilks, who argued that this virtual 
monopoly did exist, Austin points to accounts of Asante traders, not in the employ of 
the asantehene, frequenting markets as south as Cape Coast (1996, p. 13).  Although 
governmental traders did receive small concessions, such as the waving of a toll (which 
amounted to little more than 2 percent of a load), “all subjects were encouraged to 
take a hand in trade” (Austin, 1996, p. 14).    
 
With regard to the trade in slaves, this was not only significant in the southward 
migration of these captives. The regional interaction of the northward trade in slaves 
also had a social impact.  The crux of Austin’s counterargument to Wilks stems from 
the role that commoners, rather than a ’middle class’, had in the development of 
private ownership.  Wilks maintains that the common man in Asante had not the 
means to accumulate private wealth, and even if he did so, the state would siphon 
most those earnings through death taxes.  Austin, however, points to the proliferation 
of small-scale, kin-based units engaging in economic activities to accumulate wealth.  
This could range from local production of agricultural goods, mining operations, and 
most significantly, trade.  Indeed, evidence of this growing wealth can be found in the 
fact that almost all Asante homes possessed domestic slaves, acquired from markets to 
the north (Austin, 1996, p. 17).   
 
The economic ramifications of this fact were pervasive in that they allowed families to 
acquire even more wealth through production of other marketable goods through use 
of their slave labour.  This would then allow the family to re-invest the earnings in the 
purchase of more slaves.  The social outcomes of this practice were many, as it 
provided opportunities for common people to acquire slaves, which were not the sole 
purview of the aristocracy.  The cultural interaction also had a marked effect, as almost 
all slaves were obtained from differing northern ethnic groups, but once ensconced in 
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Asante were “incorporated as members of cadet lineages” (Austin, 1996, p. 17).  These 
intercultural relations are yet another consequence of the (sometimes involuntary) 
mobility of Africans in the pre-colonial period. 
 
In truth, West Africa played host to innumerable migrations, exchanges, interaction, 
antagonisms and alliances throughout its long pre-colonial history.  From the Neolithic 
frontiersmen, to the modern empires that have risen and fallen, Africa’s people have 
developed norms and patterns of social interaction intra- and inter-ethnically.  At the 
apex of the Asante Empire, not only did these regional connections link the people of 
(what is now) western Ghana to the states of the north, but also the various European 
trading outposts to the south.  Asante contended with rivals and peers, with uprisings 
and wars, with trade and social interactions, and did so with an evolving and 
sophisticated diplomacy at the level of high politics.  Unfortunately, data is scarce at 
the level of grassroots interactions.  However, from what we do know about the 
pervasive nature of individual entrepreneurs and traders, the movements of enslaved 
persons from the north, and the numerous exchanges which must have occurred at 
the wide variety of markets, the average commoner in Asante can be thought to have 
had a role in this budding regionalization as well.   In a section which follows, we will 
see how this mobility of the individual will prove essential to undermining the power 
of the colonial state. 
 
Colonialism: French and British Styles 
Prior to the real ‘scramble’ for Africa, which most scholars would situate during the last 
two decades of the 19th century, the penetration of Europeans in West Africa was still 
fairly superficial, located mainly in the coastal and riverine areas (Hargreaves, 1974, p. 
402); what is sometimes described as ‘beachhead colonialism’. The French were largely 
confined to the Four Communes (Quatres Communes) of Senegal, the coastal areas of 
Grand Bassam (in present-day Côte d’Ivoire) and the ports of Cotonou and Porto Novo 
(in present-day Benin).  The British in 1880 had a presence in Sierra Leone, much of the 
Gold Coast and the areas around Lagos.  Over the following two decades, the map of 
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West Africa was to be altered dramatically, leaving no independent states, save the 
Republic of Liberia.  Whether or not this push toward the interior was a direct 
consequence of the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885, as is the general 
assumption9, the reality is that within the span of 20 years, the competing European 
powers, of which Britain and France were the most proactive, succeeded in 
appropriating an unfamiliar land with an output of relatively small numbers.   
 
The question of how these small contingents of occupiers could have overwhelmed 
indigenous resistance has two probable answers: either resistance was relatively 
modest, or rather the European powers possessed significant advantages over those 
who opposed them.  As to the former hypothesis, Hargreaves (1974, p. 403) contends 
that, “considering the area involved and the proud independence of the peoples there 
had…been surprisingly little violence.”  However, other authors have provided 
evidence of high levels of resistance to European intrusion in many areas, with African 
armies outnumbering “the European armies as much as five-to-one, sometimes even 
ten-to-one” (Crowder, 1977, p. 134).  With such a discrepancy of numbers, how was 
the partition accomplished with such celerity?   
 
Crowder (1977) focuses on four factors that ran in favour of European occupation.  
Firstly, the overwhelming degree of fire-power on the part of Europeans, not only 
afforded by the Maxim gun (660 shots a minute) but also the antiquity and limited 
number of firearms at the disposal of African armies effectively nullified the advantage 
of population possessed by the latter.  Secondly, the expertise associated with the 
advances in firearm technology meant that even if the indigenous fighters possessed 
new weapons, they did not always use them to their full advantage.  “Ijebu never took 
advantage of the fact that breech-loading rifles permitted you to fire lying down thus 
presenting a smaller target to the enemy.  Instead they continued to fire them 
                                                     
9
 For an alternate interpretation of events see Simon Katzenellenbogen’s piece “It Didn't Happen at 
Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa's Colonial Boundaries”, which is also 
discussed later in this chapter.  
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standing up as though they were the old fashioned muzzle-loading guns” (Crowder, 
1977, p. 134).  Moreover, European forces were comprised of standing armies, with 
regular training, whereas most African armies of the time were formed on an ad hoc 
basis from members of the general population.  Finally, one significant fact is that most 
African forces were not allied, providing smaller, individual targets for invading 
European armies.  
 
However, regardless of how it was accomplished, by the turn of the 20th century, 
metropolitan power was to be exercised over an expansive and difficult terrain.  Our 
focus in this section turns to the question of how this authority was imposed, and 
inquires as to the significance of the variation in British and French policy.  Following a 
discussion of ideal types of direct and indirect rule, and a brief look at the mission 
civilisatrice, we will compare colonial practices in West Africa. 
 
Direct vs. Indirect Rule 
“The same ideal inspires both our policies. In our respective histories, 
the generous spirit of humanity creates the same impulse in both countries, 
and the great voice of your Wilberforce, the liberator of the African slave, 
and your Fowell Buxton, echo across the halls of Time  the words of our Declaration  
of the Rights of Man.” – M. Albert Sarraut (cited in Arnett, 1993, p. 251). 
 
Though it is not now as common to contrast British and French colonial practice in 
West Africa as stark opposites on a spectrum running from indirect to direct methods 
of rule, the divergence in the rhetoric of their respective policies still maintains some 
of its salience.  As ideal types, both indirect and direct rule have their own moral 
justifications, as well as practical applications. 
 
Direct rule, sometimes referred to as assimilation, is generally associated with French 
policy (Crowder, 1977, p. 145).  As the name contends, the aim of colonialism is then 
the evolution of indigenous peoples into a society which mimics the métropole 
politically, culturally, linguistically, and socially.  This transformation is accomplished 
through education, the transmission of cultural artefacts, and the transplanting and 
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linking of institutions.  Though later admonished for its reprehensible condescension, 
from the ethical standpoint of French colonisers from as early as the beginning of the 
19th century, this desire to share with other nations the ideals of the Revolution cannot 
be said to have had wholly pernicious motives.   
 
Indirect rule, on the other hand, was as a policy that was later developed by, and 
associated primarily with the British.  As a result of Lord Lugard’s experience in 
Northern Nigeria, whereby he incorporated the organs of existing indigenous 
institutions to carry-out policy at the local level, the possibility of exporting these 
methods became very attractive.  From a practical standpoint, utilising structures 
already in existence solves many administrative headaches, and does not force one to 
stretch the already thin line of colonial officers and administrators.  Moreover, it has 
the added feature of increasing the allegiance to the colonial government by keeping 
the local indigenous leaders in office.  Furthermore, from a moral stance, indirect rule 
does skirt around the issue of overt ethnocentrism, though conversely can be criticised 
for its impersonal and exploitative nature, extracting benefits from a colony without 
necessarily contributing to it socially.  
 
A third form of colonial rule, utilized by both the French and English at various times 
and places in West Africa, is that of association.  Indeed, from the onset of the 20th 
century, association was the espoused form of colonial policy in France, which sought 
to walk the line between extreme forms of direct and indirect rule.  The theory behind 
this policy, which is rather vague in its specifics, was that rather than the imposition of 
French culture (which demeans that of the indigenous culture), the colonies ought to 
develop for the ‘mutual benefit’ of both peoples.  Crowder describes this policy in 
quite a cynical fashion, in that “the association was like that of a horse and rider, with 
the French in the saddle!” (Crowder, 1977, p. 145). 
 
These typologies are merely clarified above for the purposes of the discussion that 
follows.  Neither France nor Britain conformed to one strategy at all times in their 
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dealings with the colonies in West Africa, however, neither were their policies without 
trend or logic. 
 
France & the Mission Civilisatrice 
“In the shapeless clay of primitive peoples, France is modelling 
the face of a new humanity.” – E.J. Arnett (1933, p. 424) 
 
“La France doit porter partout où elle le peut, sa langue, ses moeurs,  
son drapeau, ses armes, son génie.” – Jules Ferry (cited in Dimier, 2004, p. 11)10 
 
The mission to civilize was not the sole purview of France with reference to her 
colonies, however the drive to cultivate France Outre-Mer (Overseas France) affected 
policy and had consequences in practice.  From the foundation of the fort of St-Louis-
du-Senegal in 1659, the French presence in West Africa expanded and shifted in 
character.  Initially, as with the other European powers, the lure of Africa lay in her 
economic potential, particularly in slaves (Adloff, 1964, p. 132).  However, following 
the Revolution of 1848, and the rise of the Second Republic, slavery was abolished and 
French citizenship extended to the possessions in Senegal, divided into the Four 
Communes (Quatres Communes) of Dakar, St. Louis, Rufisque and the island of Gorée 
(Crocker, 1947, p. 59).   This had the far-reaching implications of equality before the 
law for all men, and for the first time Senegal was to have an elected representative in 
Paris (Hargreaves, 1967, 86). 
 
An analysis of French policy in the 19th century through the lens of regionalization 
provides an interesting narrative.  Indeed, the form of assimilation (or direct rule) 
favoured in this period did have significant outcomes in certain areas.  It is to these 
regionalizing forces that our discussion now turns. 
 
It is perhaps with regard to institutions, and their effects, that France’s influence on 
West Africa has been most influential, when examining the phenomenon of 
                                                     
10
 Translation: “France must always carry, wherever she is able, her language, her morals, her flag, her 
weapons, her genius.” 
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regionalization in the colonial period.  As mentioned above, even prior to the 
formation of French West Africa (or AOF11), the linking of the politics in the colonies to 
that of the métropole was a key difference between the colonial powers.  The fact that 
African citoyens were permitted to elect a representative was symbolically, though 
perhaps not practically, significant.  This is not to claim that the French were 
necessarily more enlightened and accepting than the British, and certainly there was 
hesitation on the part of the former to extend these benefits to all Africans within the 
sphere of their control. 
 
A distinction was made after 1848, with the extension of the rights and privileges of 
citizenship, between Africans who were citizens and those who were subjects.  Citizens 
enjoyed the benefits of French patronage in the form of electoral rights, education, 
taxes and most importantly French laws (LeVine, 2004).  Subjects, however, did not fall 
under the sphere of these advantages, and in fact were treated under a series of less 
favourable practices (this will be treated at greater length below).  To be counted as 
citizen meant that one must be born on French soil (in Africa to be born in the Quatres 
Communes was to be born on French soil), or one could become an assimilé, by 
proving one’s evolution and francisation.  This could be accomplished through the 
acquisition of French education, by becoming a Christian, or by allegiance to France 
through military service (LeVine, 2004).  Though in theory this policy of assimilation 
was universalist, in practice it was a highly selective and elitist system, and by 1940, 
the entirety of the AOF comprised only 500 assimilés (LeVine, 2004). 
 
For those few citizens, however, allegiance to France and to the AOF brought with it an 
understanding of space much wider in scope than the locality or colony.  To be a 
citizen was to feel part of a larger region.  The desire to link the various coastal 
outposts of the French African empire was one which, with the onset of the Scramble 
and the suspicion of British ambitions, drove colonial policy in the late 19th century.  By 
the turn of the century, France was in possession of an “area of West Africa nearly as 
                                                     
11
 Afrique Occidental Française 
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large as the United States of America” (Crowder, 1977, p. 146), but with a 
comparatively small population of roughly 12 million.  In order to govern this sparsely 
populated and immense space, the French decided to join the various colonies into a 
federation (AOF), which by 1904 was comprised of Senegal, Soudan (Mali), Guinea and 
Côte d’Ivoire (Crowder, 1977, p. 146).   This later expanded to include Niger, 
Mauritania, Dahomey (Benin) and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). 
 
In order to administer this federation, France created the office of the Governor-
General in Dakar, Senegal, to oversee the workings of the other colonies, himself 
represented by a Lieutenant-Governor in each of these subsidiaries.  The central 
government was composed of a Conseil Supérieur de Gouvernement, whose 
membership of French and African citizens was appointed by the Governor-General.  
Lieutenant-Governors in each colony also possessed their own bureaucracy, as well as 
a handpicked Conseil Administratif.  Only the Quatres Communes were governed 
separately, and along with their elected representative in Paris, they retained a 
separate Conseil Général.  Under this system, the central government remained highly 
centralised, with a great deal of power resting in the hands of the Governor-General 
who exercised control over the individual colonies.  However, his power was itself 
circumscribed by the métropole, and he did not enjoy the liberty of personal legislative 
authority (Crowder, 1977, p. 153). 
 
The development of these administrative units, and the wider AOF created a situation 
whereby children born in West Africa in the early 20th century (certainly those who 
were directly linked to these institutions) began to affiliate themselves with these new 
political constructs.  And certainly, this reality is evidenced in the field of education. 
 
Although missionary schools have had a presence in West Africa for almost as long as 
Europeans have settled there, official governmental educational programs tarried 
somewhat. The first foray into African education on the part of the French 
establishment came in 1816 with the founding of a school at Saint-Louis.  However, 
64 
 
this institution was criticised for teaching in both French, and the local language, Wolof 
(Gifford & Weiskel, 1971, p. 672).  By the mid-19th century, the French government had 
turned over the direction of education in Senegal to religious orders of monks and 
nuns (Gifford & Weiskel, 1971, p. 671). 
 
However, with the continued penetration into the interior, the benefits of secular 
education became more desirable, as most of the inhabitants of these regions were 
Muslim.  In 1855, the Governor, Louis Faidherbe, appointed secular instructors to a 
mission school in Saint-Louis (Harrison, 2003), which coincided with the creation of a 
French school for the sons of chiefs, known as the “School of Hostages” (Gifford & 
Weiskel, 1971, p. 672).  This education policy was implemented primarily for strategic 
purposes, in order to facilitate the push toward the interior. 
 
By the turn of the century, and following the demand for the secularisation of 
education in West Africa by the French parliament in 1903, educational policy was 
markedly changed.  Governor-General Roume altered the course of education in the 
AOF by elaborating the four essential features of this public educational system: that it 
take place in the medium of the French language, that it be entirely free of charge, 
that it remain secular, and that education be linked to the need for administrative 
personnel in the colonies (Gifford & Weiskel, 1971, p. 674-675). 
 
In order to gain a high administrative position, one would inevitably need to move, 
sometimes a great distance, in the process of his schooling.  Graduates of village 
schools could hope for no better than the lower ranking positions in the governmental 
hierarchy, and even those who completed the courses at the regional (upper primary) 
school would only become “subordinate clerks in each individual territory” (Gifford & 
Weiskel, 1971, p. 675).  It was only the select few who attended one of the federal 
schools in Dakar, most notably the École Normale William Ponty, who could achieve 
the higher ranks, or train to become teachers and medical assistants. 
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One of the consequences of the mobility in education was the wider affiliation many 
students felt for not only the AOF, but for France itself.  This hierarchical educational 
system linked students from all areas in West Africa, from Porto Novo to Saint-Louis, 
and impressed upon them the construct of this federation.  “Members of the French-
educated African elite who had travelled outside their home territory…could feel 
culturally Guinean, Ivoirian or Soudanese while at the same time seeing themselves as 
part of a larger federation” (Chafer, 2002, p. 18).  Moreover, the affiliation and 
affection for Mother France was also apparent, with one former Ponty graduate 
stating that decolonisation for Africa is like “someone who has lost his father or 
mother” (cited in Sabatier, 1985, p. 180). 
 
For the elite, French colonial policy provided opportunities for education, work and 
travel, and linked its citizens not only in each individual colony, but in the larger AOF 
itself.  Political space became markedly expanded, even in comparison to the 
preceding generation. 
 
Britain & Native Authorities  
“Take up the White Man's burden-- 
Send forth the best ye breed-- 
Go, bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captives' need; 
To wait, in heavy harness, 
On fluttered folk and wild-- 
Your new-caught sullen peoples, 
Half devil and half child.”  
(Kipling, in Spielvogel, J., 2008, p. 754) 
 
“The Englishman by temperament feels little sympathy with the new class of 
schooled African; his preferences are for the “savage.”” (Crocker, 1947, p. 76) 
 
At the level of central government, the British, in contrast to their French 
contemporaries in West Africa, chose not to link their disparate colonies into one 
uniform governing structure.  Instead, the four territories (1914) of the Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria were each headed by a Governor, possessed of 
legislative control (Crowder, 1977, p. 155).  Unlike the French Governor-General in 
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Dakar, the individual Governors of the British colonies were accorded a great deal of 
freedom from London, and worked in conjunction with their own Legislative and 
Executive councils.  Although the Legislative Council could contain African members 
appointed by the Governor, the vast majority were British officials upon whom the 
Governor could always be assured of an acquiescent vote (Crowder, 1977, p. 155).  
Moreover, in the case of the Gold Coast, although the colony was itself subject to the 
laws created by the Legislative Council, the protectorate area of Asante and the 
Northern Territories was “ruled by proclamation: that is the Governor proclaimed law 
on his own authority” (Crowder, 1977, p. 155). 
 
Nevertheless, it is in the sphere of local government that the contrast between British 
and French rule is most apparent, with the former associated with the policy of 
indirect rule. This policy, though lauded for its high morals (non-imposition of foreign 
ideals and institutions), was not developed by theorists in the ivory tower.  The system 
of Native Authorities espoused by Lord Lugard following his experiences as High 
Commissioner of Northern Nigeria from 1900-1907, was heavily influenced by realities 
on the ground.  At the turn of the century, Northern Nigeria was ruled by a class of 
Fulani Emirs, who had some time in the distant past conquered the native Hausa, and 
converted many of the population to Islam (Mair, 1936, p. 120).  There existed already 
a high degree of economic development, specialisation of trade, a sophisticated 
taxation system, as well as judicial powers exercised in accordance with Koranic Law.  
The political and economic system that Lugard found in place upon his arrival was one 
which was highly adaptable to the needs of the colonial government, and indeed in 
utilising these local institutions, the meagre British resources would not be stretched 
beyond their limits.   
 
The British presence in each division would be represented by a District Officer (or 
Resident), whose aim was to ‘assist and ‘advise’ the local government, in an effort to 
promote improvement in these systems.  However, such improvement rarely took 
place, and District Officers “increasingly came to regard their role as one of preserving 
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rather than modifying.” (Crowder, 1977, p. 157).  Despite the unique characteristics of 
the Northern Nigerian case, indirect rule was later attempted in all parts of British 
West Africa, becoming the canon of British policy following the First World War. 
 
It is fallacy to suppose, however, that British practices in her dealings with colonial 
peoples were never informed by assimilationist tendencies.  Indeed, prior to the 
Scramble, it is arguable that British actions lent much more to the direct, rather than 
indirect, form of rule.  This is evidenced in the high degree of cultural cross-
pollenization and the rise of a class of Creole elites12, throughout many parts of British 
Africa prior to the 20th century.  Bickford-Smith (2004) maintains that in the mid-19th 
century, Creole elites, throughout the Empire saw themselves as ‘black Englishmen’, 
and not ‘natives’.  Just as the French mission civilisatrice was all-invading in the actions 
of its colonial officers, so to, Bickford-Smith asserts, the British were compelled to 
‘civilize’ the African cultures with whom they interacted.  Perhaps a superficial reading 
of Kipling’s White Man’s Burden held a motivating place in the minds of British colonial 
officers, for indeed the cultural interactions and assimilationist practices were not as 
uncommon a feature as one might assume. 
 
Bickford-Smith (2004) points to the frequency of social interactions between the 
British inhabitants of colonies, such as Sierra Leone, with the Creole community, who 
mixed at various engagements, ranging from balls to concerts and even in each other’s 
homes.  However, by the 20th century, this mixed society had all but vanished, with 
white settlers in Freetown establishing a separate residential community called Hill 
Station, set “750 foot above the city”, the purpose of which was to protect Europeans 
from local diseases, and the African carriers of such  maladies (Bickford-Smith, 2004, p. 
205).  This rejection of Creole elites, he maintains, was a break from previous 
                                                     
12
 The term “creole” is here employed in the sense outlined by Bickford-Smith, not necessarily 
descriptive of a person of mixed race, but rather encompassing all persons influenced by a high degree 
of “cultural hybridity”, which may or may not be accompanied by “racial hybridity” (Bickford-Smith, 
2004, p. 195) 
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encouragement, and brought about due to the policy of indirect rule, which favoured 
‘traditional’ African elites, to the exclusion of the new class of educated, Europeanized 
Africans. 
 
However, even outside of the urban centres, where indigenous communities were 
much more isolated from the everyday of European influence, indirect rule was not 
universally achieved, nor in some cases even employed in the first instance.  Initially, 
British practice was not informed by policy, and a variety of methods of rule were 
employed according to the realities on the ground.  However, following the Lugard 
experiment in Northern Nigeria, indirect rule became the favoured policy, leading the 
British to attempt “to impose this system even where it was obviously unsuitable” 
(Crowder, 1977, p. 156). 
 
At the onset of the 20th century, in southeastern Nigeria, the British sought to impose a 
system of indirect rule, for which they required the traditional chiefs to be identified.  
Unlike their northern neighbours, inhabitants in this region were not as stratified, nor 
did their chiefs possess the degree of power found in the north.  Furthermore, due to 
suspicion on the part of these communities, when the British appeared, desiring to 
uncover the identity of the chiefs, false chiefs (sometimes in the form of criminals) 
were put forward “to go and see what this was all about” (Gann & Duignan, 1978, p. 
211).  The result was thirty years of abuse on the part of these false rulers, now 
entrusted with judicial and executive powers. 
 
Latterly, several measures were taken, to develop a congruence of policy throughout 
the disparate colonies of British West Africa, following the First World War.  These 
included a common training for colonial officers, instituted in 1920, though still falling 
short of the rigorous educational requirements of their French counterparts.  
Furthermore, research and development programs were initiated, and in 1927, the 
first Governors’ Conference was realised (Heussler, 1971, p. 575). 
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Despite these late initiatives, the governance policies employed by the British in West 
Africa could never be said to be consistent.  As has been stated, local factors had to be 
taken into consideration, and in light of the ‘thin white line’ of the colonial service13, 
cooperation with local communities more often than not made the momentous task of 
governance slightly less daunting.  “Indirect rule could not be fully practiced, and had 
to be modified in different ways by the different colonial powers” (Boahen, 1990, p. 
144).  It seems that for both the French and the British in West Africa, the ability to 
undertake either a pure form of indirect or direct rule proved virtually impossible, and 
in some cases undesirable as well.  So how can we account for the logic of colonial 
governance, if our current paradigm of indirect-direct rule does not seem to hold?  In 
analysing a counterfactual case, to which we will now turn, an attempt will be made to 
explain the divergence between reality and official rhetoric. 
 
Neither Indirect nor Direct:  
Institutional Choice & British Colonial Practice 
 
Having treated the diplomatic relations of the Asante Empire above, it seems quite 
fitting to continue our discussion of British policy in relation to this large, well-
developed society.  The professed aims of indirect rule, as well as the normative 
arguments in favour of the British presence in Africa, rely heavily on the principle of 
relative non-intervention of the European power, whose purpose is merely an advisory 
role.  Colonial development was to be for the benefit of Europeans and Africans alike, 
with the British District Officer as the assistant to the local authority, the result of 
which would be the gradual evolution of native institutions toward a higher level of 
institutional development.  In this vein, strong indigenous leaders were requisite for 
the policy of indirect rule, for the greater control these chiefs possessed, the easier it 
was, in theory, for the British colonial service to maintain a state of equanimity. 
                                                     
13
 Taken from Kirk-Greene’s study of the role of British colonial service in Africa (The Thin White Line, 
1980) 
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It has been stated several times over that the British, unlike the French in West Africa, 
seemed to favour traditional elites.  Reasons for this apparent discrepancy have been 
explained by the differences in policy, but also by the differences in metropolitan 
politics; the British with their monarchy, and aristocratic traditions intact, the French in 
the aftermath of their Revolution.  Granting that this explanation is somewhat crude, 
there seems to be an element of veracity in it.  Though initial recruitment in the British 
diplomatic service was haphazard at best, by the turn of the 20th century a more 
rigorous process was set in place, with a vast majority of officers having completed a 
university education, and more often than not were a product of the professional 
classes (Gann & Duignan, 1978, p. 197).   
 
The British viewed their own role in Africa as distinct from the French in that, unlike 
their contemporaries, “our aim and also our practice is to eliminate ourselves” 
(Crocker, 1947, p. 66).  With these thoughts in mind, how does one account for the 
fractious relationship with Asante throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, which 
led to the forced exile, on the part of the British, of the rightful asantehene?  By means 
of an analysis of the causes of the Anglo-Asante wars, through the lens of Boone’s 
thesis on institutional choice, we will demonstrate how this case may act as an 
example contrary to professed British policy in West Africa.  It may also call into 
question the rubric by which many scholars have come to account for colonial policy in 
West Africa more generally. 
 
Institutional Choice 
A recent book by Catherine Boone (2003) develops a theory of political governance in 
Africa based on local institutions, a work expanded from a previous article on the same 
subject.  Her thesis rests on the countering of the traditional argument that the 
policies and strategies of African governments have been determined by exogenous 
factors, which impinge on the decision-making powers of national leaders.  In the case 
of Africa, these have included European colonial legacy, bipolar Cold War rivalries, the 
international financial system etc.  Boone turns the question on its head, and by 
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looking to cases wherein there have existed starkly divergent policies within the same 
government toward various regions within its control, she analyses the question 
through endogenous factors.   She rests her explanatory structure on the basis that a 
ruler’s decisions is influenced “in response to situations they confront…on the ground” 
(Boone, 2003, p. 34). 
 
From this foundation she develops a sophisticated rational-choice paradigm, based on 
two factors: the degree of hierarchy found within the local community, and the level of 
economic independence it possesses.  These two variables provide four strategies 
available to the ‘central’ government vis-à-vis the rural territory it seeks to govern: 
Powersharing, Usurpation, Non-incorporation and Administrative Occupation . 
 
Although Boone has crafted this paradigm for use in her analysis of post-independence 
governmental strategies in West Africa, she does allow that it can be applied to 
colonial governments as well.  Furthermore, she maintains that “this argument should 
hold regardless of colonial administrative doctrine (France’s formal commitment to 
direct rule, and Britain’s to indirect rule), and even across regions with a single 
postcolonial state” (Boone, 2003, p. 36).  
 
Taking my cue from Boone, the case of Asante is interesting in that the empire was 
possessed of a very well-defined social hierarchy, with relative economic 
independence vis-à-vis the centre.  Therefore, given Boone’s hypothesis, it was 
strategic for the British colonial government to choose usurpation, rather than a form 
of collaboration with Asante, for the latter were positioned to be strong rivals, rather 
than strong allies (Boone, 2003, p. 29).  To demonstrate this relationship, we will 
examine the case of two major events in Asante history, and the political events which 
would eventually lead to the removal of asantehene Prempe I. 
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Osei Bonsu and the First Anglo-Asante War 
Osei Bonsu, one of the pre-eminent asantehenes in history, was to be the first leader 
challenged by the British in 1824.  Relations between the two nations had been 
strained due to the abolition of slavery in 1807, however it was the Asante occupation 
of the coastal Fante areas in that same year that worried the British on the Gold Coast.  
This invasion should not have come as a surprise, according to Boahen (1974), who 
maintains that the conquest was “an historical inevitability” (p. 167).  Occupying a 
huge territory provided Asante with many opportunities for trade both northward and 
southward, however the Fante states effectively blocked the coastal areas, and thus 
European trade.  Asante traders were therefore forced to deal with these middlemen, 
who, they claimed, were dishonest.  “As Osei Bonsu told Bowdich in 1817, the Fante 
received pure gold from Asante and mixed it with base metal before selling it to the 
Europeans, ‘ten handkerchiefs are cut into eight; water is put into rum, and charcoal to 
powder, even for the king’” (Boahen, 1974, p. 168).  It was in fact upon his defeat of 
the Fante nations, that Osei Tutu Kwame (as he was then known) took on a new name.  
As the story is told, he continued on to the sea and after wading in it, returned with 
the name of Bonsu, meaning whale, for not even the sea could produce an enemy to 
resist him (Boahen, 1974, p. 174). 
 
Despite the fact that the British were sympathetic to the coastal Fante, with whom 
they had developed trade relations by this point, they were forced to seek harmonious 
relations with Asante, who now controlled an area wider than that of the current state 
of Ghana.  Therefore, in 1816 a mission was sent to Kumasi, and a treaty was signed, 
securing British trade interests in the Gold Coast.  However, this treaty was not 
honoured on the part of the British, who refused formally to recognise Asante rule 
over the Fanteland, though it was an important clause agreed to by both parties in the 
treaty.  Moreover, when the asantehene’s messengers arrived to report disrespectful 
behaviour, which ran contrary to the treaty, they were duly overlooked.   “It is 
humiliating to be compelled to make the admission and to confess that a King of 
[Asante] had greater regard for his written engagement than an English Governor” 
(Cruickshank cited in Boahen, 1974, pp. 182-183). 
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Furthermore, it was a great shock to the asantehene Osei Bonsu to later discover that 
his copy of the treaty was not identical to that published by the British Government.  
One significant divergence was the inclusion of the King of Dwaben, putting him on par 
with the asantehene (Boahen, 1974, p. 182). Following this insult, another envoy, 
Joseph Dupuis, was sent to Kumasi in 1819 and a new treaty was agreed upon.  Despite 
this success, the political situation in the Gold Coast was to drastically alter within the 
next few years. 
 
Until the year 1821, the Gold Coast fell under the jurisdiction of the British Company of 
Merchants. It was, however, disbanded for a variety of reasons, including its inability 
to effectively end the slave trade.  From that point, all the British forts came under the 
command of Sir Charles MacCarthy, then Governor of Sierra Leone (Crowder, 1977, p. 
106).  It seems from his earliest visit to the Gold Coast, MacCarthy held little sympathy 
for Asante, and in fact described them as “true barbarians”, headed by a “Barbarian 
Chief”, though he hoped they would be subdued “without a war on an extensive scale” 
(MacCarthy cited in Boahen, 1974, p. 185). 
 
Opinions regarding MacCarthy’s motivations and actions during his short tenure are 
divided.  What is more certain, however, is the sequence of events which follow.  Upon 
his arrival, MacCarthy did not send word to Kumasi of the change in administration, 
nor did he send any gifts and overtures to the monarch, as would be customary 
(Metcalfe, 1964, p. 71).  In 1822, a Fante, who was also a sergeant in the British service 
was arrested for an insult to the asantehene, punishable by death (Boahen, 1974, p. 
186).  This spiralled into full-scale military confrontation, igniting an already incendiary 
situation.  The asantehene claimed that the man was Fante and thus under his 
jurisdiction, whereas the British maintained that the sergeant “was a subject of the 
King of England and was consequently amenable to the laws of that country only” 
(Chisholm, 1822, p. 78).  When in 1823 the man was executed, MacCarthy’s troops 
were rallied and following a few smaller encounters, a decisive battle was fought at 
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Adamanso in January 1824, where MacCarthy was to meet his demise (Metcalfe, 1964, 
p. 72).  
 
What is interesting to note about the case of the first Anglo-Asante war, is a thesis 
propounded by Boahen, who surmises that war could easily have been diverted had 
MacCarthy not been seeking an excuse for military confrontation. Indeed, control over 
trade had been a sticking point between the British and Asante for some years, and 
MacCarthy upon his arrival on the Gold Coast stated that Asante would have to be put 
down “before our footing in this country can be considered safe and respectable” 
(MacCarthy in Boahen, 1974, p. 186).  With a high degree of hierarchy, including 
subsidiary states and an elaborate system of councils and chiefs, along with fierce 
economic bargaining power, Asante was not in a weak position.  In the case of the 
young Fante who was apprehended, Boahen continues by stating that it was a full four 
months between his arrest and execution, and moreover that he had been kept at 
Abora Dunkwa, 18 miles from Cape Coast, and not further north at Kumasi.  Boahen 
concludes that this is persuasive evidence that perhaps the asantehene wished for a 
peaceful settlement of the matter.  MacCarthy, despite this four-month reprieve, 
never sent an envoy in that time, ignoring the advice of an official who “hinted that he 
thought it possible that” the British “would wish to send a person to intercede with the 
King” (Chisholm, 1822, p. 78). 
 
What is even more intriguing is that Osei Bonsu is considered to have been in many 
respects a forward-thinking leader.  He modernised the institutions of Asante, and for 
the first time men were appointed “to offices in the administration not because of the 
families they came from but because of their ability” (Crowder, 1977, p. 103).  He 
engaged the services of literate Muslims, and strengthened ties to the north.  He 
conquered the Fante states, something none of his predecessors had been capable of 
accomplishing.  It is perhaps this degree of power, which the asantehene could wield 
over such a large region that prompted British action toward that of usurpation, rather 
than powersharing. 
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British Ambitions and Prempe I 
“My Kingdom of Asante must remain independent as of old, at the same time be  
friendly with all white men.” asantehene Prempe I (cited in Adjaye, 1989, p. 237) 
 
Much of the history of 19th century Asante was littered with political conflicts with the 
British, culminating in no less than five Anglo-Asante wars.  Although questions may be 
brought to bear regarding the use of the first Anglo-Asante war and its clash with 
British rhetoric of non-intervention (for indeed this occurred long before it was official 
governmental policy to employ indirect rule), its incorporation, I believe, is warranted.  
Though not expounded as clear policy as at the turn of the century, the features of 
indirect rule have a longer history in the distinctions drawn by the British between 
their aims in Africa, in comparison to that of other European powers.  The benevolent 
ambitions of empire do leave one to ponder the actions of the British in the many 
Anglo-Asante wars which ensued. 
 
However, this alone is perhaps not enough evidence to support of Boone’s thesis of 
institutional choice.   Therefore by this short examination of asantehene Prempe I’s 
reign and, the lengths to which British officials went in order to usurp Asante power, 
we will see how despite the official policy of the day Britain did not choose the path of 
collaboration, as one would assume if relying solely on a policy of indirect rule. 
 
Following the fourth Anglo-Asante war of 1872, whereby the Asante suffered a great 
defeat and lost all the territory south of the River Pra, the power of the British on the 
coast was greatly improved.  Unfortunately for Asante, further tributary states took 
advantage of this period of weakness and many succeeded in breaking away (Crowder, 
1977, p. 110).  Consequently, it was at a time of significant upheaval and insecurity 
that Prempe I came to the throne in 1888, as the “Empire seemed finally to have 
broken up” (Crowder, 1977, p. 111).   
 
It was a testament to the force of Prempe’s personality and charisma, that within a 
matter of months he was able to bring metropolitan Asante back under his control.  
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Shortly thereafter, many tributary states also returned, including “the Dwaben, who 
had fled south of the River Pra” (Crowder, 1977, p. 237).  The British, who had just 
achieved control over much of the Gold Coast, were unsteadied by this resurgence of 
power, as it “posed a threat to *their+ imperial designs” (Adjaye, 1989, p. 237).  It was 
at this time that the British employed ‘protection’ strategies in order to gain control 
over Asante, meaning that in exchange for their allegiance, Britain would protect 
Asante from its enemies and pay the Asantehene a fixed sum each year.  Despite 
repeated offers in 1890, 1891 and 1894, Prempe refused this policy in favour of 
remaining independent, open to relations with all Europeans. 
 
Due to their fears of French ambition in Asante, the British took drastic measures and 
in 1896 led an army into Kumasi to arrest the asantehene (Boahen, 1974, p. 261).  
There is a divergence of opinion as to the exact reasoning behind this startling move.  
Whether it was a pre-emptive action against the French (Metcalfe, 1964, p. 471), or 
merely that the British finally had an (albeit flimsy) excuse to take control over a land 
they had coveted for so long, either way the Asante were deceived. 
 
Adjaye (1989) has brought to light greater knowledge of the motivations of Prempe 
himself, during that last stand against the British and also throughout his lengthy exile.  
It is a fact that during the 1896 expedition, the Asante offered no resistance 
whatsoever (Metcalfe, 1964; Adjaye, 1989; Boahen, 1974; Crowder, 1977).  
Speculation as to why Prempe did not militarily defend himself has been rife, however 
Adjaye, using documentary evidence, has shown that Prempe truly believed that 
negotiation would prove fruitful and that the British had deceived Asante by deposing 
their king.  “The absence of all resistance to the advance of the troops was really due 
to the repeated promises that the government had no intention to depose the King 
provided that they acceded to the terms that would be imposed” (Adjaye, 1989, p. 
226).  And to these terms Prempe, it seems, was more than willing to acquiesce.  On 
the morning when the British arrived in Kumasi, Prempe agreed to all the conditions 
brought before him, including the act of publicly bowing before Lord Wolseley (Adjaye, 
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1989, p. 223).  However, upon demand of the payment of indemnity incurred by 
asantehene Kakari following defeat in the war of 1872, Prempe presented Wolseley 
with £2,720, saying that he was informed he would be allowed to pay the amount in 
instalments, and that furthermore they had only received notice of this amount owing 
two days prior.  When the money was again demanded immediately, Prempe implored 
Wolseley to allow him to return to his home to retrieve more money.  This request he 
was refused and he, along with many of his wing chiefs, was at that moment arrested.  
He was later exiled to Sierra Leone, and then to the Seychelles.  
 
Prempe I spent the next 28 years in exile, and was only repatriated as a private citizen 
in 1924, later passing away in 1931 (Adjaye, 1989, p. 223).  The question stands, why 
would Britain withhold office from a rightful chief of a sophisticated society, when 
their policy is officially one which seeks to support and encourage the development of 
these very same African societies?  If Britain’s true aim in Africa was to assist in the 
flourishing of African institutions, through their own cultural means, and ultimately for 
the British to ‘eliminate’ themselves, why actively depose a ruler who by all accounts 
was known for his intelligence and modernizing tendencies (Adjaye, 1989, p. 247)?   
 
The case of Asante, and certainly that of Prempe I, seems to run counter to the 
rhetoric of indirect rule espoused by Britain in that era.  This would seem to lend 
credence to Boone’s thesis, that it was the realities of what the British found on the 
ground which drove their colonial policy, and ultimately to seek to usurp power in 
Asante. 
 
The Colonial State: Bula Matari 
It took but a mere two decades to bring all of Africa, save Liberia and Ethiopia, under 
European control.  However, it is a certain truth that there exists a vast difference 
between conquering a land and governing it.  The challenge set before these 
imperialists was a great one, for not only was the newly acquired territory immense, in 
many cases with a sparse population, but the terrain was perilous.  Though by the 
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early 1900s medical advances had made significant progress, death by disease was still 
not uncommon in the colonial service in Africa. 
 
With all of these obstacles, how did Europeans endeavour to govern the peoples of 
West Africa?  The first essential move was to delimit the colonial boundaries on the 
ground, an act which has undoubtedly influenced the current geopolitical reality of 
West Africa.  One can examine the rise of the colonial state from two opposing 
perspectives, that of oppression (which has ramifications for the development of the 
post-colonial state) or that of opportunity.  As we shall uncover below, either one in 
isolation does not effectively account for the reality of the colonial state.  Viewing the 
age of high imperialism as mere oppression does grave injustice to the ingenuity of 
indigenous populations, and ignores the adaptability and mobility which existed in pre-
colonial and colonial Africa, and its continuation in the wake of independence. 
  
The colonial ‘control’ over Africa in the latter decades of the 19th century was indeed 
accomplished through a combination of treaties and military confrontations.  Superior 
firepower in the form of machine guns, the maxim gun and canons, as well as surprise 
attacks and the exile of leaders led to the quick overthrow of empires.  Despite the 
religious fervour behind the resistance of the Sokoto empire in Northern Nigeria, the 
emirs were brought to heel within a few years (Boahen, 1987, p. 50).  Exile was the 
fate of such leaders as the Oyo of Benin, Samori Toure and asantehene Prempe I, the 
latter sent to the island of Mahé in the Seychelles, the home to a host of 
‘uncooperative’ African kings (Adjaye, 1989, p. 234). 
 
It is undoubtedly true that this fierce conquest left behind an impression of fear and 
resentment among many of the newly subjugated peoples.  In one colony in particular, 
that of the Congo Free State under King Leopold’s rule, the brutality of the conquest 
led to the establishment of the concept of the Bula Matari (Young, 1994, p. 1).  
Describing the awe-inspiring and fear-laden impression of native peoples for Henry 
Morton Stanley, the push into the interior led to his nickname, Bula Matari, meaning 
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“he who crushes rocks” (Young, 1994, p. 1).  This epithet quickly shifted to describe 
any agent of the burgeoning and brutal regime which existed under King Leopold.  
Furthermore, Belgian officials, themselves, began to use the title as synonymous for 
the state, for the fear it instilled among the population.  Therefore, “a summons from 
Bula Matari was an order from the government” (Young, 1994, pp. 1-2). 
 
Young uses this notion of Bula Matari and expands it to account for the various 
colonial states in Africa, and their legacies following independence.  For our purposes 
in this chapter, our use of Bula Matari is solely as a conceptualization of the brutality 
and grievous exigencies of various colonial practices, and the mingled fear and 
resentment of subjugated populations in West Africa. 
 
The Indigénat 
Though the French bestowed upon Africans many privileges not accorded to their 
peers in the British colonies, the contrast between the elite African citizens and the 
lowly African subjects in the AOF was startling.  As we have discussed above, citizens 
and assimilés were governed under a separate system of law, and possessed particular 
rights such as the vote.  Subjects, on the other hand, did not fall under the purview of 
this privileged system, and were governed by an arbitrary system of law. 
 
The indigénat, a penal system developed first in Algeria, and transplanted to French 
sub-Saharan Africa, instilled in local administrative officers a wide degree of power; a 
power that was easily abused (Hargreaves, 1967, p. 137).  Under the indigénat, a 
subject was not accorded the right of Habeas Corpus, and could be arbitrarily 
imprisoned, fined, or deported, with no recourse to appeal or judicial review.  
Moreover, offences punishable by the indigénat could be defined by decree, at the 
whim of the administrative official (Hargreaves, 1967, p. 137). For quite obvious 
reasons, this was probably the most detested institution of French colonial power. 
 
 
80 
 
Conscription 
Another practice was that of military service, and in the case of the French colonies 
following 1904, conscription, should voluntary recruits not be sufficient (Adloff, 1964, 
p. 177).   Volunteers had served in various conflicts in the name of France, such as the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and later in the two World Wars.  In all cases, African 
soldiers fought not only within their own continent, but in France itself (Adloff, 1964, 
p. 177).   During the First World War, conscription numbers sharply increased to 
accommodate the demands of war, with 80,000 Africans in active service by 1916.  
These men, however, were not all fighting, rather many of them also served in 
ancillary battalions, engaged in labour and factory duties (Adloff, 1964, p. 178).  
 
In the case of the British, their approach to the use of Africans in the military took a 
very divergent path. Indeed, much of the policing in early colonial West Africa was 
undertaken by the Indian Army, for it was thought (at least initially) that the continent 
was not a place for “soldiering or manpower recruitment” (Killingray, 1979, p. 421).  In 
fact, though the Royal West African Frontier Force (WAFF) had been operational by the 
outbreak of the First World War, they, as well as other African troops, were thought 
unreliable, and unfit for service outside of Africa (Killingray, 1979).  However, the 
effect of two World Wars, and the stark changes of the international system in the first 
half of the 20th century led to a need for greater African military involvement.   Though 
the Colonial Office vehemently opposed the involvement of African forces, the 
desperate need of manpower during the Second World War forced their hand, and 
troops were deployed in campaigns in Asia and the Middle East (Killingray, 1979). 
 
 
Taxation 
“J’ai vue des exemples de villages décimés par la maladie du sommeil 
continuant  à payer depuis plusieurs années le même impôt que du temps 
où la population était dix fois plus nombreuse” (Pieusserges cited in Asiwaju, 1976, p. 585)14 
                                                     
14
 Translation: “I’ve seen examples of villages decimated by sleeping sickness, continuing to pay for 
several years, the same tax as at the time when the population was ten times more numerous.” 
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Taxation of West African colonies was a delicate balancing act for both France and 
Britain.  By the early 20th century, the common fiscal opinion in Europe was that the 
colonies ought to be self-financing, to bear the burden of colonial administration and 
development.  This led to the introduction of several forms of taxation, from import 
and customs duties, to direct taxation.   
 
Customs duties had existed in both territories at the time of official colonialism, 
however the French had imposed capitation tax in Côte d’Ivoire from 1901.  The 
British, on the other hand, chose to levy most of their taxes from imports, and avoided 
direct taxation in the Gold Coast until 1936 (Asiwaju, 1976, p. 584).  Taxation, in itself, 
is not necessarily a form of oppression, for indeed the sums collected provide for 
infrastructure development and institutional upkeep.  However, in West Africa, it has 
been argued, the taxation systems introduced were, at times, very unjust for several of 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, there was the issue of representation.  As we have noted earlier, only citizens of 
the French colonies, not its subjects, were accorded full rights and privileges.  And yet, 
French subjects were required to pay this capitation tax, without the benefit of 
receiving the vote, or falling under the jurisdiction of French law.  The same 
resentment is apparent in the British colonies, with a fierce resistance to Lugard’s 
suggestion that direct taxation ought to be implemented in West Africa.  Dr. Nanka 
Bruce, in his speech dated 24 September, 1931 (five years prior to the introduction of 
direct taxation in the Gold Coast) had this response to offer: 
 
We must not take the view of the Noble Lord [Lugard], no matter how 
experienced he may be.  There is no need in this country to have direct taxation.  
In every country where direct taxation is imposed there must equal 
representation. I will only put this proposition: Is Government prepared to give 
this country full representation, and is Government prepared to give the control 
of our finances to the people of this country?  If not, it is better that we remain 
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where we are and try to balance our budget in some other way. (Bruce, 1931, p. 
632) 
 
The second issue regarding taxation is illustrated by the quotation which began this 
section.  The Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Mr. Pieusserges, noted the unfair 
implementation of the capitation tax, whereby members of the community who were 
deceased or had migrated were still included on the roll and the remaining population 
were responsible for providing the missing shares.  This abuse of power by over-
assessment led to a strong resentment on the part of the local populations, many of 
whom were unable to bear these fiscal burdens. 
 
Forced Labour and Préstation 
Apart from the indigénat, the system of préstation, or forced labour, was one of the 
most resented and detested policies of colonial administration in the AOF.  In order to 
supplement the taxation system, all adult males were required to give up to twelve 
days a year of unpaid labour to the government (Hargreaves, 1967, p. 117).  One could 
exempt oneself from this obligation through a cash exchange, however most subjects 
did not have the means to do so.  The form that this labour took was generally local 
public works projects, road maintenance, and railway construction.  Following the First 
World War, subjects could also be conscripted for paid labour in lieu of the mandatory 
military service (Hargreaves, 1967, p. 117).  Though this form of ‘public service’ was 
defended from a standpoint of duty to the colony, the use of préstation for private 
enterprises is not so easily justified.  It was not uncommon, for example, to use this 
unpaid labour for work on private planations, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire, “often under 
conditions which were not adequately subjected to administrative inspection or 
control” (Hargreaves, 1967, p. 117). 
 
The British policy of forced labour has usually been spared this last criticism, a 
common distinction being that unlike their French contemporaries, the British used 
such labour for public works only (Thomas, 1973, p. 79).  In the Northern Territories 
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Protectorate (NTP) of the Gold Coast, labour recruitment was frequent, due to the lack 
of export production. However, from 1906, government recruitment for paid labour in 
the southern mines began, and it is argued that this recruitment of ‘voluntary’ workers 
can be likened to a forced (paid) labour strategy (Thomas, 1973).  Thomas (1973) 
demonstrates that the governmental recruitment campaigns on behalf of the privately 
owned mines did not so much induce volunteers, rather than intimidate chiefs into 
coercing recruits.  These campaigns were conducted primarily in the NTP, and the 
officers in charge were required to meet the demands of a pre-set quota.  Moreover, 
desertion on the part of these recruits was an enormous dilemma for the mine 
owners, the reasons for which were primarily due to poor treatment, ill health and 
deception, as most workers were not initially informed that they would be required to 
spend their days underground (Thomas, 1973). 
 
Though it is arguable that the French policy in West Africa was more of an imposition 
than that of the British, colonialism was certainly not carried out in the most 
benevolent of fashions. The legal system, conscription, taxation and forced labour 
were all institutions of colonial oppression, which were met with varying degrees of 
indignation and outrage from the indigenous population.  However, as we shall 
uncover below, these institutions were not merely accepted by Africans, and indeed 
the adeptness with which local populations circumvented and opposed these 
impositions provide a more complex picture of the colonial situation. 
 
Subverting the Colonial State: Ananse 
When discussing the colonial state, it can be tempting to only list the policies of 
oppression, as above.  However, it is helpful to also look at those opportunities created 
by the colonial state.  Opportunity is expressed in this chapter through the character of 
Ananse, a popular folk-hero in Asante, and wider Akan, tradition.  Ananse is a many-
varied character, sometimes described as human, sometimes spider, who is son of the 
Nyame, the sky god. Ananse is a trickster, whose success relates to his great ingenuity 
and skill, and who is only ever captured in a trap of his own making (Danquah, 1944, p. 
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199).  The popularity of Ananse still exists to this day, being the subject of children’s 
tales in Ghana and abroad. 
 
Our use of Ananse in this piece is to give full credit to the ingenuity displayed by 
indigenous peoples, whose greatest stand against colonialism came not from overt 
military resistance, but from individual strategies.  This cunning, inventive and subtle 
intransigence demonstrates the adaptability of West Africans, and strikes at the core 
of opinion which views their ‘acceptance’ of colonialism with relative passivity.  We will 
examine two of the most significant forms of resistance in the era of colonialism. 
 
Exploitation of Financial and Political Opportunities 
“Considerable facilities exist for the smuggling of spirits across land frontiers.   
Both in the Ivory Coast and in French Togoland railways run northwards from ports situated  
near the Gold Coast frontiers.”  (Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the  
Consumption of Spirits in the Gold Coast, cited in Nugent, 2002, p. 85) 
 
The most significant forms of resistance were dependent on the mobility of Africans, 
something which we have noted was not alien to them.  There are two practices which 
proved most disastrous for the colonial governments, the first of which was the 
exploitation of divergent fiscal regimes.  Unfortunately for the European imperialists, 
the parcelling of West Africa created the existence of a large number of borders, which 
they could not possibly hope to effectively monitor.  This in itself would not have 
proven a great difficulty, had not the various colonial regimes operated their customs 
and fiscal policies in disharmony. 
 
In his very detailed work of the Ghana-Togo borderlands, Nugent (2002) describes the 
incredible troubles wreaked by the high incidence of smuggling across the imperial 
frontiers.  Despite the development of the British Customs Preventive Service (CPS), 
whose mandate it was to maintain order along the borders between British and French 
West Africa, the lack of personnel across such an extensive and rough terrain made the 
aims unattainable.  Evidenced by the case of spirit smuggling in the 1920s, British 
officials were at a loss as to how they could implement the desired prohibition of 
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certain forms of alcohol, without “a doubling in strength of the Preventive Service 
along the eastern frontier” (Nugent, 2002, p. 84).   
 
Indeed, due to the lower French tariffs, there already existed a flourishing illicit trade 
in spirits (Nugent, 2002, p. 85).  Nugent contradicts a common argument, that cross-
border trading routes during the colonial era (and to this day) are simply a 
continuation of traditional trading patterns, and not the product of colonial borders.  
This assumption is simply false, and does not give credit to the African entrepreneurs 
who sought to take advantage of the monetary discrepancies and variable tariffs that 
the borders afforded.  Nugent (2002) demonstrates that contraband trading routes 
were a direct result of the borders, and that “smugglers, who were a familiar feature 
of every border town, were not resisting colonial borders so much as reinforcing them 
through their day-today activities” (p. 103). 
 
The problem of tax evasion also became quite serious, certainly for the French who 
had imposed direct taxation, at a time where the British had not followed suit.  In the 
borderlands between the colony if the Gold Coast and Togo, this led to a situation 
where a farmer would cross the border to work in his fields during the day, and return 
to his home on the other side at night.  Thus, the farmer could avoid direct taxation, 
and in his daily crossings, could smuggle contraband goods as well (Nugent, 2002, p. 
102).   
 
As for political opportunities, Africans took advantage of times of imperial weakening 
to demand greater autonomy from the more exigent practices of the colonial 
administration.  An example of such concessions occurred during the conscription crisis 
of the First World War, whereby the French government was forced to grant soldiers 
certain freedoms upon their return from service.  These included “exemption from the 
indigénat, and from taxation, payment of allowances to their families and preferment 
for ex-soldiers in some government jobs” (Adloff, 1964, p. 178).  Indigenous peoples 
began to take advantage of the benefits of politicizing themselves, through the 
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machinery of government, elected or otherwise, as well as the forming of political 
associations and trade unions. The colonial state offered new avenues for subsistence 
as well as the gaining of rights and privileges. 
 
The Use of Migration 
“L’exode est l’arme des faibles.”15 (Asiwaju, 1976, p. 578) 
 
Migration, more so than smuggling and tax evasion, was detrimental to colonial 
designs, and was heavily employed by those communities in relative proximity to 
imperial frontiers.  As a statement of resistance, using migration as method of refuge 
was made possible by the differing colonial practices of the French and British 
governments. 
 
In his excellent piece entitled “Migrations as Revolt”, Asiwaju (1976) provides an 
account of the movement of residents of Côte d’Ivoire and Upper Volta toward, in 
particular, the colony of the Gold Coast, prior to 1945.  Among the causal factors for 
these mass movements, were the oppressive colonial impositions listed above, such as 
taxation, forced labour and conscription.  These emigrants were not returned to Côte 
d’Ivoire by British officials, despite demands on the part of the French government, for 
the simple reason that the increased labour force was to Britain’s advantage (Asiwaju, 
1976, p. 581).  Moreover, the French were piqued by what they “considered to be 
undue publicity” on the part of their British peers toward these migrations.   
 
Asiwaju (1976) maintains that these migrations were very significant in terms of 
numbers, despite the fact that accurate estimates are impossible to make.  Obviously 
illegal immigrants would avoid the policed border posts, and attempts at the time to 
account for these migrants in the Gold Coast were hampered by the difficulty in 
distinguishing them from their ethnically similar kinsmen (Asiwaju, 1976, p. 589) 
However, the impact of these movements can be weighed in light of isolated data, an 
                                                     
15
 Translation: “Exodus is the weapon of the weak.” 
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example of which is the migration of over 12,000 people from Assini to the Gold Coast 
between 1916-1917, and a staggering 80,000 French subjects from Upper Volta, Mali 
and Niger to the Gold Coast from the late-1920s to the early 1930s (Asiwaju, 1976, p. 
590). 
 
Evidence of these movements is found in the accounts of British officers, who at the 
time were very much aware of the reason for the flights, and were in no hurry to 
discourage the influx of French subjects.  The increase in potential labourers could only 
be an advantage over the competing French.  David Boyle, a District Commissioner 
posted in Asante was said to have written in his diary in 1916 that “the large number 
of French emigrants from Segu and the Senegal Niger country seems to point to some 
heavy taxing, forced recruiting, or other difficulties up there” (Fuller, 2000, p. 127). 
 
This use of migration and other forms of resistance against the dominance of an 
exterior power is reminiscent of peasant resistance in other historical and geographic 
contexts. In his seminal work, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance, James C. Scott (1985) demonstrates how subaltern peoples in Malaysia 
used a variety of tactics, from evasion to outright resistance, in the class struggle 
against the acceptance of the terms of their own subordination. In this same way, the 
system of colonial dominance imposed on African people was not passively accepted 
by the ‘subjugated’ classes. Rather the methods of resistance in and of themselves led 
to the creation of a colonial system that could not have been anticipated by either 
party.  
 
The borders created and concretized during the latter 19th century and the early 20th 
century were not without their advantages, in light of certain oppressive practices of 
the colonial governments.  Indeed, it is the resourcefulness of West Africans in their 
utilization of the borders, both for financial benefit, as well as for refuge, that 
hampered (in particular French) colonial designs.  The indigenous populations were not 
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uniformly passive, for indeed it is their ingenuity and skill which would maintain their 
survival and help to bring about their independence. 
 
The Partitioning of Africa Part I: The Balkanization Lament 
“For about a century, perhaps since 1885 when it was partitioned, Africa has been ruefully 
nursing the wounds inflicted on it by its colonial past.  Remnants of this unenviable colonial 
heritage intermittently erupt into discordant social, political and even economic upheavals, 
which, some may say, are better forgotten than remembered.  But this ‘heritage’ is difficult, if 
not impossible to forget; aspects of it continue, like apparitions, to rear their heads, and haunt 
the entire continent in various jarring and sterile manifestations: how do you forget unhealed 
wounds?”  
(Ajibola, as cited in Griffiths, 1994, p. 1). 
 
It is said that in late 19th century, the culmination in the scramble for Africa was the 
Berlin Conference of 1885-86.  The continent had experienced a sudden and profound 
change like no other before it, and even if what Katzenellenbogen (1996) claims is true 
(that much of the setting of African boundaries occurred prior to 1885), it is 
undeniable that the European influence was to have changed the historical trajectory 
of sub-Saharan Africa.  The rivalries among the colonial powers pushed the expansion 
of the costal outposts into the hinterland, in order to secure a meaningful occupation 
of territory.  Settlement grew, colonial governments developed and expanded, 
education systems were nascent and the proliferation of European languages and 
culture met with a variety of reactions from indigenous nations.   
 
In the years leading up to independence, particularly in the French-speaking colonies, 
there began the faint rumblings of a new school of thought, which I for lack of a better 
term, I have called the Balkanization Lament.  In the aftermath of the partitioning of 
the continent, and growing alongside the pan-African movement there began the 
critique of the colonial powers and grieving over the balkanization of sub-Saharan 
Africa which occurred (supposedly) at the Berlin Conference. 
 
The Balkanization Lament has many distinct features.  The first is the view that the 
50,000 miles of boundary that divide Africa are artificial, and more so than other areas 
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of the world, due to the rapidity and outside-influence of their imposition (Griffiths, 
1995, p. 2).  This has left much of the continent parcelled into non-viable states, which 
are “too small, in terms of area, population and resources” (Griffiths, 1995, p. 4). 
Dowdon states that explanations as to Africa’s ‘failure’ begin with “bad geography and 
bad history” (2009, p. 266). He further states that Africa’s borders are artificial, in that 
they do not follow ‘natural’ boundaries. 
 
Boutros-Ghali (1972, p. 7) elaborates this view with two further characteristics: that 
boundaries are foreign to Africa, and that they were imposed without the participation 
of indigenous peoples.  In elaborating the ideas as to the problem with African 
boundaries (which he himself does not necessarily hold to), Boutros-Ghali (1972) 
clarifies the position with a series of linear claims.  Firstly, that due to the under-
population of pre-colonial Africa, and therefore the abundance of territory, the 
concept of boundaries in the Western ‘nation-state’ sense was wholly unknown.  
Moreover, the nomadic and semi-nomadic nature of most societies meant that 
authority in sedentary areas was exercised over only the locality, and not over the 
wider non-sedentary population.  And lastly, that the lack of technology, and the 
complexity of landscape did not allow for the clarification of concrete boundaries. 
 
As to the secondary claim, that Africans did not participate in the partition of the 
continent, Boutros-Ghali again elaborates the underlying assumptions.  Colonial 
boundaries were imposed by outsiders, without reference to local ethnic groups, or 
the geographical realities on the ground.  The divided nations were partitioned into 
artificial states, “characterised by a permanent irredentism”16 (Boutros-Ghali, 1972, p. 
9).  This lack of foresight on the part of the colonial dividers left several territories 
without access to the ocean, or unviable economically. Furthermore, many of the 
boundaries were drawn following meridians, parallels, or geometric lines, with only 
26% depicting ‘natural’ boundaries such as lakes or mountains. Dowdon (2009, p. 267) 
                                                     
16
 My translation 
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claims that “these lines gave birth to Nigerians, *Ivoirians+, Ugandans and Tanzanians 
who had little in common with many of their new fellow citizens.” 
 
This led the leaders of the first pan-African Conference in 1958 to state that “the 
barriers and artificial boundaries traced by the imperialists to divide the African 
people, to the detriment of Africans, must be abolished or modified”17 (Boutros-Ghali, 
1972, p. 10).  This statement made in Accra, was to occur just two years prior to the 
devolution of power to the constituent parts of the former colonies of French West 
Africa.  Indeed, if what Griffiths (1995, p. 3) claims is true, that “the colonially-imposed 
partition is a political straight-jacket for modern Africa”, the burning question is thus, 
why despite the growing fervour of the Balkanization Lament, did the leaders of the 
newly-independent African states choose not to redraw these artificial, colonially-
imposed boundaries, or rather do away with them altogether? 
 
The Partitioning of Africa Part II: The Proactive African Paradigm 
“It n’est plus possible ni souhaitable de modifier les frontières des nations au nom de critères 
raciaux, religieux…; en effect, si nous prenions pour critère de nos frontières la race, la tribu ou 
la religion, il y aurait en Afrique des Etats qui seraient effacés de la carte…”18  
(President Tsiranana, as cited in Boutros-Ghali, 1972, p. 13). 
 
In response to the previous question, the counter-view, that of the involvement of 
Africa in the creation of its historical trajectory, has been gaining supporters of late 
(see Chabal, 1986).  As a caveat, the elaboration of this view is not to negate some of 
the disastrous effects that European occupation brought, nor to absolve the colonial 
powers of any wrongdoing in their dealings with sub-Saharan Africa.  Rather, its aim is 
to throw off the shackles of condescension and put Africans at the forefront of their 
own history. 
 
                                                     
17
 My translation  
18
 Translation: “It is no longer possible, nor desirable to modify the boundaries of nations in name of 
race, religion…; in effect, if we use as criteria race, tribe or religion, there would be states in Africa that 
would be erased from the map.” 
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Reiterating the assumption underlying the Balkanization Lament, we recall that it is 
two-fold: that pre-colonial Africa had no real conception of boundaries, and that 
Africans themselves were relatively passive in the partition of the continent.  In 
response to the former claim, many authors have set about the task of demonstrating 
an appreciation of territory and boundary among Africans, prior to the coming of the 
Europeans.  Allott (1969) has made the claim that pre-colonial Africa did in fact have a 
conception of space and boundary, even if it was not defined precisely as the Western 
conception.  A variety of groups, such as the Masai, would occupy and claim control 
over a given territory, which may or may not have been delimited by a natural 
boundary.  These ‘spheres of influence’ defined the boundaries of a given community, 
as “territory *was+ a fundamental conception with traditional African societies, as with 
modern western states” (Allott, 1969, p. 10).  Paul Nugent’s argument (1996) concurs 
with Allot, though from a more economic basis he claims that in order to control 
people and goods, one must maintain some form of boundary.  He goes on to say that 
pre-colonial Africa did not possess a unified conception of boundaries, as these would 
necessarily be dictated by the given politico-economic system, and Africa at this time 
possessed a wide variation of systems of production (Nugent, 1996, p. 37).  However, 
territoriality and boundaries were essential to pre-colonial Africa, and defence of the 
claim that boundaries were relatively unknown seems illogical. 
 
Brownlie also contradicts this assumption that pre-colonial Africa lacked borders.  
“From the seventeenth century onwards, societies became more organized. 
Agricultural people certainly had a concept of territory and legitimate holding. Even 
pastoral peoples have a concept of territory in the form of grazing grounds” (1979, p. 
8). He also goes on to cite records of a border dispute between the Sokoto and the 
Matsina. 
 
With respect to the second assumption, that of the passivity of Africans in the creation 
of boundaries, we return to the work of Boutros-Ghali.   In his response to the 
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morcellement19 of Africa by the European powers, he states firstly that African 
boundaries are no more artificial than any other international boundary.  Not even 
‘natural’ boundaries, such as rivers, lakes and mountains are self-evident, that “Nature 
does not know any limits, except those imposed by Man” 20 (Boutros-Ghali, 1972, p. 
11).  This then leads to the related claim, that Africans were not the passive recipients 
of boundaries, but rather had, at times, a proactive influence in their creation.  Touval 
(1972) states that African leaders, though not familiar with European diplomacy, were 
not necessarily political innocents.  
 
African societies did not exist in a political vacuum, and their leaders usually had 
political experience gained in dealing with neighbouring societies, with superior or 
subordinate tribal authorities and with rival groups or individuals.  Thus when 
European emissaries came and offered inducements in return for treaties, their offers 
often fell upon politically-sensitized ears (Touval, 1972, p. 6). And as was discussed in 
the survey of the Asante empire, above, diplomacy and political manoeuvring was 
highly sophisticated among many African societies. 
 
Touval goes on to state that African leaders had their own ambitions and aspirations, 
which many hoped to achieve through alliance with a given European power.  Whether 
wishing to secure the status quo, or to gain an advantage over the enemy, many times 
indigenous peoples sought the assistance of outside powers to secure their own ends.  
“Still others, like the ruler of Buganda, attempted to make use of the special treaty 
relationships with European powers to preserve their own rule over rebellious subject 
peoples” (Touval, 1972, p. 6).   
 
Nugent (1996) discusses the opportunities ushered in by colonial alliances for lower 
ranking vassals and those seeking to overthrow authority.  In this time of great change, 
“old hierarchies could be reversed if political aspirants only played their cards right” 
                                                     
19
 Translation: parcelling 
20
 My translation 
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(Nugent, 1996, p. 47).  Furthermore, Nugent takes to task the view that the lines 
drawn by the Europeans were done so without reference to local concerns and 
realities.  Obviously, many of the initial international treaties among the colonial 
powers contained lines created in the absence of any topographic, geographic, and 
ethnographic knowledge, for the simple reason that much of the interior had yet to be 
explored.  “However, what is often missed is that the respective colonial powers did 
tinker with the lines they began drawing in ignorance” (Nugent, 1996, p. 42).  
Boundaries were quite often redrawn to take into consideration local interests, as very 
often the maintenance of an ethnic group coincided with the colonial interest.  
 
The two divergent views of African participation in the creation of boundaries, still 
leaves unresolved the question of why, despite the criticism heaped upon the 
‘artificial’ and ‘arbitrary’ lines which divide the continent, have they not been 
modified?  The answer, I believe lends more to the Proactive African Paradigm, than to 
the Balkanization Lament; that African leaders, particularly at independence, made a 
choice to recognise and retain the current boundaries, despite the statement of the 
1958 pan-African Conference.  In fact, it was in 1963, only five years later and once 
many of the former colonies had gained independence, that the charter of 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) solidified the adherence to the status quo.  
Rather than taking the opportunity of redrawing the map at a time of change, the OAU 
charter recognised the sovereignty of all former colonial units (Boutros-Ghali, 1972, p. 
12).   
 
Certainly the task of creating new political boundaries is not a simple one.  However, 
“in a rare instance of not muddling through on a question of monumental importance, 
the Africans decided early and decisively that the colonial map should be retained 
*emphasis mine+” (Herbst, 2000, p. 97).  To say quite simply that the boundaries of 
Africa were colonially-imposed from without, is misleading.  Boundaries were indeed 
set with reference to treaties among colonial powers, and with indigenous leaders.  
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However, from the late 19th century these lines have undergone a variety of changes, 
due to decisions taken on the part of Europeans as well as Africans.   
 
Both Jeffrey Herbst and Christopher Clapham offer theories, as to why the colonial 
partitions were not altered at independence.  Herbst (2000) views the issue as one of a 
choice between security and power on the part of the leaders of the newly 
independent states, contrasted with the desire for more ‘logical’ boundaries.  In 
essence, it would appear to be a rather large gamble to risk one’s own political future 
and that of the newly-acquired state (Herbst, 2000, p. 97).  “At independence, the 
leaders of the new independent states readily acknowledged the disastrous effects of 
the partition of the continent, but were reluctant, if not totally unwilling, to support 
policies likely to restrain state sovereignty and, consecutively, their power” (Bach, 
1999, p. 2).  One must not forget, as well, that these artificial boundaries had been in 
existence for over half a century at the time of independence, with many of the 
residents feeling some budding sense of patriotism.  
 
Clapham (2005) turns the question on its head, and looks at the distinction between a 
state which creates its own boundaries, and boundaries that create a state.  “The 
boundaries may be more artificial but they are for that very reason more – not less – 
central to the identity of the state that lies within it” (Clapham, 2005, p. 54).  This 
notion of protecting what one has already won, and not risking all the chips on another 
round, does seem to ring true.  Also, the inconsistencies in political philosophy among 
the new African state leaders demonstrate yet another obstacle to cooperation.  
However, these issues were perhaps not impossible to circumvent had all parties been 
willing.   
 
As to this claim of the artificiality and arbitrary nature of African borders, Brownlie 
offers the view (1979, pp. 3-4) that no border is ‘natural’, even those that follow 
geographical features such as rivers.  Even rivers must have a more precise definition 
of ‘boundary’ in international law.  At times the boundary is the median line of the 
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river, at other times its thalweg, or the “median line of the principal channel of 
navigation” (Brownlie, 1979, p. 17).   
 
What has been noted in this section is that the creation of African boundaries has been 
a complex and evolving process, which neither Africans nor Europeans alone could 
have accomplished nor envisioned.  The roots of colonialism run deep, and once 
created, boundaries can take on a meaning which far exceeds the thin line on a map.  
However, Africans have been a part of the process of boundary creation from the 
outset, and their resistance, acquiescence and decisions have influenced the course of 
their historical trajectory.  It is this freedom and responsibility, which the Balkanization 
Lament ultimately ignores. 
 
A way forward 
The static nature of African society in the pre-colonial and colonial periods is a notion 
which does not hold, in light of the plethora of contradictory evidence.  From our 
earliest accounts of the continent, Africans have demonstrated that they are peoples 
who are no strangers to movement.  The trans-Saharan trade which eventually 
brought together the cultures of West Africa with the Islamic world, began a 
partnership of migration and cultural exchange which extends to the present day.  The 
West African empires which would rise and fall during the last millennium would owe 
their existence to this trade, and would eventually bring them into contact with the 
great commercial nations of Europe. 
 
The sheer power of the Asante empire in its height greatly affected trade on the Gold 
Coast, and the diplomatic relations among the various indigenous ethnic groups, the 
Islamic states to the north, and the European outposts on the coast.   The great 
changes brought about by the Scramble for Africa and the usurpation of Asante rule, 
though significant, did not divorce autochthonous people from their past.  The 
adaptability and mobility of Africans which was a mark of the pre-colonial period, is 
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evidenced throughout the half-century of imperial occupation, both as forms of 
resistance and opportunity.   
 
In this way, although I have used Asiwaju’s citation as the title of this chapter, that of 
migrations being the weapon of the weak, I am not certain that ‘weak’ is an 
appropriate descriptor.  Africans were subject to many harsh policies under colonial 
rule, however it was their strength and ingenuity that made their subversion of the 
colonial state so successful.  In maintaining a focus of the role that Africans have 
played in the resistance to colonial regimes, their eventual overthrow, and then in the 
creation post-colonial states (and preservation of colonial state boundaries), this thesis 
will now turn to examine the way in which Africans use modern-day borders in survival 
strategies, and also to subjugate and oppress. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter traced a narrative of West Africa that demonstrates a history of migration 
as well as political acumen.  It began through a comparison of British and French 
colonial ‘styles’ and found that their differences were not as significant in practice. The 
British relationship with the empire of Asante was given a comprehensive treatment, 
demonstrating British aspirations in usurping local control in the Gold Coast. 
What followed was a depiction of the oppressive policies that existed in many of the 
colonial states, demonstrating an exogenous imposition of powers that constrained 
the freedoms of Africans.  However, in response to the oppressive colonial state, the 
chapter also provides evidence for the ingenious tactics used by Africans to subvert the 
colonial state, including the use of migration as revolt. 
The chapter concludes with a debate on the creation of borders in Africa, and suggests 
that the modern political map is the result of interplay between the ambitions of the 
colonial powers and local African aspirations. And that these borders were ultimately 
sanctioned by African leaders in the early years following independence.  
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Chapter Four:  
Borders as a means of eudaimonia 
Individual security in the Ghanaian-Ivoirian borderland 
 
“Spatial boundaries have ambiguous features: they divide and unite, bind the interior 
and link it with the exterior, are barriers and junctions, walls and doors, organs of 
defence and attack, and so on” (Strassoldo, 1989, p. 393). 
 
As an integral part of the ‘African borders as negative’ perspective, the questions of 
instability, criminality and political violence seem always at the forefront.  In the 
opening pages of Uniting Africa, Francis outlines the view that, “[c]ontemporary Africa 
is portrayed as synonymous with perennial wars, armed conflicts, political instability, 
criminal violence; in a state of ‘permanent humanitarian emergency’....The 
continent...has moved from the periphery to the ‘periphery of the periphery’” (Francis, 
2006, p. 1). 
 
Proponents contend that the violence which plagues Africa can be, in part, blamed on 
the legacy of post-colonial borders that have carved up a great continent into 
disparate, warring opponents (Dowdon, 2009).  And a certain logic exists behind this 
thesis, in that the division of the continent into separate political entities creates many 
divisive lines; an ‘us’ and a ‘them’.  However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
creation of African borders was not simply the imposition of outside forces, but was 
also the result of an expression of political manoeuvring on the part of Africans.  
 
This chapter will treat a more basic discussion of whether borders in Africa are 
complicit in the prevalence of violence and insecurity, using the lens of the Capabilities 
Approach.  Although this is a very complex question, we will contend that the opposite 
argument can be made.  Borders assist in the maintenance of two elements of 
personal security, namely sanctuary from physical threats and opportunities for 
economic survival.  Using the example of the cross-border movements that occurred 
during the height of the Ivoirian crisis in the early 2000s, we can demonstrate the 
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positive outcomes that resulted from the permeable borders in terms of personal 
security for those fleeing violence.  Following the case study, this chapter will examine 
the economic survival opportunities that exist at the border, both for Ghanaians and 
Ivoirians. We will conclude that the unique qualities of African borders can indeed 
provide a means of human flourishing, particularly in the context of limited 
opportunities. 
 
Artificiality of borders as an ingredient of instability 
As implied in the introduction to this chapter, a persuasive logic lulls one into the view 
that divisions between African nations in the form of postcolonial borders must 
contribute to the wars and political insecurity by pitting neighbours against one 
another in the pursuit of scarce resources. It appears on the surface to be a solid 
equation: the same resources met with increased demand from multiple challengers 
will led to greater instability. 
 
This argument, however tempting, is built on less than solid foundations, and is 
supported by a structure replete with gaps and holes.  The first assumption, that 
borders in Africa are artificial, arbitrary, and hence undesirable, has been shown to be 
insupportable.  All borders are inherently artificial, even those which are said to be 
‘natural’, given that they follow geographical features such as rivers or mountains.  The 
delineation of space is a concept imposed on nature by man to a particular end, 
whether that be to solidify his hold on farmland, or as a collective to protect political 
influence by creating state borders.  The second, and related assumption is that 
borders are the result of exogenous imposition by the colonial powers, and that this 
non-Africanist legacy is the crux of the security problem.  To put it simply, it is the 
arbitrary delineation of the borders, and not their artificiality which is important. We 
have already dealt with this question at length in the previous chapter, but needless to 
say these assumptions are overly simplistic in their account of history. 
 
 
99 
 
Another error in logic arises from the assumption that a pan-continental African state 
is the ‘natural’ progression that would have taken place were it not for European 
interference.  And that this great state would have had a peaceful birth and pacific 
growth.  Dowdon (2009, p. 267) claims that “before colonization *in Africa+ there were 
traders, artists and farmers and a ruling class. After colonization there were farmers 
and a small random group that had secured their status through Western education or 
by being soldiers.”  This utopian view of pre-colonial Africa is misleading and arguably 
condescending; it assumes a lack of African agency with respect to interactions with 
colonial powers. 
 
Obviously, there is no way to concretely test an alternate history whereby a pan-
Africanist state would have evolved without colonial interference.  However, some 
realities allow one to provide a counter-narrative to the ‘borderless’ African utopian 
thesis.  Africans are not a singular people with a common history, culture or values.  
They comprise a multitude of religions, geographies, and histories, not to mention the 
staggering variations of language and dialect.  Therefore, it is unrealistic to simply 
assume that a pan-Africanist state would have been a logical or ideal political structure 
for the continent. 
 
A question of security 
When treating the question of security more broadly, one must first define what the 
concept entails in terms of security for whom, by whom and to what end.  On the 
whole, when treating the topic of African security, research on the subject tends 
toward a collective, more state-centric approach. This top-level study is an important 
exercise in understanding African security, and research in the area of borders and 
security are beginning to flourish. How does the existence of a border impact the 
prevalence of violence within a state, and vice versa?  Is the strength of an African 
state proportional to the level of political and physical security?  Are stronger states 
less prone to war?   
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In fact, research has indicated that conflict has a great deal to do with the security of 
neighbouring states, and in the postcolonial period the statistics have not been too 
encouraging.  It has been shown, particularly in the case of West Africa, that most 
security problems have been the result of regime failures rather than inter-state 
conflict, which “then escalate into regional conflicts or spillover into neighbouring 
countries, inter alia through refugees and migration” (Söderbaum F. , 2000, p. 125).   
 
However, taking my cue from research done by Söderbaum and Taylor, it is the 
intention of this chapter to turn the whole question on its head.  Just as “micro-regions 
act as a microcosm and an entry point to the study of regionalism in Africa,” 
(Söderbaum & Taylor, 2007, p. 6), so too is the question of individual security a 
potential entry point to the study of ‘regional’ security more broadly.  Simply put, 
rather than a ‘top-down’ approach to the study of security, this chapter will look at 
various elements of individual security in the face of an African state-society complex 
centred on the question of borders, with the aim of complimenting current research, 
rather than detracting from it.  It is not the intention of this piece to claim that analysis 
of regional security projects on the state-level are misinformed, rather that the 
addition of the lower-order focus might provide a fuller picture of the situation ‘on the 
ground’, as it were.  
 
Using Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, this chapter will focus on two 
positive uses of the border between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, emphasizing how the 
border provides an expanded range of opportunities for individual security. Using 
Nussbaum’s breakdown of the essential human capabilities, the question of individual 
security can be understood as a combination of the first three elements, namely the 
capabilities of Life, Bodily Health and Bodily Integrity.  In short, we will look to the way 
in which the border broadens what individuals are able to do and be in light of these 
three capabilities, particularly in the context of circumscribed opportunities.  
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“Friendship with Vigilance”21:  
Mapping the state apparatus in Brong-Ahafo 
It would do well before discussing the way in which African borders can prove to be 
beneficial for individuals, to first examine the nature of the African state apparatus.  
The relationship between the state and its borders is an important one, particularly so 
for Africa, wherein the conception of the state does not always conform to a 
Westphalian ideal. 
 
For example, how does the individual thrive, and indeed survive when a large threat 
comes not from external violence, but the reach of a predatory state apparatus? I 
contend that the unique qualities of the African state-society complex create a physical 
and ideational space to manoeuvre; to escape, or even subvert, a predatory state.  
These spaces, many times, tend to exist in the borderlands.  Without the existence of 
borders, the following individual survival strategies would be eradicated or near-
impossible to maintain.  To clarify, these headings are quite broad.  They are not 
intended to be all-encompassing, nor exhaustive; however, they do illustrate many 
unique micro-regional strategies.  
 
In the Westphalian state, borders set the physical limits of state power and control, 
they delineate citizens from foreigners and they protect citizens from outside threats.  
However, it has been argued that the state in Africa does not correspond to this 
conception in many ways, and therefore it ought to be understood differently from its 
European-born brother.  For some time, it was in vogue to lay the ills of Africa at the 
foot of colonialism. Dependency theorists claimed that the war, violence, famine and 
poverty in Africa were the direct result of the imposition of colonial institutions ill-
suited to the structure of African society (further compounded by the artificiality of the 
colonial borders, creating non-viable territorial structures). 
 
                                                     
21
 “Friendship with Vigilance” is the motto of the Ghana Immigration Service 
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However, in the late-20th century, Jean-François Bayart countered these dependency 
theorists, in his work “The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly.”  He contended that 
the African state was not merely a variation of the western, European state, nor simply 
the result of colonial imposition.  Rather, the state structures in Africa can be 
understood as a product of their own historical trajectory. 
 
The Politics of the Belly is a complex metaphor, describing the cooptation of elites by 
the state, resulting in an artificial bourgeoisie, without a true class struggle.  Bayart 
uses the image of the belly due to its importance in African culture more broadly, 
which references: 
 Food shortages 
 And conversely, ‘eating’ both in a physical as well as in the metaphorical sense 
of accumulation 
 Women and the politics of sexual relations 
 Corpulence, often seen as representative of a powerful man 
 Nepotism 
 And the control over “forces of the invisible” (Bayart, 1993, p. xviii).  
 
 
Bayart purports that the African state is not a result of colonial importation; a mere 
transplantation of European governmental structures on colonial Africa.  Indeed, he 
suggests that the African state “rests upon autochthonous foundations and a process 
of reappropriation of institutions of colonial origin which give it its own historicity; it 
can no longer be taken as a purely exogenous structure” (Bayart, 1993, p. 260). Bayart 
claims that the long history of extraversion among African elites led to the cooptation 
of colonial structures. "Africans have been active agents in the mise en dependence of 
their societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining in it, in such a way 
that it became an anachronism to reduce home-grown strategies to formulas of 
'nationalism' or indeed 'collaboration’” (Bayart, 1993, p. 24). 
 
However, for all of the positives brought about by Bayart’s insistence at incorporating 
the historicity of African society into the study of the modern African state, 
Christopher Clapham asserts that Bayart’s thesis presents two key failings: that it deals 
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very little with the structures and institutions of the African state (emphasising rather 
the continuity of elite behaviour), and secondly that it fails to account for change 
(Clapham C. , 1994).  In moulding his account of African politics to the continuity of 
African society, Bayart’s argument does not tackle some of the major challenges 
replete in African life south of the Sahara: famine, war, economic collapse, 
environmental degradation, violence etc.   
 
The African state has been variably described as neo-patrimonial (Cammack, 2007; 
Bratton & van de Walle, 1994), weak (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Reno, 1997), and failed 
(Kraxberger, 2007; The Washington Post, 2005).  Neo-patrimonialism is a contestable 
concept that has been used to refer to the complex patron-client system that has 
existed in many post-colonial African states.  This system may work in conjunction with 
existing bureaucratic structures or at times it may undermine these structures. Taylor 
and Williams (2008) provide an analysis of state power in West Africa, concluding that 
the dominant political culture is neo-patrimonial in nature.  By maintaining a complex 
system of patron-client relationships, regimes are able to effectively counter 
challenges to their control of the state apparatus.   
 
Pitcher, Moran and Johnston argue that neo-patrimonialism is a concept that is often 
incorrectly employed.  Its origins are Weberian, from his work detailing systems of 
legitimating power and authority.  Weber offered patrimonialism as one such system 
of securing compliance, although Pitcher et al. emphasize that Weber saw this form of 
authority as one that involved reciprocities, effectively checking the ruler’s authority.  
Therefore, neo-patrimonialism should not necessarily be understood as synonymous 
with “corruption, “bad governance,” violence, tribalism or a weak state” (Pitcher et al., 
2009, p. 126). 
 
In examining the process of political change in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle (1994) 
contend that it has been neo-patrimonial systems that allow many regimes to maintain 
their control of state power by establishing rules as to who may legitimately 
participate in the public system and the degree to which competition would be 
104 
 
permitted.  A particularly ‘successful’ example of neo-patrimonial rule was that of Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, President of Côte d’Ivoire for 33 years. A more robust examination 
of his particular brand of neo-patrimonialism will be treated later in this chapter. 
 
To varying degrees, the state structures and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa have had 
limited success in gaining control over territories in the periphery. However, as Boone 
(2003) argues, the success with which the centre gains such a foothold has more to do 
with the structures of local politics in the periphery than with the power and structure 
of the centre.  To illustrate her argument, Boone examines several regional case 
studies in West Africa, including Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.  She demonstrates 
that even within one state, the structure of relations between rural regions and the 
centre can vary, as a result, she claims, of the unequal bargaining power among rural 
elites. This has led to an uneven pattern of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, even 
within different regions of one state (Boone, 2003). 
 
Using two variables, Boones creates a four-option strategy to illustrate the centre-rural 
relationship in West Africa, where the focus is not on the nature of the state 
structures, but on the rural powerbase.  The two variables are the degree of social 
hierarchy in the rural area (how much control do local elites exert) and the economic 
autonomy of those rural elites (how dependent are they on the centre for their elite 
status). The interaction of these two variables then creates four institution-building 
options for the government at the centre vis-à-vis a given rural area, with the ultimate 
aim of gaining control of the rural economic industries, in particularly agriculturally-
rich zones. These four options are then demonstrated as follows: 
 Who wields authority at the local level? 
 Rural elites 
(devolved authority) 
State agents 
(centralized authority) 
State institutions created at 
the village level 
(deconcentration) 
Powersharing Usurpation 
State institutions ‘suspended 
above’ localities 
(concentration) 
Non-incorporation Administrative occupation 
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Boone argues that Kwame Nkurmah’s regime in the early post-colonial era sought to 
usurp the authority of the traditional Asante elite, who then had a firm control over 
the cocoa-producing belt of the forest zone.  As part of this usurpation, Nkrumah 
created new parallel institutional structures to displace the authority of the rural elite 
in Asante, even though this strategy was not used in other rural areas of Ghana.   
 
In many of the other rural areas, for example, the Nkrumah regime instituted a 
powersharing model, including the in north, and in Brong-Ahafo. Indeed, Brong-Ahafo 
was itself a new administrative area created by Nkrumah’s regime in 1959 in part to 
secure the support of the Brong-Ahafo chiefs by carving the area out from Asante as a 
“political reward” (Boone, 2003, p. 176). This also served to weaken the position of the 
Asante chiefs. I would argue that this powersharing model in Brong-Ahafo has led to an 
incomplete capture of state institutions in the region on the part of the centre, 
particularly in the borderland. 
 
The term borderland is another of these highly-contestable political terms.  In its most 
basic understanding, one can define the borderland as a region of interaction 
surrounding a border.  However, a more nuanced interpretation can be found in 
Jonathan Goodhand’s piece War, Peace and the Places in Between: Why Borderlands 
are Central. In this work, Goodhand (2008) divides borderlands into three typologies, 
based on the area’s relationship with the state.  Classical borderlands are found on 
international borders, with the border itself influencing the interactions across both 
sides.  Internal borderlands are not located next to international borders, but function 
rather independently as regions with weak state penetration.  And finally, frontier 
states and global borderlands are very similar to classical borderlands in that they are 
usually situate near an international border; however, Goodhand conceives of these 
global borderlands as being entirely non-state spaces. 
 
In line with this typology, I would contend that the borderland between Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana functions as a classical borderland.  It straddles an international border, 
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which creates a region of opportunity for populations on either side.  As Goodhand 
rightly notes, the separation between the borderland periphery and the “state-
controlled centre may be conceptualised as a mobile, semi-permeable, internal 
frontier – a zone of transition from low to high administrative intensity and where the 
border effect has become less significant than the ‘state effect’” (2008, p. 228).  And 
yet, I believe that Goodhand’s admittedly rudimentary typology lacks one key feature.  
Within the classical borderland, and specifically in the case of the Ghanaian-Ivoirian 
borderland, one can argue that there is a frontier that exists between the borderland 
(periphery) and the state (centre), as well as another frontier within the borderland, 
where the state presence is reasserted at the international border itself.  
 
In present day Brong-Ahafo, there are 19 administrative districts, each headed by a 
District Chief Executive (DCE), assisted by a District Co-ordinating Director (DCDs). 
These two positions fall under two authority lines, with the DCE answering to the 
Regional Minister (political head of the Brong-Ahafo region), and the DCD falling under 
a Regional Coordinating Director. Brong-Ahafo also has a District Assembly, which 
undertakes the legislative functions for the region, where two-thirds of its membership 
is elected, and one-third is appointed by government.  
 
In addition to these local structures, two key institutional players include the Ghana 
Immigration Service and the Ghana Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS)22. 
The role of the former is “to regulate and monitor the entry, residence, employment 
and exit of all foreigners. Movement of Ghanaians in and out of the country is equally 
monitored” (Ghana Immigration Service, 2010).  The role of CEPS is to collect all 
applicable customs duties and taxes on goods entering the country, as well as 
investigating incidents of smuggling (CEPS, 2006).    
 
                                                     
22
 In 2009, CEPS was incorporated into the Ghana Revenue Authority, however as my field research 
references CEPS I have decided to refer to it as such throughout the rest of this piece. 
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Despite these many key players with a vested interest in monitoring cross-border 
movements, the enormity of the task is daunting.  On the whole, Ghana has over 
2,000km of land borders with three neighbouring states (Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso 
and Togo). According to the Ghana Immigration Service (2010), there are 45 official 
entry points along the land borders, a militarized border patrol unit as well as foot and 
vehicular patrols. But as is discussed later in this chapter, the function and abilities of 
these services in Brong-Ahafo are not as robust as they might seem. Lack of staff and 
resourcing, coupled with an incomplete state capture of institutions and individuals in 
the borderland have led to a flourishing of cross-border movements. 
 
This imperfect state control over the Ghanaian-Ivoirian borderland in the Brong-Ahafo 
region has allowed for a flourishing of illicit cross-border movement, at times 
supported by agents of the state (border officials), as well as individuals on either side 
of the border.  From a state-centric perspective this reality could be construed as a 
disadvantage; as a subversion of the state itself. From a micro-perspective, however, 
this fluidity of the border has opened up two important avenues for human flourishing, 
which shall be discussed at greater length in this chapter. The first of these 
opportunities presented by the border is the notion of escape in the face of physical 
threat; the second is the opportunity for economic survival that is presented by the 
border.  
 
Borders, Sanctuary and Safe Passage: The example of the Ivoirian Crisis 
If agents of the state can be predatory, then the conception of the state as ‘protector 
from exterior threats’ does not always correspond to reality on the ground.  Take, for 
example, the effect of civil war on many states in West Africa, most notably Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
In the case of civil war, the ‘state’ ceases to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force in the Weberian sense.  In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, both the government and 
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the rebel forces23 make claims to their legitimate use of violence as agents of the state.  
As an individual, what recourse do you have once the primary threat to survival comes 
not from exogenous forces, but rather from within the state (and at times at the hands 
of state actors)?  In this way, the borders as incompletely captured state institutions, 
become avenues for safety in the face of internal threats.  
 
Long seen as a bastion of security and prosperity in the region, Côte d’Ivoire has been 
rocked by violent, political instability for over a decade, beginning with the 1999 
military coup led by Robert Guéï (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).  The roots of this 
crisis are very complex, with studies tracing its origins to the death of President Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 (and the collapse of his sophisticated neo-patrimonial 
system), the increasingly limited supply of fertile farming land, and the malleable 
discourse surrounding  citizenship and Ivoirité. All of these factors have led to a crisis, 
in which the definition of Ivoirian citizenship (with its resultant privileges) has been a 
major battleground.  Those who do not qualify, and are therefore considered ‘foreign’, 
have been subject to violent attacks, theft, and death.  The borders have been crucial 
to the security of so many during this crisis.  In order to understand the role of the 
border, we will first examine the three contributing factors which led to the crisis, 
before analyzing the way in which the border has been used by Ivoirians and 
‘foreigners’ for sanctuary and safe passage. 
 
Houphouëtism 
Côte d’Ivoire first became an independent state in 1960, following more than fifty 
years of French colonial rule (Schwab, 2004, p. 47). Félix Houphouët-Boigny became its 
first President, remaining in this position until his death in 1993.  Sometimes referred 
to as “Papa Houphouët”, during his tenure, Côte d’Ivoire was effectively a one-party 
state, ruled by the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI).  The ‘success’ of 
Houphouët-Boigny’s 33 years in power can be understood as the result of a complex 
                                                     
23
 I use the terms ‘government’ and ‘rebel’ forces not to indicate any form of legitimacy upon the 
former, but rather to conform with common usage by media sources. 
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system of patronage and balance among disparate ethnic groups, described as 
Houphouëtism.  
 
Houphouëtism has been variously defined, but one comprehensive understanding has 
been developed by Francis Akindès. Akindès describes Houphouëtism as “a set of 
structuring principles and practices interpreted in various ways, which function as a 
system of reference and a political culture that is socially recognised but is not 
conceptualised” (Akindès, 2004, p. 7). Effectively, Akindès sees Houphouëtism as a 
political-economic complex, which is the result of the synergy of the following three 
parameters: 
i. Deliberate and centralised openness policy to the outside world 
Côte d’Ivoire had been a destination for migrant labour, due to a variety of colonial 
policies, from forced labour to economic incentives.  Following independence, 
Houphouët-Boigny instituted policies that further encouraged economic migration 
and investment in the burgeoning Ivoirian economy.  These policies led to a massive 
influx of migrants from all over West Africa, particularly from Burkina Faso, “Mali, 
Niger, Guinea, Ghana, Togo and Benin” (Akindès, 2004, p. 10). Côte d’Ivoire was an 
economic success, and many of these migrants became long-term settlers. This 
abundance of labour resources was a key instrument for economic prosperity, 
benefiting the state as a whole, and solidifying Houphouët-Boigny’s political control. 
 
ii. Philosophy of the “peanut roasters” 
The concept of the “peanut roaster” originates from an African parable, which 
warns against looking too closely at the peanut-roaster’s mouth.  In the process of 
roasting peanuts, the cook has the privilege of tasting the peanuts.  The peanut 
roaster is a metaphor for those who belong “to a select circle of political clientele 
who benefit from an unequal but socially recognised distribution by the mere fact 
of belonging to this group” (Akindès, 2004, p. 11). Houphouët-Boigny maintained 
order through the creation of a group of elites, controlled by a sophisticated system 
of patronage.  It was postulated that this fabricated bourgeoisie would then 
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contribute to an endogenous system of investment and entrepreneurship. 
Ultimately, the system of patronage led to an elite class, who had accumulated 
substantial fortunes. 
 
iii. Paternalistic management of social diversity 
The third component of Houphouëtism was 
the creation of a reinvented social history, 
which ordered the various linguistic groups 
within Côte d’Ivoire according to a hierarchy.  
There are four major linguistic groups in 
Côte d’Ivoire: the Mandé, Gur (Voltaïque), 
Krou and Akan. Houphouët-Boigny belonged 
to the Baoulé, one of the major components 
of the Akan group.  The rewriting of the 
social hierarchy in the decolonization and 
early independence period, ranked the 
groups with the Akan at the top and the Krou 
at the bottom.  Akindès emphasizes that this myth of the superiority of the Akan 
(and in particular the Baoulé) was not a simplistic imposition, but rather was the 
result of a complex system of indoctrination and persuasion, to establish a “pre-
destined elitist vocation of this ethnic group to govern the state” (Akindès, 2004, p. 
14).  It was another essential piece of the complex puzzle of Houphouëtism, which 
allowed for the political domination of the Baoulé within the PDCI. 
 
Although the concept of Houphouëtism attempts to reconcile and balance competing 
interests and groups, it did not involve a democratic system. Indeed, Houphouët-
Boigny’s aim was to create order, claiming “I prefer injustice to disorder: one can die of 
disorder, one does not die of injustice. An injustice can be repaired” (Schwab, 2004, p. 
54). Houphouët-Boigny proclaimed the advantages of a single-party system, stating 
that “*n+ow we have no reason to be divided, so it is desirable that all of us should be 
Figure 4.1: Linguistic groups in Côte d’Ivoire 
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members of the sole party, just like an African family. We are not going to pay for an 
opposition just to please the Occident” (Schwab, 2004, pp. 53-54). 
 
Limited land resources  
The second contributing factor in the Ivoirian crisis was also a primary factor for the 
earlier economic prosperity of the fledgling nation.  The extremely fertile and 
abundant land in the forest zone is an ideal climate for the farming of cocoa.  One key 
aspect of the openness policy of Houphouëtism was a new conceptualization of land 
ownership that encouraged mass migration from neighbouring West African countries.  
Houphouët-Boigny instituted a policy of mise en valeur, meaning that anyone could 
claim user rights by working an unused plot of land.  The slogan was “land belongs to 
those who make it produce”24 (Woods, 2003, p. 645). 
 
When fertile land was abundant, as was the case in the early post-colonial period, the 
many agreements regarding user rights remained relatively unproblematic.  Tens of 
thousands of migrants from northern Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring countries arrived 
in the forest zone to work on coffee and cocoa plantations (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 26). 
Although there exists many forms of work contracts, some of which involve access to 
land and some which do not (Koné, 2001), a common practice in the forest zone was a 
relationship called busan (or abusan).  In Baoulé, busan “means to divide into three 
parts” (Koné, 2001, p. 13), and signifies a relationship between the land-owner and the 
labourer, where two-thirds of the sale of the crop goes to the former, with the 
remaining third going to the latter.  Through the busan relationship, labourers 
eventually gained access to their own land, in exchange for their labour.  As land 
became more scarce, farmers and labourers eventually moved further east in the 
forest zone, seeking new land for cultivation.  This was also exacerbated by a lack of 
public investment into agricultural infrastructure, leading to “low and stagnant yields, 
soil depletion and erosion, and low quality output (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 26).   
                                                     
24
 Alternately, this slogan is also understood as “the land belongs to the person who cultivates it” (Koné, 
2001). 
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Unsurprisingly, as access to fertile land became more difficult to acquire, tensions 
arose among groups attempting to define who had the ‘right’ of access to existing 
farms.  Unfortunately, access to land in the independence era has been largely 
regulated by customs and social networks as opposed to legal instruments (Koné, 
2001, p. 1).  Legislation was passed in the late 1990s, effectively excluding non-
Ivoirians from land ownership (Koné, 2001, p. 2), despite the fact that many migrants 
had acquired Ivoirian citizenship. This leads nicely into a discussion of the discourse of 
Ivoirité, and the shifting definition of who qualifies as Ivoirian. 
 
The Discourse of Ivoirité 
With the death of Houphouët-Boigny, the economic decline and the increasing 
pressures on limited fertile land, the question of citizenship became a crucial political 
tool.  The end of the Ivoirian miracle, and the subsequent fight for diminished 
resources fuelled an “anti-migrant rhetoric among those who consider[ed] themselves 
‘true’ Ivoirians” (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 28).  The elections25 that followed Houphouët-
Boigny’s death were subject to a new electoral code, instituted by his eventual 
successor Henri Konan Bédié. This code effectively prevented prominent opposition 
members from running in the elections, through the creation of two types of citizens: 
‘pure’ Ivoirians and ‘mixed’ Ivoirians.  The policy of Ivoirité conceptualizes the myth of 
the ‘pure’ Ivoirian, and accords to him certain political rights (the right to stand for 
election, the right vote etc.) as well as land-ownership rights. 
 
Ivoirité is a socially and politically constructed concept that has not been applied and 
understood in a uniform manner. The rapidly changing leadership within Côte d’Ivoire 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, led to an ever-evolving use of Ivoirité, with the 
discourse captured and adapted to solidify power. Akindès (2004, p. 26) states that 
Ivoirité has a dual function: “From an internal point of view, “Ivoirité” defines the 
                                                     
25
 Although the 1995 presidential and legislative elections were intended to be free, open and 
democratic, they were ultimately boycotted by opposition parties (Boas & Huser, 2006, pp. 28-29). 
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criteria for participation in the distribution of scarce resources (jobs, property, power) 
within the country. From an external point of view “Ivoirité” defines national 
preference.”  
 
Traditionally, the PDCI had a favourable relationship with the north, and indeed the 
‘openness’ in Houphouëtism had led to the enrichment of both Baoulé land-owners 
and northern migrant labourers in the forest zone.  However, the economic and 
political situation inherited by Bédié in the mid-1990s was very different from that of 
Houphouët-Boigny in 1960.  Land was at a premium, and the fertile frontier of the 
forest zone had shifted west, away from the Baoulé-dominated east, and about a third 
of the population in Côte d’Ivoire was now foreign-born.  Northern and foreign 
labourers had acquired access to their own land, and pressures from local Ivoirians had 
prompted a situation where these ‘outsiders’ were viewed in a less than favourable 
light.  Furthermore, Bédié’s chief rival within the PDCI, was a northerner and the 
former Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire, Alasanne Ouattara.  Ouattara was appointed as 
Prime Minister in 1990, and also undertook the duties of President in the final months 
of Houphouët-Boigny’s reign, while the latter was taken ill.   
 
In order to engineer the election to secure his victory, Bédié capitalized on the 
nationalist, anti-migrant rhetoric by using the discourse of Ivoirité.  Bédié asserted that 
Ouattara was in fact Burkinabé, claiming that both of his parents were not born in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Ouattara maintains that his parents were both Ivoirian and that he was born 
in Dimbokro, in present-day Côte d’Ivoire. The question of Ivoirité is further 
complicated by the relatively young age of the state of Côte d’Ivoire, the lack of 
consistent birth records and the fluctuating nature of the colonial border. Indeed, 
although present-day Burkina Faso was sometimes considered a separate entity 
(Upper Volta) under the AOF, it was “an integral part of Côte d’Ivoire until 1947” 
(Akindès, 2004, p. 8).  
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Relying on this xenophobic policy of nationalism, Bédié used the language of Ivoirité to 
secure his position as President, removing opposition members from posts within 
government and the military (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 29). Foreigners were also used as 
scapegoats, blamed for the downturn in the Ivoirian economy. Although not overt, 
Bedié’s Ivoirité aimed to maintain political and economic control in the hands of the 
Akan (Akindès, 2004, p. 28). It was not an inclusive, pluralistic nationalism, but a tribal-
based, Christian, ethnic nationalism. 
 
Traditionally, the population in the north of Côte d’Ivoire has been predominantly 
Muslim (also referred to as Dioula).  The discourse of Ivoirité has excluded northern 
Ivoirian Muslims, identifying these groups as culturally linked to Dioula in neighbouring 
countries like Burkina Faso and Mali (Akindès, 2004, p. 29). This understanding of 
Ivoirité is exacerbated by the fact that the 1998 census found that 86% of immigrants 
in Côte d’Ivoire were Muslim (Akindès, 2004, p. 29).  
 
Following Bédié’s ‘victory’ in the 1999 elections, won using a similar strategy, he was 
ousted through a military coup, which put Robert Guéï into power. Interestingly, 
despite an initial attempt to broaden his support by the inclusion of opposition 
members within his government, Guéï eventually also turned to the language of 
Ivoirité (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 29).  This new interpretation was “selectively civic”, in 
that it was inclusive of other regions such as the west, east and centre, but still 
maintained the exclusion of northern Ivoirians (Akindès, 2004, p. 29). 
 
Guéï’s reign was short-lived, as he lost the 2000 election to Laurent Gbagbo of the 
Front Popular Ivoirien (FPI), in which Ouattara was not allowed to run.  Once elected, 
Gbagbo also used the concept of Ivoirité, however he manipulated the discourse to 
favour his own ethnic group, the Bété, and focused the anti-migrant rhetoric, at least 
initially, more on non-Ivoirians, rather than northern Ivoirians. The Bété, like the 
Baoulé, no longer had ready access to fertile agricultural land in the forest zone, and 
the only way in which they could now gain access was to challenge non-indigenous 
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ownership.  “Their argument was straightforward: indigenous land could not be 
alienated from the community. Thus…migrants who had acquired land from Bété 
farmers in return for their labour, or who had purchased the land directly, now learned 
that they really did not own their land” (Woods, 2003, p. 651). 
 
Bedié, Guéï and Gbagbo all agreed that Alasanne Ouattara was ineligible to stand for 
election, maintaining he was Burkinabé (Woods, 2003, p. 652).  The discourse of 
Ivoirité was, and still is, a powerful political weapon, used to eliminate the opposition, 
and to enrich southern supporters, at the expense of northern and foreign migrants. 
This emphatic nationalism and the declining economic opportunities created a 
situation in which those not considered Ivoirian found themselves to be at great 
personal risk. 
 
Xenophobia and violence 
The three interrelated factors, which contributed to the Ivoirian crisis of the early 
2000s, are inextricably linked.  The death of Houphouët-Boigny, coupled with the 
collapse of the Ivoirian economic miracle created a power vacuum that was eventually 
filled by a leader who capitalized on the growing xenophobia in Côte d’Ivoire. The late 
1990s saw a rise in violence and discrimination against foreigners and northerners 
residing in the south, and in the main city of Abidjan (Woods, 2003, p. 652). 
Relationships between law enforcement (the army, the police) and those not 
considered Ivoirian (foreigners, northerners) became strained, with accusations of 
harassment, violence and discrimination. Woods (2003, p. 654) states that, 
“increasingly, northerners viewed the state as dominated by ethnic groups from the 
south – particularly, the police and the military. The ethnic killings that followed the 
2000 elections targeted only northerners….Thus, the rising levels of violence against 
Muslims created the conditions that led to the north rebelling and the onset of civil 
war.” 
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In 2001, 40% of inhabitants in Côte d’Ivoire were immigrants, with almost two-thirds of 
those migrants originating in Burkina Faso (Center for Migration Studies of New York, 
2001).  Widespread looting of immigrants was condoned by police, and between 
December 2000 and January 2001, more than 300,000 migrants left Côte d’Ivoire 
(Center for Migration Studies of New York, 2001). Some of these families had lived in 
Côte d’Ivoire for generations. 
 
By 2002, the country was divided along north-south lines, controlled by two factions: 
the south, held by government forces of Laurent Gbagbo, and the north controlled by 
rebel groups and the Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). Indeed, those 
who considered themselves autochthonous, “encouraged by the government and local 
strongmen, found in the civil war and the ‘Ivoirité’ discourse a pretext to ethnically 
cleanse their neighbours and harvest their neighbours’ cocoa” (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 
30). 
 
Individuals on both sides of the conflict used cross-border movements for sanctuary 
and safe passage during violent outbreaks. These survival mechanisms were made 
possible by the proximity and permeability of the Ghanaian border. 
 
Burkinabé and Safe Passage 
During the height of the crisis that plagued Côte d’Ivoire, many of the victims of 
violence and persecution were the seasonal foreign workers, many whom were 
Burkinabé in origin.  The links between what is now Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire 
have a long-standing tradition, dating back centuries. 
 
With the arrival of European settlers, and the development of the plantation and 
mining industries, the migratory seasonal worker began to emerge in greater numbers.  
This became the norm, certainly for those in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), where 
the soil was much less fertile than the coastal regions of southern Côte d’Ivoire.  For 
decades, industry in Côte d’Ivoire was reliant on this steady flow of migrant workers, 
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particularly in the booming coffee and cocoa industries.  The arrangement suited both 
the migrants who needed employment, as well as Ivoirians who were dependent on 
inexpensive labour. This flow continued even throughout the transition from colonial 
rule to the post-colonial state. 
 
However, the troubles 
surrounding the succession of 
long-time President 
Houphouët-Boigny at the end 
of the 20th century, laid bare 
the divisive lines in Ivoirian 
society.  Houphouët-Boigny 
was a very skilled neo-
patrimonial ruler, maintaining 
not only his control for over 
three decades, but also the 
balance of power among his 
supporters and detractors.   
 
Under his administration, the country flourished in the post-colonial era, with other 
states touting it as the shining example of a new independent Africa.  Taking 
advantage of the rich natural resources, and the relics of French colonial 
infrastructure, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed a comparative prosperity with relation to its West 
African neighbours.  Yet, a confluence of factors led to the weakening of this neo-
patrimonial rule, apparent even before Houphouët-Boigny’s death.  Ivoirian society 
reeled under the full impact of the political uncertainty of the presidential succession, 
coupled with the economic downturn and ‘failure’ of the SAPs (Structural Adjustment 
Programs) implemented in the 1980s.  This societal breakdown of the early 21st 
century led to widespread xenophobia, impacting not only foreign travellers, but 
mostly the very same Burkinabé upon which the agrarian economy depended. 
Figure 4.2: Burkinabé escape route during Ivoirian crisis 
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The distance from the coastal regions of Côte d’Ivoire back to Burkina Faso is not 
insignificant, and the longer one stays within the country, the more one would be 
exposed to potential violence and even death.  Workers were desperate to return 
home, and the safest route for most was to travel eastward across the border to 
Ghana, then turn north to Burkina Faso.  In order to assist the evacuation during a 
particularly tumultuous time in 2002, six to ten escorted busses ran daily from Côte 
d’Ivoire through the border towns like Sampa, then north to Paga *see Figure 4.2] 
(Kpobi, 2007). 
 
The border at Sampa in the Ghanaian Brong-Ahafo region is a primary port of entry, 
near the Ivoirian town of Bondoukou. Between the post at Sampa and the checkpoint 
of Soko (in Côte d’Ivoire) is a three-mile stretch of uninhabited land, which is 
comprised of mostly marshland (Kani, 2007).  Although not witnessed by this 
researcher directly, officials at the Sampa border post state that the road on the 
Ivoirian side from Soko to Abidjan is paved. Once on the Ghanaian side, that road 
becomes a dirt track. However, when fleeing the violence in the south of Côte d’Ivoire, 
the road from Abidjan to the border post at Soko would have been a relatively quick 
journey, given that it was paved. 
 
Sanctuary 
The violence in the Ivoirian crisis was not restricted to foreigners, or rather, as 
discussed, the conception of a ‘foreigner’ was much more broad.  Those citizens of 
foreign birth were targeted, as well Ivoirians born to foreign parents.  Their proximity 
to the Ghanaian border provided a survival strategy separate from safe passage, which 
I have categorized as sanctuary. This differs from the Burkinabé escape route, in that 
Ivoirians seeking sanctuary generally cross the Ghanaian border temporarily during 
heightened tensions and outbreaks of violence. Once the violence has subsided, these 
citizens then cross back into Côte d’Ivoire.   
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There are two forms of sanctuary, a longer-term state-recognised version, namely 
asylum.  The second form is an informal version, whereby individuals cross borders 
(officially or unofficially) for a limited period of time.  It is this latter form sanctuary 
that provided security for countless Ivoirians during the crisis. 
 
For several years, the Ghanaian representatives in Sunyani district recognised the 
waves of temporary migrants fleeing an acute situation of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. 
These cross-border ‘migrants’ would stay sometimes as little as one day, then return to 
their homes once the situation was calmer (Kpobi, 2007).  Most times this movement 
was completely legal, as the ECOWAS legislation allows for temporary free movement 
of the citizens of its member states.  The existence of that border allows for a safe 
haven during times of momentary ‘flare-ups’ in local violence. 
 
Rebel attacks against southern forces also led government officials, soldiers and locals 
to seek temporary sanctuary in Ghana.  In October 2002, officials at the border post in 
Sampa noticed a daily commute by Ivoirian ministers and soldiers, between Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2002).  Interestingly, to avoid the violent 
outbreaks, Ivoirian soldiers had taken to crossing the border each night, sleeping in the 
town of Sampa, Ghana, and then returning to duty in Côte d’Ivoire each morning. 
Similarly, several Ivoirian ministers had moved their families and households to 
temporary lodgings in Sampa, and they too commuted every day between Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2002).  
 
The Deputy Superintendant of Immigration at Sampa stated that “police and custom 
officials from the war-torn country *of Côte d’Ivoire+ also joined the fleeing soldiers 
and ministers” (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2002). 
 
Again in 2004, violence erupted in the north, following a siege by the government-led 
forces that killed nine French peacekeepers. The French government responded by 
destroying army aircraft.  The violence that ensued involved Ivoirians engaging in “a 
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violent campaign of looting, torching and rape…targeting foreigners” (UN Integrated 
News Service, 2004). News reports from this period describe widespread ethnic 
violence on both sides of the conflict, of which the following is a small sample:  
 
 March – October 2004 (Abidjan): Paramilitary police perform a daily round-up 
of Muslims (mostly northern Ivoirians) through spot-checks of identity papers. 
These migrants are driven to locations outside of the city, then beaten and 
robbed (Balint-Kurti, 2004). In addition to the theft, violence and humiliation, 
they are also subject to murders by the gendarmerie that go unpunished (All 
Africa News, 2004). 
 
 March – October 2004 (Gagnoa): 12 people killed in the southwest near 
Gagnoa, following which more than 700 Burkinabé farmers are removed from 
their farms in the region. Some returned home (Aboa & Murphy, 2004). 
 
 August 2004 (Korhogo): Rebels massacre dozens of men and boys by 
suffocation in shipping containers. U.N. officials uncover three mass graves in 
the area (Oumar, 2004). 
 
 November 24, 2004 (Gagnoa): “Bété youths armed with machetes, kitchen 
knives and sticks had attacked northerners in [Gagnoa], killing at least six 
people and injuring 29 others” (UN Integrated News Service, 2004). 
 
 December 23, 2004 (Ouragahio): 11 villagers killed in a knife attack by an 
armed gang, suspected of being displaced Burkinabé. A note was left reading 
“unless you give us back our fields and plantations, we will attack the villages 
one by one” (Agence France Presse, 2004). 
 
In the face of threats to personal safety, Ivoirians and foreigners turned to the nearby 
borders to find sanctuary while the violence erupted.  There are reports of individuals 
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fleeing not only to Ghana, but also other neighbouring countries.  There is a real 
opportunity presented by the existence of borders in West Africa, allowing individuals 
to escape, seek refuge and ultimately to preserve key elements of human flourishing:  
life, bodily health and bodily integrity. 
 
Economic Survival: Creating opportunity out of scarcity 
The exercise of human capabilities is evidenced in the individual micro-strategies that 
exist in the borderland economy between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  Although it can be 
argued that the accumulated effects of these micro-regionalist actors culminate to 
destructure the economies of the countries involved, that is less the case in Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire, due to their diversified economies (Stary, 1999). In fact, the 
opportunities capitalized upon due to the existence of the border can help to fill a void 
created by an unfavourable geographic and economic location. As Stary (1999, p. 176) 
notes, “*c+ross-border trade may be interpreted as an adjustment on the part of the 
borderland population to an economic crisis which invites them to maximise every 
source of profit.” 
 
In this section, we will analyze the factors which exist along the Ghanaian-Ivoirian 
border (focused particularly in the Brong-Ahafo region) that contribute to a budding, 
though unintended, micro-region.  The opportunities presented by the border lead to 
cross-border activity, and it can be argued that the culmination of these movements by 
individual actors constitute a micro-region of sorts.  We will then question the 
relationship between this micro-regional activity and macro-level economic forces.  
 
Migration and the search for prosperity  
There has been much research on the subject of rural-urban migrations more broadly, 
as well those focussed on Africa (Okpara, E. E., 1986; Potts, D. & Mutambirwa, C., 
1990; Bakewell, O., 2009).  This form of migratory movement has evidence across 
many continents and in various economic and historical contexts.  In Ghana, the 
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percentage of the population residing in an urban centre has risen from 15.4% in 1950 
to 47.8% in 2005 (United Nations Population Division, 2009). 
 
Following the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa, most cities witnessed a significant 
increase in population. However, this was not the only significant pattern of migration 
in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. As treated elsewhere in this thesis, both of these coastal 
nations have traditionally experienced a north-south migratory pattern, as well as 
cross-cutting west-east trade routes.  Moreover, As Potts (1995) demonstrates, many 
African cities have also endured an out-migration or reverse migration toward the 
rural, in light of the limited prospects for economic survival.  This reality might have 
implications for other rural areas, such as borderlands, that may offer economic 
opportunities that do not exist in urban centres. 
 
Social and economic characteristics in Brong-Ahafo 
The Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana lies along the western border adjacent to Côte 
d’Ivoire. Occupying much of the central-west of Ghana, Brong-Ahafo’s capital is 
Sunyani and its main market town is Techiman. Sunyani is almost 400km from the 
capital of Accra, and the market in Techiman lies 60km from Sunyani.  The major 
market of Kumasi is also located to the south in the Ashanti region. Brong-Ahafo has an 
estimated population of 2.2 million, and straddles the forest and savannah climactic 
zones (Ghana Statistical Service). The major industries include cocoa and timber 
production (Government of Ghana).  
 
The literacy rate in Brong-Ahafo is below the national average, and ranks only above 
the two northern regions.  The percentage of residents aged 15 and over who are 
literate is 49% (with men surpassing women), while the national average at 54.5% 
(Government of Ghana).  The difference between the sexes is not surprising, given that 
the school attainment rates are higher for men in the region.  While attendance rates 
are relatively equal between boys and girls at primary school, the attainment rates for 
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boys exceeds that of girls at all higher levels.  In the Brong-Ahafo region, 42% of the 
population over the age of 6 years has never been to school (Government of Ghana).  
 
Contrary to a customary critique from the ‘borders-as-negative’ camp, the Ghanaian-
Ivoirian border does not arbitrarily divide a common people with a shared history, 
culture and language26.  The major groups are comprised of the Agni and Koulango on 
the Ivoirian side of the border, and the Asante, Bron and Nafado on the Ghanaian side 
(Stary, 1999, p. 169).  However, as Stary notes, the borderland community has 
undergone significant alterations, arguably due to the very existence of the border 
itself. The unique opportunities that exist along the border have led to a community 
made up of indigenous groups, “on to which alien populations have superimposed 
themselves (Burkinabe, Nigerians, amongst others), as well as populations that have 
traditionally been travelling over the whole of West Africa, like the *Dioula+” (Stary, 
1999, p. 169). In other words, these outsiders have migrated toward the border in part 
to take advantage of the economic opportunities that the border itself presents. 
 
Border crossing in Brong-Ahafo 
The border posts in Brong-Ahafo are overseen by the Ghana Immigration Service, 
whose Regional Director, Francis Kpobi is located in Sunyani.  There are also customs 
officials at the border posts, under the auspices of the Ghana Customs, Excise and 
Preventive Service (CEPS).  The ‘official’ border crossings for the region are (from north 
to south): Gonokrami, Sampa, Kwameseikrom, Nkrenkwanta, Funa, Oseikojokrom. 
However, many unofficial and unguarded crossings also exist, which due to a lack of 
resources are not regularly patrolled. 
 
The Sampa border post is separated from the Soko checkpoint on the Ivoirian side by a 
three-mile stretch of uninhabited land.  Soko is four miles from the regional capital of 
Bondoukou in the upper-east Zanzan region of Côte d’Ivoire.  Bondoukou became the 
                                                     
26
 Once exception is the southernmost part of the border, where the Nzima are located on both sides 
(Stary, 1999, p. 169). 
124 
 
primary northern base for the United Nations operation in Côte d’Ivoire during the 
crisis, and occasionally the UN peacekeepers crossed the border into Ghana at Sampa 
(Kani, 2007).  
 
The hours of operation for the Sampa border post are 6am to 6pm daily, and the area 
is patrolled at night while the post is closed.  The post is occasionally open out of hours 
for special crossings involving diplomats.  The post has currency exchange facilities, 
and uses the same national exchange rate as all other border posts.  Border residents 
do take advantage of price differences across the border, as well as any favourable 
exchange rates (Agbseye, 2007). 
 
Officials at the Sampa border post primarily deal with three main forms of border 
crossings (Kani, 2007): 
i. Border resident crossings 
The vast majority of crossings fall into this category, where local residents from 
either side of the border cross regularly to visit family and go to the market.  In fact, 
these crossings mainly correspond with market days in Sampa, Soko and 
Bondoukou.  
 On Sundays, the Bondoukou market usually attracts approximately 50 
people, who cross into Côte d’Ivoire and return the same day. 
 On Mondays the Sampa market is open, which sees 200 people crossing and 
returning throughout the day. 
 Fridays are the regular day for the Soko market, when 45 people cross and 
return. 
 
The Soko residents will generally cross the border on foot, whereas larger distance 
traders (for example from Bondoukou) come by taxi or small buses.   
 
As cross-border marriages are common in the region, frequent visitation occurs 
across the border, although not always through the official routes. Family members 
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may cross for a day, bringing special food cooked specifically for a family occasion 
(Kpobi, 2007). There are also usually more pervasive movements during holidays, 
such as Easter and Christmas. 
 
Furthermore, there are cases of border residents whose farms are located on one 
side of the border, while their homes are on the other side (Kpobi, 2007).  They 
would therefore make a daily crossing to work the land, and then return home in 
the evening. 
 
Border residents are generally not required to produce a passport, as identification 
cards are considered sufficient. Unofficially, border staff confirmed that many 
people cross without any identification, as they are simply recognized by sight. 
 
ii. Commercial traffic 
Sampa sees official commercial traffic, comprised of traders from Niger, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Nigeria and surprisingly, to a lesser extent, Côte d’Ivoire. Border officials 
felt that “Ivoirians don’t much like to travel” (Kani, 2007). 
 
Following the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, this type of traffic has undergone a significant 
reduction.  Commercial crossings require official identification, and individuals must 
complete various forms of paperwork.  Transit visas are frequently issued for cars, 
on the promise that the driver will exit the country (with the vehicle) within 60 days. 
Vehicles that do remain illegally in the country can be confiscated. In Sunyani, one 
of the Ghana Immigration offices sits in front of a field replete with hundred of 
confiscated vehicles.  This was explained by an official who stated that the fines 
levied for the return of a confiscated vehicle usually outweighed their value. 
 
iii. Unofficial crossings 
Unofficial crossing are pervasive in this region of Ghana, a fact that is known to the 
immigration officials in Brong-Ahafo.  A thriving industry of smuggling exists, 
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involving both foreign actors, as well as local conspirators.  North of Sampa, there is 
an unapproved crossing at the village of Boku, which the Sampa officers attempt to 
police.  There are also many footpaths over the border, in the surrounding 
woodland.  However, border officials confirmed that their ability to patrol these 
areas is hampered by mobility and resourcing problems.  At the time of the 
interview in 2007, the Sampa post had access to one car, which was broken, and 
one motorbike, and officials were unsure if this was broken as well. 
 
Recognizing a need for greater security, particularly with the threat presented by 
the instability in Côte d’Ivoire, the government in Ghana has attempted to clamp 
down on illegal trade.  Extra training has been provided for customs officers, and 
many now patrol the footpaths and unofficial crossings in plain clothes (Agbseye, 
2007).  The primary concern has been to prevent the spread of illegal arms. 
 
Unofficial Crossings and Economic Survival:  
The example of agricultural goods 
It is this issue of ‘unofficial’ crossings that presents a unique challenge when studying 
the utility of borders.  It could be argued, from a macro-level perspective, that this 
exploitation of permeable borders and collusion with official and locals, is actually a 
form of state subversion.  The culmination of these individual actions constitutes a 
challenge to the state itself (both fiscally and in terms of state security), and moreover 
may run counter to higher-level regionalization processes. 
 
If we examine the way in which agricultural goods are illicitly moved across the 
Ghanaian-Ivoirian border, we will gain a better understanding of how the border itself 
can be used to secure economic survival in a region where other economic 
opportunities are unviable or scarce. 
 
As the above data suggests, the Brong-Ahafo region relies heavily on the agricultural 
industry, due to its position in the forest and savannah zones.  At one time, Brong-
Ahafo was the leading region in cocoa production, however due to environmental 
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pressures from bushfires and human activities, the region is now ranked third (Ghana 
News Agency, 2009). The high unemployment rate in the region has caused it to be the 
main source of illegal youth migration in the area, with young people leaving by way of 
the Sahara to northerly destinations (Boatang, 2011).  
 
Officials in Brong-Ahafo are seeking ways to encourage youth to remain by developing 
new industries that will create employment in the region.  However, until real 
economic opportunities are available, individuals have developed a variety of methods 
to sustain their economic survival. Once such ‘option’ is the trade in agricultural 
products, through legal or illicit means. 
 
At the border post in Sampa, the vast majority of goods that are handled are 
foodstuffs, and in particular rice brought over from Côte d’Ivoire (Agbseye, 2007).  The 
rice is not produced in Côte d’Ivoire, but rather imported into the country cheaply, and 
later moved into neighbouring countries (legally and illegally). The main levies that are 
applied to agricultural products are as follows: 
 Value added tax (VAT): 12.5% 
 National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL): 2.5% 
 ECOWAS Levy: 0.5% 
 Export Development and Investment Fund Levy (EDIF): 0.5% 
 Import duty: 20% 
 
This last fee, the 20% import duty, is applied to all processed agricultural products, 
however raw goods (like cashews) are exempt.  Instead, raw agricultural products are 
assessed a 1% processing fee and a 1% inspection fee (Agbseye, 2007). 
 
Legally, the above fees apply to all quantities of goods, including small gifts. In practice, 
the border officials use their discretion regarding exceptions.  One official described it 
as “the African way,” meaning that people are exempted from the charges for 
humanitarian and familial reasons, particularly if the quantity of food is small 
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(Agbseye, 2007). One officer suggested that this would usually constitute two to three 
days worth of food. 
 
Obviously, these levies assessed at the borders posts are not insignificant. Particularly 
the 20% import duty on processed foodstuff is a substantive fee, and therefore there is 
an incentive to circumvent the official routes. One crop which has been popular for 
smugglers is rice, which is considered a processed product. 
 
In the early 2000s, the Ghanaian government sought to increase the local production 
of rice and decrease its importation by 30% (GHP, 2004).  Rice has quickly become a 
staple of the Ghanaian diet, with an annual per capita consumption of 30kg, and 
growing at a rate of 4.7% annually (GHP, 2004). In 2003, Ghana produced 168,000 
tonnes of rice, and officially imported 400,000 tonnes. The estimate for rice smuggled 
into Ghana that same year is about 160,000 tonnes (GHP, 2004).  
The effort to increase local rice production is severely hampered by the thriving illegal 
trade in rice across the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border.  The situation is caused by the very 
high tariff applied to the importation of rice into Ghana, compared with that of Côte 
d’Ivoire, whose tariffs on rice are one of the lowest in the region.  A primary smuggling 
route runs from Abidjan through Sampa, to the market in Techiman [see Figure 4.3].  
 
In 2004, it was estimated that 3,000 
bags of rice were smuggled weekly 
across the Ghanaian-Ivoiran border, 
mostly at the Sampa border post 
(Ghanaian Chronicle, 2004). The loss 
of revenue from that post alone was 
an estimated 7.3 billion cedis 
(equivalent to over USD 800,000).  
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Rice Smuggling Route from Abidjan 
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The smuggling route from Abidjan is operated mainly by women with the assistance of 
a transport owner.  Allegedly, they bribe their way through the customs check-points, 
and by the time they arrive at the market in Techiman, their produce is able to be sold 
lower than market value.  It is thought that the customs officials at Sampa collude with 
the smugglers for a share in the profits (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2004). The smugglers 
then move the rice into the market after dark, hidden in warehouses, before being 
distributed to ‘accredited agents’ (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2004).  Accredited agents are 
those market sellers who have proven themselves to be trustworthy.  
 
At the market in 
Techiman, a variety 
of popular imported 
rice brands can be 
found, including rice 
from China, India 
and the United 
States.  The price 
variation between 
the smuggled rice 
and the imported 
rice can vary from 
5,000 cedis to 
30,000 cedis a bag 
(GHP, 2004).  One newspaper found that a smuggled bag of the popular CCC brand of 
rice was being sold in the Techiman market for 180,000 cedis, whereas the imported 
bag of the same rice was being sold in the market for 200,000 cedis (Ghanaian 
Chronicle, 2004).  
 
Figure 4.4 – Trade route from Burkina Faso through Techiman market 
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Even on a more local level, the farming communities along the border in Ghana have at 
times been co-opted by smuggling rings, and their residences have been used as 
temporary storehouses for illicit goods.  As with the colluding customs officials, these 
borderland community members benefit by sharing in the profits (Kpobi, 2007). 
 
In addition to the standard smuggling route from the port at Abidjan, other traders 
from neighbouring states are also capitalizing on the lower-priced agricultural goods at 
the market in Techiman.  The Principal Customs Collector at Sampa has noted that 
there has been an increase in the number of Burkinabé traders that cross from Ghana 
into Côte d’Ivoire to sell goods they have purchased at the Techiman market (Agbseye, 
2007).  Although this route is in part a product of the Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana smuggling 
route, it operates through the official border crossings.   
 
In 2010, the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) took the extraordinary measure of 
conducting meetings with community stakeholders at each of the border posts in the 
Brong-Ahafo region, with the aim of curbing illicit trade. Packaged under the banner of 
‘national duty’, the Anti-Revenue Leakage Monitoring Team met with “revenue 
collectors, security agents and leadership of transport unions” to impress upon them 
the importance of revenue collection for national development (Ghana News Agency, 
2010).   The GRA also announced its intention of creating a Revenue Protection 
Information Bureau, to “enhance access to information on revenue-related activities in 
relevant communities for necessary action” (Ghana News Agency, 2010). The head of 
the Anti-Revenue Leakage Monitoring Team was also said to have warned border post 
staff against “conniving with importers and businessmen to dupe the nation” (Ghana 
News Agency, 2010). 
 
It is apparent that illicit trade is thriving along Ghana’s borders.  The complex economic 
activities, both illicit and official, that exist in the borderland operate due to social and 
market forces which offer survival strategies for the various agents involved.  Although 
morally the issue of illicit trade is often seen as a negative and as a threat to the 
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security of the state, I contend that in fact at the micro-level these forms of smuggling 
can act as a bulwark against the threats of poverty and economic deprivation.  Even 
individuals that function as part of the state apparatus at the border can play a role in 
the continuation of this illicit industry, although the micro-level activity can run 
counter to the macro (state-level) goals. 
 
Borders and Individual Security in Africa 
Borders can act in the interest of individual security, as well as detract from it. Borders 
in Africa have been viewed in quite a negative light, seen as vestiges of a colonial 
period best forgotten.  Leaving the continent in perpetual fragmentation, the dream of 
a borderless supra-state has seemed an ideal solution for the security problems which 
arise, supposedly, from their very existence. 
 
This chapter has sought a more balanced view of West African borders, demonstrating 
their utility according to the Capabilities Approach.  The unique permeability of African 
borders allow a space for security strategies, proving essential to the safety and 
economic survival of  individuals in situations where the greatest threat to individual 
security comes from within state, rather than from without. By providing safe passage, 
sanctuary and economic opportunities, borders play an important role in security of a 
more individual nature.   
 
Individual security within this micro-region can inform the larger security questions at 
the macro-regional level.  The continuing existence of micro-level cross-border 
movement is related to larger macro-level forces. The obvious physical insecurity 
created by large-scale civil war in Côte d’Ivoire has led to a variety of survival 
strategies, of which cross-border sanctuary is but one.  The flourishing of illicit 
economic activity, particularly in the rice trade, is a direct result of the advantage 
created by differing macro-level economic import policies between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
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On the whole, although the permeability of African borders can be used to further 
positive outcomes for individual survival, they can also be used to subjugate and 
threaten the personal security of individuals. This question of the negative use of 
African borders is treated in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate two ways in which the Ghanaian-
Ivoirian border is used to further individual survival strategies.  The definition of 
security in this chapter relies on the first three of Nussbaum’s capabilities, namely Life, 
Bodily Health and Bodily Integrity.  
 
Employing data gathered during a field study in Ghana in 2007, the chapter presents 
the key players in the state-border apparatus in the Brong-Ahafo region.  The case 
study of the Ivoirian crisis was examined, which demonstrated two ways in which the 
border was used to ensure safety from physical threats. These were safe passage (used 
primarily by fleeing Burkinabé migrant workers) and sanctuary (used primarily by 
Ivoirians).  Economic security was then treated, using the example of illicit trade of rice 
through the Sampa border post, which is then sold in the market at Techiman.   
 
The chapter concludes that the unique permeability of the border in Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire presents opportunities for survival strategies that may be filling a void left by a 
lack of legitimate economic opportunity or an adequate security apparatus. 
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Chapter Five:  
Avoiding the Beast 
Human Trafficking, Child Labour and Sexual Exploitation in West Africa 
 
“A person finds herself on a small desert island. She shares the island with a fierce carnivorous 
animal which perpetually hunts for her. Her mental stamina, her intellectual ingenuity, her will 
power and her physical resources are taxed to their limits by her struggle to remain alive. She 
never has a chance to do or even to think of anything other than how to escape from the 
beast....All her choices are potentially horrendous in their consequences. If she ever puts one 
foot wrong she will be devoured by the beast,” (Raz, 1986, p. 374). 
 
The challenge presented by the interrelated practices of human trafficking, forced 
labour and exploitation in Africa today is exacerbated by the very characteristics of 
African borders that also provide avenues for sanctuary.  It is paradoxical that the 
porous and fluid nature of African borders, which can offer avenues for opportunities 
and even self-development, can also abet those who would oppress, abuse and exploit 
vulnerable individuals.  A full account of African borders must also address these 
negative impacts. 
 
This chapter aims to understand the prevalence of human trafficking in West Africa, 
set in its particular socio-historical context, and attempts to contrast this practice with 
traditional migratory patterns.  However, the great difficulty in studying cross-border 
movements (or even movements within a state) is the lack of knowledge as to an 
individual’s motivation.  Is the choice for migration voluntary or is she being obliged to 
move? Do we accept this individual’s personal assessment of her ‘decision’ or is she a 
vulnerable person being coerced? Is this person’s labour forced, or is it the result of an 
informed choice? 
 
There are international, continental and state-based agreements, instruments and 
legislation designed to protect vulnerable groups (such as children) from trafficking 
and forced labour, however the success of these measures has been limited in West 
Africa.  Children are still essential to several agricultural sectors, particularly cocoa and 
coffee in Ghana, and are also victims forced to become child soldiers in conflict zones.  
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While it is generally understood within these legal instruments that children are a 
vulnerable group requiring protection, other groups, such as women, are not always 
accorded the same concern despite their similar vulnerability.  The sexual exploitation 
of women in Africa is also inextricably linked with trafficking. 
 
Martha Nussbaum introduces a controversial view of prostitution in her piece 
“Whether From Reason or Prejudice”: Taking money for bodily services, arguing that 
our aversion to prostitution is not grounded in reason, and that many other 
‘respected’ professions involve the sale of bodily services.  Although Nussbaum 
includes a caveat stipulating that her argument assumes that the sexual act for sale is 
consensual, I will argue that in practice the distinction between prostitution by 
“choice” and sexual exploitation in West Africa is fallacious.  The vulnerability of most 
of these women due to their socio-economic environment makes their “choice” of 
prostitution the result of a constrained agency; they are essentially avoiding the beast.  
 
Following an examination of traditional migratory patterns in West Africa, this chapter 
will devise a picture of the current state of migration within Ghana and among its 
neighbours.   The focus of this chapter will be on the prevalence of human trafficking 
for purposes of forced labour and exploitation. We will survey international and 
national agreements aimed to curb both trafficking and exploitative work in Africa, and 
examine the rationale for the special consideration given to children.  Using the 
Capabilities Approach, this chapter will demonstrate the ways in which borders allow 
for the inhibition of human flourishing, focussing on the exploitation vulnerable 
women and children.  Although employing Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, I will 
challenge her view that decriminalization of prostitution can prove positive for women, 
and conclude that due to constrained capabilities, true consent to sexual exploitation 
is impossible. 
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Human Trafficking 
When analyzing modern migratory practices in West Africa, it is essential to look not 
only to the advantages of voluntary cross-border movement, but also to, conversely, 
examine the opportunities presented to those with more nefarious intentions. Not all 
migration is voluntary or positive in outcome.  For all of the good which can arise from 
open and porous borders, the opposite is also possible.  Current migratory practices in 
West Africa range from voluntary commercial exchanges, to forced ‘migration’ (i.e. the 
trafficking) of primarily women and children.   
 
African borders are arguably unique with respect to the lack of capable state 
infrastructure and the opportunities resulting from the permeability that this 
engenders. Along the Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire boundary, for example, border posts are 
separated by thousands of kilometres of unprotected land, through which unofficial 
roads traverse unmonitored.  These roads are patrolled only intermittently, mostly due 
to a lack of state security personnel.  This situation allows all manner of unregulated 
trade, trafficking and migration to occur. Although we have previously seen some of 
benefits of the unique characteristics of borders in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, the 
potential for exploitation also exists.  For instance, Ghana is a source, transit and 
destination country for human trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 157). 
 
Moreover, Ghana is a member state of ECOWAS (Economic Organization of West 
African States), whose treaty contains objectives aimed at allowing free movement of 
goods and people among its member states.  The Protocol on the Free Movement of 
Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was passed in 1980, and 
ostensibly allows citizens of the member states free entry into other ECOWAS states 
for a period of up to 90 days.  These elements, coupled with socio-economic push and 
pull factors, spur a thriving activity along Ghana’s external borders and across its 
internal regional boundaries. Unfortunately, this activity includes human trafficking. 
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As outcomes of migratory practices can be both positive and negative, an analysis of 
open borders in West Africa cannot shy away from a moral perspective.  The questions 
surrounding human trafficking, modern-day slavery, sexual exploitation, child labour 
etc. are not effectively examined in a moral vacuum; firstly, to do so seems nigh 
impossible, and secondly it does a disservice to the lives of those adversely affected 
directly and indirectly by human exploitation.  Therefore, in order to understand 
modern migratory practices in Africa, we require a method which allows for a moral 
analysis.  Many methods currently employed in the study of international social justice 
rely on one of three approaches: preference-based, resource-based and rights-based 
as discussed in Chapter Two (Nussbaum, Capabilities and Social Justice, 2002).  In the 
field of human trafficking, the attempts to understand and prevent the phenomenon 
have primarily come from a rights-based approach, elaborated below.  Although this 
approach has achieved successes in the passing of international agreements, it falls 
short in providing a robust tool for examining human trafficking at a more local level.  I 
contend that Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach is a preferred method of analysis. 
 
A Rights-Based Approach to Human Trafficking and Exploitation  
The definition of trafficking is perhaps one of those essentially contestable concepts 
that are replete in political life.  How do we define trafficking; is it necessarily 
movement across an internationally-recognized state border; must it involve the use of 
physical force?  These are crucial elements that even international bodies and 
instruments have great difficulty in defining.  For purposes of the prevention and 
reaction to the phenomenon of human trafficking, international instruments are 
circumscribed by jurisdictional boundaries which may not adequately provide 
protection and assistance to victims of trafficking confined within state boundaries. 
 
There are international conventions, state acts, and scholarly works which attempt to 
define trafficking, and although they do vary, most of these instruments are rights-
based.  To begin, we will survey the international and national instruments which 
pertain to trafficking in Ghana. 
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International Instruments 
Modern international instruments which attempt to prevent trafficking stem from the 
United Nations 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.  This convention treats many 
elements of what we would now term ‘trafficking’, including the abolition of debt 
bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, child exploitation, and the trafficking of slaves 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1957).  
 
There are six international and continental agreements deal directly or indirectly with 
trafficking:  
 The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
 
 The 1999 Convention No. 182 of the International Labour Organization on the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour 
 
 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (the Palermo Protocol) and the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime 
 
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) and the 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa 
 
 The 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
 The 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Especially Women and Children (Ouagadougou Action Plan) 
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Regional and Domestic Instruments 
In addition to the international agreements to curb human trafficking, there are also 
several regional and domestic instruments that now exist in West Africa: 
 A Declaration and a Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2001): Adopted 
during the Dakar ECOWAS summit in 2001, the Declaration and Plan of Action aims 
to have all member states sign and ratify the Palermo Protocol and the CRC.  
 The Human Trafficking Act, 2005 (Act 694): Given assent on the 5th of December, 
2005, The Human Trafficking Act (the Act) is an act of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Ghana, which sets out the penalties related to the crime of human 
trafficking.   
 
A Definition of Human Trafficking 
The Palermo Protocol defines trafficking in a very particular way.  It states that 
trafficking in persons, 
shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of a threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person,  for the purposes of 
exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008, p. 2). 
 
In order to illustrate this definition, as it is quite lengthy, the UN Toolkit to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons breaks down the definition into its three constituent parts: the 
act, the means and the purpose.  Graphically, it can be represented in figure that 
follows: 
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 ACT  MEANS  PURPOSE  
 Recruitment  Threat or use of force  Exploitation, including:  
 Transport  Coercion  Prostitution of others  
 Transfer 
+ 
Abduction 
+ 
Sexual exploitation = 
TRAFFICKING 
 Harbouring  Fraud  Forced labour  
 Receipt of 
Persons 
 
Deception 
 
Slavery or similar 
practices 
 
  
 
Abuse of power or 
vulnerability  
Removal of organs 
Other types of 
exploitation 
 
  
 
Giving payments or 
benefits 
 
 
 
       
Figure 5.1: UN Definition of Trafficking (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008, p. 3) 
This means, therefore, that for the act of trafficking to take place all three of these 
constituent parts must come into play.   
 
Other approaches to human trafficking? 
What outcomes flow from these rights-based agreements? How have they improved 
the lives of those being trafficked? Arguably, trafficking is a booming business that has 
not been contained by the many cross-jurisdictional instruments aimed at curbing its 
existence.  Ultimately, Nussbaum argues that rights-based approaches, while 
successful in “articulating the demands for justice” (2002, p. 128), fall short for a 
variety of reasons.  Traditional rights discourse tends to ignore certain phenomena (i.e. 
focussing on political or civil liberties, in the absence of economic or social liberties; 
the distribution of family wealth), the language of the discourse is itself so contestable 
that it can lead to confusion in its interpretation, and rights discourse tends to be 
linked with negative liberty, focused on protecting the individual from the state. 
 
So, with what options are we then left?  One oft-used international barometer for 
social justice is resource-based approaches, either at the macro or mirco-levels.  For 
example, the quality of life can be linked to the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
of a state.  Ghana has one of the highest GDPs per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, and is 
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ranked 99th overall out of 228 countries (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).  But what 
can this type of data really tell us about the lives of Ghanaians? Unfortunately, on its 
own, GDP cannot elucidate the differences between certain segments of the 
population, in terms of their command of resources (rural vs. urban, male vs. female, 
Ghanaian citizens vs. foreigners). 
 
One obvious drawback of the resource-based approach is the lack of information 
provided by the GDP data as to the distribution of wealth within the state.  Nussbaum 
recognizes that even if we were to use a resource-based analysis to examine the 
quality of life within a country that was sensitive to the distribution of wealth, the 
analysis still fails to account for how individuals are able to convert those resources 
into functionings (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 127). Nussbaum gives several examples, such as 
the increased physical needs of a lactating woman, the additional resources required 
by a person who does not have the use of his limbs, or in certain nations, the need for 
more funding to improve women’s literacy as compared to men’s.  Equal resources do 
not bring equal equality of functioning, where the starting point of functioning for 
individuals vary. 
 
Another popular approach aims to account for the preferences of the target group.  
This approach is quite attractive in that it is truly focused on people and how they 
account for their resources.  While Nussbaum is not as critical of this approach, she 
points to certain flaws in its use.  Many researchers who use preference-based 
approaches will survey individuals to assess their satisfaction with their preferences.  
However, what this research fails to take into account is the notion that preferences 
are themselves socially-constructed. Therefore, to rely solely on an individual’s 
interpretation of their preferences risks reinforcing and entrenching the social status 
quo, including inequalities.  Nussbaum gives the example of a country where women 
may be socialized to believe that they are entitled to a lower standard of living, that 
may not include certain goods like education or political participation.  These women 
“may be under considerable pressure to say they are satisfied without such things, and 
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yet we should not hastily conclude that public policy should not work to extend these 
functions to women” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 229). 
 
Nussbaum concludes that the preferred approach ought to be one that is grounded in 
human capability; examining what people are able to do and be.  Trying to account for 
an industry, like that of human trafficking, is complicated, and can be tackled through 
the approaches described above.  However, providing a moral account of the way in 
which borders are used for practices like human trafficking and ultimately how they 
can negatively impact the lives of individuals and constrain what they can ‘do’ and ‘be’, 
is a fruitful exercise that is often ignored in favour of a more traditional economics or 
rights-based analysis. 
 
The Depth of Consent 
Before delving into the heart of this issue, it seems imperative that we question the 
notion of consent. Contrary to popular belief, objects of trafficking can be active 
agents while still being victims.  I would contend that they are, however, exercising a 
constrained agency, and ‘consent’ is therefore not truly possible. 
 
The issue of consent is in a superficial way quite simple (i.e. does someone agree to 
something) but in practice extremely convoluted and difficult to distinguish.  How do 
we interpret consent? How can we define consent? Can consent be truly given when 
social and economic forces unfavourably impinge on the available choices presented to 
an individual?  
 
In this section, we will unravel the concepts of agency and choice, and attempt to 
clarify our understanding of victimization.  The distinction between constrained choice 
and consent will be delineated below. 
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The victim as ‘blameless’  
In her research , Trafficking of women for prostitution, Cameron (2008) states that it is 
a fundamental fallacy that victims of trafficking must be entirely ‘blameless’, and that 
they must have had no part in the decision(s) that ultimately led to their being 
trafficked.  The victim as a ‘non-agent’, whose unfavourable situation is the result of 
the complete domination of others, is not reflective of reality.  Cameron postulates 
that the notion that a trafficking victim may have been responsible for decisions that 
led to their situation is “unattractive to media and governments alike” (2008, p. 85) 
and that these individuals are therefore generally treated as co-conspirators, rather 
than victims. 
 
Contrary to the neo-liberal perspective that accords the success and failure of agents 
to their individual choices, Cameron puts forth the notion that given unequal socio-
economic environments, agents make certain decisions from a constrained menu of 
choices.  Therefore, the consequences of their choices are not entirely the result of the 
agent alone.  Indeed, she cites a study where some trafficked women in Europe and 
the Middle East suspected they might be forced to work as prostitutes, but that given 
their circumstances they were willing to take that risk (2008, p. 85).  In these cases, the 
women did exert agency in making choices that ultimately led to their being trafficked 
and exploited. However, “this neither makes them responsible for the system into 
which they were pulled nor mitigates the seriousness of the offences later committed 
against them” (Cameron, 2008, p. 85). 
 
Like Raz’s hunted woman scenario, the choices made by these agents are not made 
within the context of a life of full human flourishing.  At times, these choices are made 
as a result of extreme deprivation, poverty, and insecurity.  In an attempt to avoid the 
devouring beasts that surround her, the hunted woman weighs her constrained 
choices and exerts her agency in making a decision in the context of her environment.  
In this way, it is not paradoxical to have trafficked individuals as agents capable of 
making choices, while still remaining victims.  They are ultimately preyed upon due to 
their vulnerability by those who use that vulnerability for exploitation and profit.  
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Special allowances for children and vulnerable groups  
In international agreements, such as the Palermo Protocol, children are given special 
consideration in the area of consent.  It is contended that in light of their vulnerable 
status, children cannot truly consent to trafficking and exploitative acts (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008, p. 6).  A child is generally considered to be 
any person under the age of 18 years, as is the case in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (ECPAT International, 2007, p. 5).   
 
While not in disagreement with this perspective, but I do wish to challenge the notion 
that we accord special status to children, based on their vulnerability, and yet do not 
accord that same status to other potentially vulnerable groups, such as women.  There 
are most likely a variety of reasons why this is the case in the rights-based approach of 
international and regional agreements.  One can classify children very easily by 
establishing a cut-off age, and applying the rules to those persons below that threshold 
(although achieving an internationally agreed-upon definition of the age of majority is 
not in practice a clear-cut exercise).  But theoretically, states who ratify international 
agreements that require the implementation of domestic legislation that protects 
‘children’ (however defined) is simple in the sense that it applies to a clear group of 
persons, without the need for examining their vulnerability on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Children, like adults, are agents with the ability to make choices, which may lead to 
positive or negative consequences.  However, we accord special considerations to 
children, recognizing that their agency may be exerted in the context of vulnerability, 
making them not wholly responsible for the consequences of their actions.  I contend 
that this ‘vulnerable status’ ought to be expanded to other groups, such as women 
who are victims of socio-economic deprivation and insecurity, as well as to other 
groups, such as those with certain disabilities.  
 
Individuals within these vulnerable groups are sometimes exerting a ‘constrained 
agency’, which is not to say that they are not a decision-making actor, but rather that 
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their agency is exerted in a limited environment of choices. To say that any of these 
vulnerable agents are truly giving consent to their exploitation is therefore inaccurate. 
 
Constrained agency and consent 
In trying to define consent, it appears that there are several interrelated concepts that 
come into play when determining if and when consent is given.   
 
a) Firstly, consent is a concept that requires the exertion of agency, which I 
contend can be satisfied by children as well as adults.   
b) Secondly, that this agency is exerted within the context of a full menu of 
choices and a full disclosure of options. 
c) And lastly, that consent cannot be truly given by agents in situations of 
vulnerability. 
 
Can an agent then consent to being trafficked? Theoretically, you can probably argue 
for the affirmative. However, in practice the third criterion of lack of vulnerability is 
probably never satisfied.  This notion of constrained agency will be teased out in 
greater depth in our later discussion of women in prostitution. 
 
Child Migrants or Trafficking Victims? 
It can be argued that the history of West Africa is a narrative of migration.  As we 
noted in the third chapter of this thesis, the movement of peoples in Africa has been a 
feature of the continent for millennia.  Empires spread beyond their borders, traders 
moved their goods across thousands of miles, and pastoralists followed cyclical 
patterns of migration in the tending of their herds.   
 
With the arrival of colonial powers, the need for labour prompted the colonial 
governments to introduce economic incentives, tax structures, recruitment policies 
and coercive practices to secure labour from within and outside their territories.  
Although labour migration had been a feature of pre-colonial Africa, the division of 
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territories among the colonial powers and their distinctive economic and political 
structures marked a real break from traditional migration, and institutionalized the 
large-scale, seasonal and cross-border migration that has been a key feature of 
modern Africa (Adepoju, 2005, p. 1).   
 
In more recent times, both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have been main countries of 
immigration, with neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo among the source 
countries for labour emigrants (Adepoju, 2005, p. 1). The people of West Africa move 
for economic reasons, social or familial ties, to seek security and safety, and for 
political aims, among others.    The diversity of push and pull factors in modern 
migratory practices makes its study difficult to undertake, as the distinction between 
voluntary and non-voluntary movement is often blurred. 
 
Child Migrants: The difficulty of definition 
Distinguishing between child migrants and child trafficking is a serious obstacle.  Is it 
the motivation that separates the two? The decision-making process? Or is it the effect 
on the child that determines whether or not a child is a migrant or has been trafficked? 
As will be discussed below, special considerations are given to children in international 
and national instruments designed for their protection. These rely on the assumption 
that children are vulnerable and therefore unable to make an informed choice for 
purposes of migration.   
 
Can we then rely on the decision-making process being undertaken by a parent or 
guardian as being a sufficient distinction? In these instances, the parent (an informed 
adult) makes the decision regarding their child’s welfare, which may involve their 
movement for labour purposes.  Traditionally, it is not uncommon in West Africa for 
children to be sent by their parents to live with relatives, engaging in labour 
particularly on plantations owned by the relatives.  
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If using this distinction, it is possible that both child migrants and children who have 
been trafficked may end up performing the same labour (working on a plantation), one 
having been forced by an intermediary, and one sent by their parents.  If the outcomes 
are the same, does the distinction hold any value? 
 
In a working paper analyzing north-south migration in Ghana, Kwankye et. al. (2009) 
used data from the Independent Child Migration Survey in Accra and Kumasi 
conducted in 2005, which depicted the following picture of child migration.  Child 
migration from the northern regions of Ghana to the south is a very common practice, 
with one interviewee noting that, “*t+here is no house in this community from which a 
child has not migrated to the South,” (Kwankye et. al., p. 16).  Of the 450 surveyed 
migrants, 87.3 percent have little or no education, the majority are female, and they 
are most likely to migrate between the ages of 15-17 years (45.1%).  The 10-14 age 
group is also highly represented with 38.9% of respondents falling into this category.  It 
is also of note that 16% of child migrants surveyed first migrated when they were 
below the age of 10 years. 
 
The primary reason for migration was overwhelmingly the desire for independence 
and money. And although a majority of respondents attributed the decision to migrate 
as self-made, many others cited parents and relatives as key decision-makers. 
 
Trafficking, Child Labour and the Agricultural Industries 
The forced or coerced labour of children is a practice that is still prevalent in West 
Africa, despite efforts to eradicate its existence.  Although it is impossible to obtain 
exact figures, it is estimated that 200,000 children a year are trafficked from West 
African countries (Cullen-DuPont, 2009, p. 77) . Many of the international and regional 
agreements recognize the interrelated nature of human trafficking and child labour, 
treating the two phenomena concomitantly.    
 
147 
 
Côte d’Ivoire is a destination country for trafficked persons, with victims forced to 
work in the agricultural sector primarily originating from Ghana, Mali and Burkina Faso.  
These children work in “cocoa, coffee, pineapple and rubber plantations *and+ boys 
from Ghana are forced to labor in the mining sector” (U.S. Department of State, 2010, 
p. 123). Girls are also trafficked from Ghana, Togo and Benin and forced to work as 
domestic servants and street vendors.  Child domestic servants who are abused or 
discarded by their host family have little means to support themselves and return 
home. Often, these girls become sexually exploited as a means of survival (ECPAT 
International, 2007, p. 16). Girls are also lured to Côte d’Ivoire to work as waitresses, 
only later to be forced into prostitution (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 123). 
 
In Ghana, many children are displaced internally by traffickers, either unwillingly or 
with the consent of their parents, who are often deceived by the trafficker.  They are 
forced to work in the fishing or agricultural industries, or as domestic servants, beggars 
or porters (called kayayei) (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 157).  It is estimated 
that in Accra alone, over 30,000 children are working as kayayei (Baafri, 2010). 
Children are also used in the commercial sexual exploitation27 industry. 
 
This cross-border trafficking is a serious blight on the comparatively stable political 
system in Ghana.  Not only are Ghanaian girls trafficked out of country into forced 
prostitution in Europe, girls from neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso and Côte 
d’Ivoire are trafficked into the Ghanaian commercial sexual exploitation industry.  
Moreover, “*c+itizens from other West African countries are subjected to forced labor 
in Ghana in agriculture or involuntary domestic servitude. Trafficking victims endure 
extremes of harsh treatment, including long hours, debt bondage, lack of pay, physical 
risks and sexual abuse” (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 157). 
 
                                                     
27
 The terminology used here is intentional. Sexual exploitation, as distinct from “prostitution” makes 
clear the unequal power relationship that exists between the exploiter and the victim.   
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Data Challenges  
In cocoa producing nations, like Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, it is not uncommon for 
members of a farmer’s family to be involved in many of the farming activities.  This 
may also include more distant relatives being sent to work on the cocoa plantation.  
This traditional practice presents challenges in the study of child labour, and the 
determination of whether it is exploitative.  Boas and Huser tackle this issue in their 
comprehensive report on Child labour and cocoa production in West Africa. When 
trying to capture the extent of child labour in the cocoa industry, data becomes a 
serious obstacle due to these definitional issues.  To many farmers, the notion that the 
work of their children (or foster children) should be considered as ‘child labour’ is 
absurd (Boas & Huser, 2006, p. 15), even though some of the work can present real 
safety hazards to the children. 
 
Harkin-Engel Protocol 
The cocoa industry in West Africa, and most significantly in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, is 
a global industry which still uses child labour to this day (Oved, 2010).  Estimates by 
UNICEF put the number of African children working on Ivoirian cocoa plantations at 
10,000 to 15,000, and they are mainly ‘sold’ by intermediaries to farm owners 
(FitzGibbon, 2003, p. 83).  In 2001, the Harkin-Engel Protocol was signed by the 
Chocolate Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) 
to develop a child-labour-free certification process that conforms to ILO Convention 
No. 182, and covers all of West Africa by 2010.  The Payson Centre at Tulane University 
was tasked with auditing the progress of the Harkin-Engel Protocol, from 2006 – 2011 
in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
The Payson Centre recently released its fourth annual report on Harkin-Engel Protocol 
on September 30, 2010.  They found that both countries are far from meeting the 
targets set out in the Protocol, and that 97.46% of cocoa-growing communities in Côte 
d’Ivoire and 86.3% of cocoa-growing communities in Ghana have yet to be reached 
with remediation activities (Payson Centre for International Development and 
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Technology Transfer, 2010, p. 14).  Moreover, researchers found evidence of forced 
adult labour in the cocoa industry. However no remediation interventions have as yet 
been designed to eradicate this issue in either country. 
 
Interestingly, the 2010 annual report provided the results of a household survey and a 
snowball survey undertaken by researchers in Mali and Burkina Faso, both identified as 
source countries for trafficked children.  The snowball survey indicated that a high 
proportion of respondents were at one time victims of child trafficking (75% in Burkina 
Faso, 63% in Mali), and almost all had been exposed to hazardous work on a cocoa 
farm (97.9%) and experienced the “worst forms of child labour other than hazardous 
work" (99.5%) (Payson Centre for International Development and Technology Transfer, 
2010, p. 123).   
 
Of the victims of child trafficking, very few (25% in Burkina Faso, 20% in Mali) had 
interactions with police or border guards, and only two respondents had ever had any 
contact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government agencies or social 
services agencies (Payson Centre for International Development and Technology 
Transfer, 2010, p. 16).  Borders guards in both Burkina Faso and Mali indicated that 
they were aware of the problem of child trafficking to both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, 
but many reported that if they suspected a case of child trafficking, they would ‘do 
nothing’ (Payson Centre for International Development and Technology Transfer, 2010, 
p. 128). 
 
Borders, Child Soldiers and the Ivoirian Crisis 
Conflict zones in Africa continue to be fertile ground for child trafficking, particularly 
for use as child soldiers.  As FitzGibbon notes, “*m+en, women and children continue to 
be abducted by all sides in African conflicts to serve as porters for looted goods, arms 
and ammunition, forced labourers, and sex slaves for military and militia officers” 
(2003, p. 83). 
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Following the attempted coup against President Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire in 
2002, pro-government and opposition forces held territories which essentially divided 
the state along north-south lines (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2009, p. 
116). During the height of the political crisis that rocked Côte d’Ivoire in the early part 
of the decade, child soldiers were ‘recruited’28 and trafficked both from within the 
country and from the neighbouring states of Liberia and Ghana (Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers, 2004, p. 17).  Child soldiers were used by both the pro-
government and the opposition forces, recruited in refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana, and in volatile areas where schools had been closed. Clearly children in these 
situations were extremely vulnerable. 
 
The cross-border nature of child militants has been a serious issue in the area since the 
Sierra Leone conflict in the 1990s.  Many of the military operations crossed multiple 
state borders, with governments and opposition factions providing support. The Child 
Soldiers Global Report 2008 states that,  
A migrant population of thousands of young fighters, including child soldiers, 
crossing borders between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, saw 
conflict mainly as an economic opportunity.  Many had first been forcibly 
recruited as children in one conflict, and then had willingly crossed borders to 
take up arms in another conflict, often with different armed groups….most had 
been motivated by promises of financial gain, and many could not articulate the 
political objective of the group they fought with (2009, p. 117). 
 
The government of Burkina Faso, located directly to the north of Côte d’Ivoire, has 
admitted that armed Ivoirian groups did temporarily cross the border to seek refuge in 
Burkina Faso during the conflict. It is generally believed that Charles Taylor of Liberia 
also provided refuge, as well as military support to factions during the crisis. 
 
                                                     
28
The word ‘recruitment’ is used loosely, not intending to imply a sense of voluntary enlistment on the 
part of children into these armed groups.   
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The role of cross-border movements in the Ivoirian crisis cannot be underestimated in 
importance.  Both sides in the conflict relied heavily on support from neighbouring 
countries, financially, militarily and in terms of soldiers, many of whom were children. 
 
Moreover, related to the conflict itself, children were also abused in ways other than 
forcible recruitment into armed factions.  Children were used by militant groups as 
servants and girls were sexually abused.  
 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
Globalization, while it has arguably brought many innovations and benefits to the lives 
of those touched by its effects, has also exacerbated certain negative impacts.  The rise 
of the global sex trade industries has created a demand for not only adult ‘workers’ 
but also children.  In many parts of the world, children are bought, transported and 
sold for use in a variety of commercial sexual exploitation industries, including child 
sex tourism (CST) and child pornography. 
 
Unfortunately, much of the attention and research into this growing epidemic has 
focussed on Southeast Asia, to the exclusion of other significant players, such as Africa 
(Flowers, 2001, p. 148). Although Flowers notes that hard data on global child sexual 
exploitation is difficult to acquire, due to the illegal and underground nature of the 
industry, he concludes that, “the proliferation of the sex trade industry globally has 
resulted in an increase in the prostitution and sexual exploitation of children” (2001, p. 
148). 
 
Africa has not been immune to this global trend, and indeed the continent as a whole 
has been recognized as a destination for CST (Flowers, 2001), defined as “tourism 
organized with the primary purposes of facilitating the effecting of a commercial-
sexual relationship with a child” (Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 1996).   Certain Sub-Saharan African countries have been identified as key CST 
destinations, of which Ghana, along with Kenya, South Africa and the Gambia are the 
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most popular (ECPAT International, 2007, p. 6).  And it is not only young girls who are 
victims to this growing industry. A local Ghanaian ECPAT group conducted a study in 
2006, which found that the abuse of boys was increasing (ECPAT International, 2007, p. 
6).   
 
Nigeria has now become a key transit country for trafficking West Africans to Europe 
for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation (Cullen-DuPont, 2009, pp. 78-79).  
A well-organized network of recruiters, traffickers and exploiters lure young girls from 
public places with the promise of employment in a large African city or even overseas. 
Traffickers use a variety of methods to entice and then oppress their victims, including, 
 the use of trusted intermediaries, such as family friends or even relatives to 
undertake the recruitment 
 the seizure of identity documents upon arrival in a destination country, 
therefore making escape much more difficult 
 threats of violence against the victim’s family in her hometown 
 the use of violence against the victim herself 
 the practice of cultural forms of oppression (for example, some West African 
traffickers will use traditional rituals to coerce their victims to remain 
obedient). 
 
These networks operate efficiently, with the aim of immediately separating the victim 
from systems of support (such as family), and this almost always involves physically 
transporting the individual either internally within the country, to a neighbouring 
country or even to another continent, such as Europe.   In this way, borders play a key 
role in maintaining the international industry of human trafficking and commercial 
sexual exploitation. 
 
Borders in West Africa facilitate the easy movement of people, due to their 
comparative permeability, whereas the more stringent European borders inhibit the 
escape of victims once their identities have been seized. It is a perfect marriage of 
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these border systems that has made West Africa a leading supplier of human 
trafficking victims. 
 
In Nigeria, many prepubescent trafficking victims are transported twice. The first will 
be to a country for forced labour as a domestic servant, and then once they reach 
adolescence, they are transported to a second country and forced into commercial 
sexual exploitation (Cullen-DuPont, 2009, p. 82). 
 
The Good Life and the Sale of Bodily Services? 
Can true human flourishing exist when a person takes money in exchange for the use 
of one’s sexual or reproductive capacities? It is generally assumed that prostitution 
runs counter to ‘the good life’. However Martha Nussbaum argues against several 
feminist responses to prostitution in her work “Whether From Reason or Prejudice”: 
Taking money for bodily services. Her argument relies on the proposition that 
prostitution, like any other ‘profession’ is based on the sale of a bodily service in 
exchange for monetary compensation.  Comparing the sale of sexual services with that 
of an opera singer selling his vocal talents, and a professor marketing her mental 
faculties, Nussbaum concludes that the ‘assumption’ that prostitution is necessarily 
‘bad’ is one that may not be grounded in reason (Nussbaum, 1998). 
 
What is it that differentiates the sale of sexual bodily services from that of other uses 
of our being? Nussbaum begins her argument by comparing prostitution with other 
professions: a chicken factory worker, a domestic servant, a nightclub singer, a 
professor of philosophy, a masseuse, and what she dubs a “colonoscopy artist” (a 
person who receives pay for having her colon examined with the latest instruments).  
By examining each of these professions as compared to prostitution, Nussbaum quite 
convincingly demonstrates that each of these ‘legitimate’ professions can carry 
comparable risks and negative impacts as one might face in prostitution.  In each case, 
the individual gives up a portion of herself, in exchange for monetary compensation. 
 
154 
 
However, not all of her arguments are equally as persuasive. In the comparison of the 
prostitute and the professor of philosophy, Nussbaum likens the invasion of body 
(prostitute) with that of the invasion of mind (philosopher), and concludes “when 
someone’s unanticipated argument goes into one’s mind, is this not both intimate and 
bodily? (And far less consensual, often, than the penetration of prostitute by 
customer?)”  Yes, along that line of argument, Nussbaum may be correct but, as will be 
discussed below, her entire argument relies on a faulty foundation; the presumption of 
consensual prostitution. 
 
Nussbaum then counters six arguments that are traditionally used to prove the 
amorality of prostitution, demonstrating that the difference between the sale of sexual 
services and other professions might not be quite as clear as we would wish to 
assume.   
 
At the outset, Nussbaum makes clear that the form of prostitution she discusses must 
be consensual; that non-consensual prostitution does not allow for human flourishing. 
I would question how we can determine or even infer consent in the case of 
prostitution; and in fact I will go one step further in contending that consent for the 
sale of one’s sexual or reproductive capacities is most often non-consensual. 
 
Legalization of Prostitution 
I contend, as stated at the outset of this chapter, that consent and prostitution – in 
practice – are generally incompatible.  Although Nussbaum’s article is very persuasive 
and successfully demonstrates that our aversion to prostitution lacks a grounding in 
reason, her conclusion that the state should not prevent this ‘option’ to those with 
little choice is perhaps a dangerous one to make. 
 
While is true that the stigmatization of these women does little improve their lot, case 
studies of legalized prostitution have not yielded results that have led to increased 
security, enhanced economic liberty nor reduced discrimination against the women in 
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this ‘profession’.  Furthermore, the legalization of adult prostitutes may in fact lead to 
greater sexual exploitation of children. 
 
What follows are the real consequences of the legalization of prostitution in 
jurisdictions across the world.  Loose borders may facilitate the trafficking of 
vulnerable individuals and legalization of this global sex industry has exacerbated this 
exploitation to meet with increased demand.  
 
Constrained Agency 
Frequently, sex traffickers and pimps prey upon vulnerable individuals, who “come 
from families marred by incest, alcohol abuse, and parental suicide” (Mees, 2009). 
Research demonstrates that entry into prostitution is generally preceded by a period 
of prolonged and repeated trauma (Farley, et al., 2004, p. 35).  The majority of 
prostitutes (anywhere from 55% to 90%, depending on the study) have experiences of 
childhood sexual abuse, and many claim that that abuse influenced their entry into 
prostitution. 
 
As with those who are victims of human trafficking, even when prostitutes are not 
trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation, it is their vulnerability that is taken 
advantage of.  And although they may ‘choose’ to become prostitutes, often that 
decision is made when the individual is still a child, in the context of constrained 
agency. Revealingly, the average age of entry into prostitution is usually around the 
age of 13 or 14 (Farley, et al., 2004). 
 
Violence 
The American Journal of Epidemiology published a study that statistically analyzed the 
mortality rates of prostitutes.  Potterat et. al. (2004) followed 1,969 prostitutes in 
Colorado Springs over a period of 30 years. They found that the crude mortality rate 
(CMR) for this cohort was 391 per 100,000, compared to the general population, 
whose standardized mortality rate (SMR) was 1.9 per 100,000. For periods of 
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presumed active prostitution, the rate increases to 459 per 100,000.  Disease and drug 
use were causes of death, however, violence was another key cause. The CMR for 
death by homicide for active prostitutes was found to be 229 per 100,000. 
 
The Netherlands is one of the most well-known jurisdictions to have legalized the sale 
of sexual services.  The notorious ‘red light district’ in Amsterdam is a leading tourist 
attraction, where women have engaged in legalized prostitution since October 2000.  
Even in this highly controlled environment, women are “routinely threatened, beaten, 
raped, and terrorized by pimps and customers” (Mees, 2009).  Studies have found that 
roughly 60% of prostituted women in the Netherlands suffer physical assaults, and 
40% were forced into prostitution or sexual abuse by acquaintances (Farley, et al., 
2004, p. 34).  
 
Prostitution was decriminalized in New Zealand in 2003, and one of the key intentions 
of this legal change was to improve safety by encouraging the reporting of violent 
incidents. However, the Prostitution Law Review Committee Report found that, 
“adverse incidents, including violence, continue to be experienced by those in the sex 
industry. There is conflicting evidence on whether violence is reported more often 
since decriminalisation, but clearly there is still a marked reluctance amongst sex 
workers to follow through on complaints” (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2008).  
 
Human Trafficking to meet demand 
It is argued that prostitution and human trafficking are two phenomena that cannot, 
and should not, be understood in isolation (Ekberg, 2004, p. 1189). The demand for 
human beings to ‘work’ in the sex industry in many countries creates a demand that is 
filled by human traffickers.  
 
In Amsterdam, the high demand for prostitutes has encouraged traffickers to transport 
women across Europe, and from other continents to capitalize on this market.  A 
recent trial involving more than 100 women forced to work as prostitutes in 
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Amsterdam found that many came from vulnerable situations, or were lured by 
traffickers with the promises decent jobs (Mees, 2009). 
 
However, the New Zealand Prostitution Law Review Committee Report (New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice, 2008) is adamant that the decriminalization of prostitution has not 
led to any increase of human trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation. Indeed, 
they firmly state that, 
the Committee considers that in the case of New Zealand, there is no link 
between the sex industry and human trafficking….Information received from 
Immigration Service NZ indicates that no situations involving trafficking in the 
sex industry have been identified. In addition, there have been no prosecutions 
for trafficking under section 98D of the Crimes Act 1961. 
 
The Report provides a caveat that the immigration service information relies solely on 
the indoor prostitution sector in New Zealand, and that the illegal, street-based 
industry is outwith their purview. They relied on other data to determine that no 
trafficked persons were being sexually exploited in New Zealand. The New Zealand 
case also presents a unique example in that its position as an island nation may 
present different challenges than those nations with multiple land borders. 
 
 
The Swedish Model: Demand-Side Legislation 
 In contrast to the decriminalization trend seen in other countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, in 1999 Sweden instituted The Law that That 
Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services, or the “Sex Purchase Law” (Ekberg, 2004). 
This new law effectively decriminalized the sale of sexual services, while criminalizing 
its purchase.  The rationale behind the Sex Purchase Law was to tackle the negative 
effects of commercial sexual exploitation by focusing on the demand-side, rather than 
the traditional method of criminalizing i.e. the supply-side.  This ground-breaking 
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approach to curbing prostitution has yielded positive results during the first decade of 
its institution. 
 
The rise of prostitution as a normalized ‘profession’ had been gaining ground in the 
decades prior to the institution of the Sex Purchase Law (Ekberg, 2004, p. 1187).  With 
the “free market” economy reigning supreme in many parts of the world, the sale in 
human beings for sexual exploitation has been one among many commodities that 
have become profitable to traffic. Ekberg (2004, p. 1188) found that a employment as 
a sex worker “is seen as a legitimate career path for women, and employment centers 
in the Netherlands, where prostitution and brothels are legalized, suggest brothel 
worker as an appropriate professional choice.” 
 
In contrast to this trend in other parts of the world, the Swedish government has made 
it an offense to pimp or to purchase sex. Based on a feminist understanding of 
prostitution as violence against women, the purchase of sex is punishable by fines or 
prison sentence, in addition to the threat of public exposure.  At the same time, the 
sale of sex is no longer a crime. Moreover, the Sex Purchase Law has a wider purpose, 
namely to “to create a contemporary and democratic society where full gender 
equality is the norm, and to recognize the right to equal participation of women and 
men, girls and boys, in all areas of society.” (Ekberg, 2004, p. 1188). 
 
This campaign against sexual exploitation in Sweden is not limited to the Sex Purchase 
Law. The government funds programs to assist sexually-exploited women in leaving 
prostitution, and also targets those social and economic factors which lead to the 
vulnerability of women and children.  Measures to reduce poverty, along with social 
programming have been introduced to empower vulnerable segments of the 
population, to reduce their risk of exploitation in the first instance. 
 
Although the introduction of the new law has not reduced the overall incidence of 
prostitution, it has resulted in a reduction of street prostitution by half.  Comparable 
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jurisdictions in Norway and Denmark, which do not have similar legislation, have seen 
a rise in street prostitution during this same period. Norway has since changed its 
legislation to be more in keeping with the Swedish law (Mees, 2009).  
 
Legalization or Criminalization: The Answer for West Africa?  
The feminist interpretation of prostitution as violence against women (and children) is 
in contrast to another branch of feminism which sees the ‘sale of bodily services’ as a 
form of female choice and empowerment (when the decision to enter into prostitution 
is solely made by a woman of age, without coercion).  Although both streams of 
feminism are persuasive in their arguments, in practice I believe the former to be a 
more sound interpretation of reality, as it is on the ground.   
 
To legislate (or to avoid legislating) based on a rational, albeit theoretical basis risks 
harm to a vast number of vulnerable people in order to protect the rights of a group 
that may not exist. In this instance, to legalize prostitution to protect the economic 
rights of entrepreneurial women has the unintended consequence of removing what 
little protections that do exist for vulnerable women who are coerced, trafficked and 
forced into the ‘industry’ of sexual exploitation.   
 
Data on sexually-exploited women and children overwhelming demonstrates forced or 
coerced entry into the ‘profession’ and the use of violence and intimidation to ensure 
the continued participation of these women and children.   The difficulty in separating 
the entrepreneurial prostitute from the sexually-exploited woman creates an 
extremely difficult task for law enforcement and legislators. 
 
Nussbaum does conclude her piece by recognizing the plight of women in many parts 
of the world that leads them to work that is not expressive of true human flourishing.  
Prostitution, along with other forms of work, is generally the result of circumscribed 
choice.  Nussbaum advocates for studies and initiatives aimed at enhancing and 
empowering women and children, to create true opportunities, but recommends that 
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in instances where choice is limited that the ‘choice’ of prostitution ought not to be 
outlawed.  
 
A practical solution? 
In practice, Nussbaum’s argument may allow for the perpetuation and expansion of 
sexual exploitation of women and children in West Africa due to continued lax 
enforcement of laws designed for their protection.  It is too easy to ignore the practice 
of sexual exploitation by rationalizing its existence through the lens of female 
empowerment. On the ground, women and children in West Africa are bought, sold 
and trafficked across the region and across the globe to supply the growing demand 
for commercial sexual exploitation.  Ghana has become a safe haven for sex tourists, 
and young Africans faced with limited economic opportunities are easy prey for 
traffickers.  
 
Any real attempt to create avenues for ‘the good life’ in West Africa must tackle the 
economic and social vulnerability of certain classes of citizens. The Swedish model is 
perhaps a good starting point in this respect. It recognizes the inequality that exists 
between those that are exploited and those who exploit. It aims to address the 
economic and social disparity that creates vulnerable classes of citizens. And by 
criminalizing the demand-side of commercial sexual exploitation, it may impact the 
prevalence of commercial sex tourism and human trafficking for purposes of sexual 
exploitation. 
 
Admittedly, gathering data on the prevalence of sexual exploitation and human 
trafficking is no easy feat. Indeed, this thesis, while advocating for a Capabilities 
Approach to the study of borders in Africa, does fall short in this respect of having 
access to reliable primary data when tackling illegal or subversive phenomena. Safety 
for the researcher is challenging to ensure, and gaining access to sources as an 
outsider can prove particularly difficult. I do not believe, however, that the lack of such 
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data discredits the underlying rationale for a moral analysis, and certainly this would 
be an excellent avenue for further research. 
 
The real challenge presented by human trafficking and sexual exploitation in West 
Africa however is found at the border. Without a more robust presence at the intra-
regional borders and ports of entry / exit in West Africa, practical application of this 
type of legislation would be near impossible.  This is again another example of the 
impracticality of imposing a European model on Africa. Any successful legislation will 
require an African solution that is cognizant of the reality as it is, on the ground. 
 
Chapter Summary 
As a counterpoint to the positive impacts of border opportunities, this chapter 
presents the alternative: that borders can be used to oppress and abuse.  This was 
demonstrated through the study of the practice of human trafficking, an issue that 
continues to be all too prevalent in West Africa today. In order to curb these illegal 
activities, many international, regional and national instruments have been ratified, 
and these were outlined at the beginning of this chapter.  Research suggests that these 
instruments have been unsuccessful, which may be due to their failure to address 
issues at the micro-regional level. 
 
The chapter then questioned the issue of consent and found that true consent to 
trafficking and exploitation is not possible.  This view runs counter to the popular 
‘victim as blameless’ perspective, frequently found in the media.  This research has 
indicated that trafficking victims can exert agency with respect to actions that 
eventually lead them to be trafficking, and that this does not negate their status as 
victim.   The issue of child migrants, child trafficking and child soldiers was then 
treated, using the example of the Ivoirian crisis.  
 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of Nussbaum’s defence of the sale of bodily 
services, countering her assumption that a person can consent to sexual exploitation.  
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This piece suggests that interpretations such as Nussbaum’s may actually result in 
further exploitation, and if real policy change is to occur in West Africa to curb the 
trafficking of human beings, it must address the reality of borders. 
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Chapter Six:  
eRegionalism 
The possibilities of virtual transcendence of borders 
 
Are borders a yoke holding back progress in West Africa, or rather is their permeability 
an avenue for economic and physical survival? The answer is as complex as the people 
who use the borders to their own ends.  Stating that African borders are ‘bad’ or ‘good’ 
is too simplistic (Griffiths, 1995; Boutros-Ghali 1972) – it masks the intricacies of the 
way in which borders are used politically, socially and economically by individuals on a 
daily basis. Using Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, the previous chapters have 
demonstrated that borders can play an integral role in the safety and security (both 
physical and economic) of Africans, in both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  The permeability 
of the border allows for individuals to find sanctuary and economic prosperity, 
particularly in volatile or economically-depressed regions.  Conversely, that very 
permeability is a chief feature that facilitates the oppression and subjugation of 
Africans, particularly in the thriving industry of human trafficking. 
 
In this conclusion, I will summarize the salient points of this thesis, highlighting the key 
arguments of my approach and discussing some of the gaps that still remain.  And 
finally, I will shift the debate somewhat by questioning the potential challenge to the 
overall impact of borders in West Africa presented by the proliferation of new 
technologies.  A very interesting avenue for further research might investigate whether 
the use of borders in Africa, and therefore their positive and negative impacts, might 
be transcended by the growing trend in wireless communication technologies.  
 
Contributions  
While the intent of this thesis was not a defence of African borders per se, it expressly 
sought to challenge the view that borders in Africa are the source of continental ills.  
The argument that borders are artificial, arbitrary and have led to poverty and violence 
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in Africa is overly-simplistic.   The hypothesis of this piece was that if West African 
borders are the sometimes unintended tool through which individual agents attempt 
to achieve personal, political, economic, social and security ends, then the impact of 
borders can be both positive and negative. 
 
One key aim of this research was to add to the literature in the area of New 
Regionalism by contributing a micro-regional case study focused on the Ghanaian-
Ivoirian border.  As the NRA is a relatively young field of study, the inclusion of new 
geographical case studies is important in that it can help to further strengthen the 
growing body of literature by providing another point of comparison.  Furthermore, 
my decision to focus primarily on a cross-border, micro-regional level analysis, rather 
than a meso- or macro-level analysis, also constitutes a meaningful contribution.  
Cross-border micro-regional studies have been too often neglected in favour of “state-
centric, formalistic *analyses that+….concentrate either on inter-state or…sub-
national…developments” (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, p. 14).  With respect to Africa, 
cross-border micro-regional studies may have particular salience due to the unique 
ways in which borders themselves are used by individuals. 
 
A further aim of this research was to provide a moral account of the cross-border, 
micro-regional activity that I sought to analyze.  While the NRA allows for a focus that 
is multi-disciplinary and multi-level, opening up what constitutes a subject of 
regionalist study, in and of itself it does not provide a framework for a moral analysis.  
I, therefore, chose to incorporate Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, which is 
based on a neo-Aristotelian account of the good life, or rather what it is to be capable 
of flourishing a truly human way (Nussbaum M. , 2002).   Using the Capabilities 
Approach has created a foundation for those value judgements in my study of micro-
regional activity. 
 
Although I could not foresee the continuation of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire at the 
outset of this project (the violence and instability had decreased by the time I was 
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engaged in this research), this issue of borders and migration is still relevant 
considering the ongoing violence.  The disputed presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire 
in 2010 have many concerned that the nation is returning to a state of full-scale civil 
war (BBC News Africa, 2011).  Indeed, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) (2011) has just reported that due to the post-
election violence, up to one million persons are believed to be displaced in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  There are reports of overcrowded bus depots, with people desperate to 
escape Abidjan.  More than 100,000 Ivoirians have already crossed over into Liberia 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). 
 
The policy implications of this research are very relevant today, as the situation has 
many parallels with the violence that erupted during the height of the civil war in 2002.  
The use of borders will continue to play a key role in the survival strategies of 
individuals, and this has implications for border security, local economies and the work 
of aid and refugee agencies. 
 
Key arguments 
Within the structure of this research, an account of the NRA was first presented, 
providing background to the field of study. This was then followed by an engagement 
with the Capabilities Approach, which outlined its advantages in relation to resource-
based, preference-based and human-rights-based approaches.  Finding Nussbaum’s 
model to be appropriate for the research question of this thesis, I chose to focus 
primarily on the first three of her ten capabilities, namely Life, Bodily Health, and 
Bodily Integrity.   
 
It is this focus on only three of the ten capabilities that presents a potential weakness 
of this research, as Nussbaum herself emphasizes that all ten are interrelated and that 
one cannot exchange some of one element for more of another (Nussbaum M. , 2000, 
p. 81).  There are two reasons I chose to focus on a reduced number of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities. Firstly, I was unable to provide a complete account of all ten capabilities 
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within the scope of this thesis.  The ten capabilities are vastly wide-ranging and to do 
them justice would require a study in much greater scope than was possible here.  
Secondly, wishing to account for both positive and negative impacts of borders made 
data a serious challenge when studying those activities that are by their very nature 
illicit, illegal or criminal.  To then attempt an extrapolation of that limited data to 
account for an impact on the more abstract capabilities such as “senses, imagination 
and thought” would be superficial and misleading.  
 
The discussion on theory was followed by an historical account of migration and 
diplomacy in West Africa, with particular reference to the area around modern-day 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  The dissertation outlined how migration had been a feature 
of the African landscape long before European colonization, but that the effects of the 
colonial presence did alter those traditional migratory routes. Furthermore, this piece 
countered the view that diplomacy and politicization were unknown to pre-colonial 
Africa, and provided historical accounts of the political interactions between the British 
colonial officers and the empire of Asante.  Although one can argue that this foray into 
an historical narrative of politics in pre-independence West Africa is perhaps 
unnecessary, I would contend that any attempt to study modern African politics must 
first situate the subject with reference to colonialism, being mindful of not falling into 
a cause-effect analysis when studying colonialism.  The impact of the colonial presence 
on borders in West Africa cannot be denied, however to attribute the creation of 
borders to a solely exogenous imposition by colonial powers is also misleading. This 
question was treated in depth at the close of the third chapter and suggested that 
modern borders in West Africa are the result of interplay between colonial ambitions 
and local African aspirations, later sanctioned by African leaders during the early years 
following independence.   
 
The fourth chapter presents an argument that the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border can have 
positive impacts for individuals seeking economic or physical survival.  This self-
preservation is particularly important in areas subject to a lack of official economic 
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opportunities or heightened threat of physical violence or death. This thesis employed 
an understanding of security that relied on the first three of Nussbaum’s ten 
capabilities: Life, Bodily Health, and Bodily Integrity.  Using data gathered from a field 
study conducted in Ghana in 2007, much of the focus in the chapter centres on the 
Ghanaian-Ivoirian border adjacent to the Brong Ahafo region (in Ghana).  Relying on 
unstructured interviews with key officials representing the Ghana Immigration Service 
and the Ghana Customs, Excise and Preventative Service, the research suggests that 
unofficial border crossings are pervasive in this region, and take many forms.  The 
example of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was examined, which demonstrated two forms 
of cross-border movement: safe passage and sanctuary.  Both of these strategies have 
been used by migrant workers (mostly Burkinabé) in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as by 
Ivoirians themselves.  Ghanaian border officials recollected bus-loads of migrant 
workers fleeing Côte d’Ivoire each day, as well as temporary border-crossers seeking 
sanctuary for as little as one night.   
 
Furthermore, the research indicates that the opportunities for cross-border economic 
survival are also prevalent in this region.  The interrelated factors of reduced economic 
opportunities in Brong-Ahafo, coupled with different customs tariffs between the two 
states of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire has led to a thriving economy in illicit trade across 
the border.  These unofficial crossings are used for agricultural products (among 
others), due to the high import duty assessed in Ghana.  Although this presents an 
enormous challenge for Ghanaian officials, the prevalence of this unofficial trade is, 
arguably, being used as a tool to address a need for economic survival.  As Stary (1999, 
p. 174) notes, “it may be interpreted as an adjustment on the part of the borderland 
population to an economic crisis which invites them to maximise every source of 
profit.” In this sense, the thesis demonstrates that the opportunities for self-
preservation and economic survival presented by the border can be understood as an 
avenue for the expression of capabilities or eudaimonia. One can again challenge my 
conclusion of eudaimonia by pointing to the circumscribed use of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities, which I addressed through the arguments made above. 
168 
 
As a counterpoint to the previous chapter, the fifth chapter demonstrates the ways in 
which West African borders can be used to oppress and abuse individuals through the 
practices of human trafficking and exploitation. Human trafficking is a serious blight on 
West Africa, despite the many international, regional and state-based instruments that 
have been designed to curb its existence.  These instruments were presented, and 
then it was suggested that the lack of success of these rights-based approaches might 
be in part attributable to their failure to address the cross-border mechanisms used in 
the illegal transport of human beings.  For instance, the blurred line between 
exploitation child labour and the traditional practices of child migration has made 
progress on human trafficking particularly difficult to achieve.  The thesis also 
examined the related issue of the sexual exploitation of women, and argued that 
Nussbaum’s defence of the sale of bodily services is flawed in that consent is 
impossible to discern.  
 
In one way, demonstrating that borders in West Africa can be used to constrain human 
capabilities is simple, in that it is not subject to the same criticisms as the previous 
chapter.  Because all ten of Nussbaum’s capabilities are interrelated and cannot be 
exchanged, establishing that one or more of these capabilities has been inhibited (as 
for example Bodily Integrity) may be sufficient to conclude that true human flourishing 
is constrained.  However, in another way, this argument has been much more 
challenging in that the data surrounding criminal activities in West Africa at the micro-
level is very difficult to ascertain and acquire.  Macro-level statistics cannot provide the 
same depth of analysis that is necessary when attempting to focus on the impact at 
the micro-level.   
 
This research as a whole traces a narrative of cross-border migration that suggests 
both a preservation and subjugation of human capabilities.  It has demonstrated that 
the permeability of the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border presents opportunities for both 
positive and negative impacts on the lives of Africans at the micro-level.  These micro-
level activities do reflect macro-level forces, at times running in parallel and other 
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times conflicting.  For example, the thesis illustrated that state-level economic policies 
on the importation of rice in Ghana has influenced the growth of smuggling across the 
border in Brong-Ahafo.  While, despite the regional and international agreements 
designed to stop human trafficking, a confluence of forces at the micro-regional level 
lead to its continued existence and growth.  This suggests that micro-regional analyses 
may be very significant to the understanding of macro-level studies.  Combining the 
framework of the NRA with the Capabilities Approach has enabled a moral analysis of 
micro-regional activity in the Ghanaian-Ivorian borderland. 
 
eRegionalism and virtual border crossing  
Although this final discussion may at first appear disjointed from the main thrust of 
this study, I would suggest that the rise of information and communications 
technology presents an interesting challenge to the study of cross-border ‘movement’.  
Currently, borders are being physically crossed with a variety of aims and subsequent 
consequences. Whether legitimate or illicit, whether for positive or negative ends, the 
fluidity of movement across African borders is pervasive.  Is this reality challenged, 
reinforced or enhanced by the growth of technologies that allow for a ‘virtual’ cross-
border interaction, rather than a physical one? 
 
Current data on the proliferation of information and communications technology in 
Africa is somewhat limited. However, the West African Borders and Integration (WABI) 
group has collated some significant information in this area.  Drawing on the logic that 
European integration was not fully-fledged at signing of the Treaty of Rome, WABI 
contends that the same expectation cannot be applied to West African regionalism; 
that it is a processes, and not yet a developed reality (West African Borders and 
Integration, 2003-2006).  Working alongside the Secretariat of the Sahel and West 
Africa Club, WABI’s main objective is to encourage the processes of integration 
through information sharing between the various players, and to promote research. 
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To this end, WABI has gathered statistical data, illustrating trends such as mobile 
phone usage versus fixed line, export and import data for the region as a whole, fibre 
optic cables and their development, roads and transport links, and even population 
statistics based on soil quality.  I will briefly touch on the interrelated technologies of 
mobile phones and the internet. 
 
Connecting the disconnected 
First-hand observation would indicate that certainly mobile phone usage has 
increased, and in particular areas has proliferated to a great extent.  When walking 
through the bustling markets of Accra, mobile phone sellers abound and are even 
superseded in number by the prepaid phone card vendors.  One can provide 
supposition as to why this might be, from the lack of fixed line infrastructure to the 
more flexible payment options associated with mobile phones.  WABI (2005, p. 8) 
states that the growth rate for mobile phones in West Africa is higher than any other 
region of the globe.  A recent UN International Telecommunication Union report 
(2009) found that “amongst the developing regions, Africa continues to have the 
highest mobile growth rate (32 per cent in 2006/2007) and mobile penetration has 
risen from just one in 50 people at the beginning of this century to over one fourth of 
the population today.” 
 
And it’s not just the proliferation of the technology that is significant, but also the use 
to which mobile phones are being put.  Not simply a method of communication, 
mobile phones in Africa are used to transfer funds between individuals (Rice, 2007), to 
access the internet for those in areas without broadband (Smith D. , 2009), and used 
by medical professionals to provide care for patients in inaccessible areas (Kimani, 
2008). One newspaper article even discusses the use of mobile phones in Uganda by 
local fisherman, who now use their cell phones to call the various markets for their 
prices.  This allows the fishermen to determine the most profitable market in which to 
sell their catch (Perkins, 2010).   
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Related to the rise of mobile phone technology, is the expansion of internet 
accessibility in Africa.  In terms of the penetration of internet technology, Africa lags 
behind the rest of the world, with only 5% of the population online, as of 2007 (United 
Nations International Telecommunications Union, 2009, p. 4). Although this represents 
an increase from 1% in 2002, it still falls short of the figures exceeding 40% for areas 
such as Europe and the Americas. 
 
The UN International Telecommunications Union sees the expansion of internet, and in 
particular broadband, access as key to development, as it is essential for services such 
as e-commerce and e-government.  However, the proliferation of mobile internet 
services and 3G networks may fill the void where traditional broadband lines are 
lacking.  These 3G technologies allow for similar internet services delivered via 
broadband without the same infrastructural investment.   
 
This access to communication and information on the part of Africans may have many 
unintended consequences, both positive and perhaps negative.  Money transfers via 
SMS have been very beneficial, particularly in regions where access to bank accounts is 
limited.  Some mobile phone companies have even expanded this service to allow 
business to pay salaries directly to the employee’s phone (Rice, 2007).  However, just 
as positive transactions can occur, there exists the risk of individuals taking advantage 
of such new technologies for more nefarious purposes, such as money laundering, 
theft, or trade in illegal goods. 
 
Regardless, all trends seem to point to the continued growth of the mobile phone and 
mobile broadband market in sub-Saharan Africa.  The consequences of this expansion 
would be an interesting topic for further research, with respect to the issue of cross-
border regionalism. Is it a driver for change with respect to micro-regional activity, or 
will it simply run alongside migratory patterns that currently exist? 
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eRegionalism and Popular Uprisings 
What occurs when people become increasingly interconnected through the use of 
communications technology?  Recent examples of the influence of technology on 
political space are the popular uprisings occurring in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Although these conflicts are not caused by technology, it can be argued that their 
promotion, spread and organization have been directly influenced by new 
technologies, and in particular the wider access to social media. 
 
A confluence of factors has been described as key in these uprisings, and includes 
disaffected youth with little access to employment and ready access to social media. 
During popular protests in Tunisia, for example, strict controls were put on internet 
and the media, to inhibit the spread of anti-government protests.  Regardless, 
protesters managed to communicate their intentions through Twitter, Facebook, 
blogs, and text messages (Lewis, 2011).  The swift result of the protests that eventually 
led to President Ben Ali fleeing the country is said to have influenced the growing 
unrest in Egypt.  Indeed the BBC has the overthrow of Ben Ali as the first event in their 
“Egypt protests” timeline (BBC News Africa, 2011).   
 
With the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in mid-February, and the current 
escalation of violence in Libya, political commentators are questioning how far this 
wave of popular unrest will spread.  Interestingly, in late January China blocked the 
search term “Egypt” in the country, for fear that the example might spur popular 
unrest (Sacks, 2011).  
 
As a crude compilation of data29, the table below collates some of the variables that 
may be influencing these political events. 
 
 
 
                                                     
29
 Source: CIA World Factbook 
173 
 
Country Population 
(millions) 
Median 
age 
Joblessness (%) Population 
below the 
poverty 
line (%) 
Internet 
users (% of 
total 
population) 
Mobile 
telephone 
users (% of 
total 
population) 
Egypt 84.5 24 9.6 20 23.7 65 
Libya 6.5 24.2 30 33 5.38 76.9 
Tunisia 10.5 29.7 14 38 33.33 93.3 
Yemen 24.3 17.89 35 45.2 9.05 34 
Côte d’Ivoire 21.5 19.5 Estimates 
around 40-50% 
due to violence 
42 4.5 62 
 
Tunisia has one of the highest rates of internet users in the region and in particular a 
high penetration of social media, with 21% of the population registered as Facebook 
users (SocialBakers, 2011). 
 
Can we extrapolate any findings that may have salience for Côte d’Ivoire? In many 
respects the situation in Côte d’Ivoire does not mimic that in the Middle East.  It is 
facing civil war rather than a lone authoritarian ruler.  Moreover, the penetration of 
the internet and social media is comparatively low. However, Côte d’Ivoire does have a 
very young population, with an estimated high rate of unemployment and the mobile 
phone penetration is very high. 
 
Obviously this presentation of data is extremely rudimentary, but there is an 
interesting opportunity for further research into the application of various forms of 
new communications technology and their impact on political and social movements, 
that have the ability to transcend borders.  Will these technologies eventually be used 
more readily in sub-Saharan African as the penetration of the technology increases?  
How might it differ from the way in which technology and social media is currently 
being used in North Africa and the Middle East? 
 
There and back again 
This study has provided an account of micro-regionalism in the Ghanaian-Ivoirian 
borderland. Using the framework of the NRA, coupled with a moral analysis borrowed 
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from Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, this research has provided a more 
nuanced interpretation of the impact of West African borders in the lives of 
individuals.  It is hoped that this case study can serve as a comparative piece in the 
field of new regionalism studies, and that it may fill a gap in micro-regional analyses in 
West Africa.    
  
175 
 
Appendix 
Agreements and Conventions that treat human trafficking 
 
International and continental agreements deal directly or indirectly with trafficking: 
1. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): The CRC was the “first 
legally binding international instrument to incorporate the full range of human 
rights” (UNICEF, 2008).  It applies to all those under the age of 18, and aims not 
only to protect them from harmful influences and exploitation, but also to protect 
their ‘right’ to survival and full development. In addition to the 54 binding articles 
of the CRC, there are also two Optional Protocols: on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography. Ghana is a signatory to the CRC and its two Optional Protocols, 
however it has yet to ratify the Protocols. 
 
2. The 1999 Convention No. 182 of the International Labour Organization on the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour: Convention No. 182 builds upon previous ILO 
agreements which aim to prevent undue hardship on children, such as the 1973 
Convention No. 138 on establishing a minimum age.  According to Convention No. 
183, the worst forms of child labour include, “all forms of slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and 
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” (International Labour 
Organization, 2006) and “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it 
is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children,” 
(International Labour Organization, 2006).  Ghana ratified this convention in 2000. 
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3. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol) and the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: The Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the General Assembly in 2000, and 
aims to curb transnational crime through cooperation and new national legislation 
to make the various acts of participation in transnational crime a criminal offence. 
Three Supplementary Protocols were later adopted, of which the two listed above 
are particularly relevant to the subject of trafficking.  The Palermo Protocol offers 
the first legally-binding international instrument with an agreed definition of 
trafficking (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). The aim of the 
Palermo Protocol is two-fold; it seeks to investigate and prosecute traffickers, and 
also to provide assistance to victims of trafficking.  The Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants provides an agreed definition of smuggling of migrants, and 
seeks to prevent its occurrence.  Ghana is neither a signatory to the Convention 
nor its Protocols. 
 
4. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) and the 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Adopted on the 21st of October 1986 
by the Organization of African Unity, the Banjul Charter is an overarching 
continental agreement intended to protect the basic freedoms and rights of 
Africans.  The most salient element in terms of human trafficking is Article 5, which 
states that, “Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity 
inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of 
exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited” 
(African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981).  Ghana ratified the 
Banjul Charter in 1989. 
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The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa entered into force on November 
25th, 2005, guaranteeing new rights for women, including the elimination of 
discrimination, the right to dignity, integrity, security of person, and elimination 
of harmful practices, among others.  In particular, the Protocol requires the 
following action on the part of States: 
 Article 4.2(g): “prevent and condemn trafficking in women, prosecute 
the perpetrators of such trafficking and protect those women most at 
risk,” 
 Article 13 (g): “adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit 
any exploitation or degradation of women,”  
 Article 13 (m): “adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit 
any exploitation or degradation of women” (African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, 2003). 
Ghana became a signatory to the Protocol in 2003, but has yet to ratify. 
 
5. The 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: Following on the 
heels of the CRC, the Organization of African Unity developed a charter protecting 
the full spectrum of civil, political, social and economic rights for children.  The 
Charter has several sections pertinent to the questions of trafficking and 
exploitation, summarized in the bullet list which follows.  The Charter requires that 
States,: 
 Article 15.1: *ensure that+ “Every child shall be protected from all forms 
of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to 
be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral, or social development,” 
 Article 24 (d): “take all appropriate measures to ensure that in inter-
country adoption, the placement does not result in trafficking or 
improper financial gain for those who try to adopt a child,” 
 Article 28: “take all appropriate measures to protect the child from the 
use of narcotics and illicit use of psychotropic substances as defined in 
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the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use of children in 
the production and trafficking of such substances,” 
 Article 29 (a): “take all appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, 
sale of, or traffick in children for any purpose or in any form, by any 
person including parents or legal guardians of the child” 
 Article 27.1: “shall undertake to protect the child from all forms of 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and shall in particular take 
measures to prevent: 
i. the inducement, coercion or encouragement of a child to engage in 
any sexual activity; 
ii. the use of children in prostitution or other sexual practices; 
iii. the use of children in pornographic activities, performances and 
materials” (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
1990). 
 
Ghana became a signatory to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child on the August 18, 1997, and ratified the Charter on June 10, 2005. 
 
6. The 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Especially Women and Children (Ouagadougou Action Plan): The Ouagadougou 
Action Plan is a joint initiative of the European Union and the African Union (and 
applies to both regional organizations and their members), which outlines four 
priority areas in the fight against human trafficking: 
 Prevention and awareness-raising 
 Victim protection and assistance 
 Legislative framework, policy development and law enforcement 
 Cooperation and coordination (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2008, p. 77). 
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Regional and Domestic Instruments 
1. A Declaration and a Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2001): Adopted 
during the Dakar ECOWAS summit in 2001, the Declaration and Plan of Action aims 
to have all member states sign and ratify the Palermo Protocol and the CRC. 
Furthermore, it stipulates other measures, specifically: 
 “criminalization of trafficking in persons, 
 creation of an ECOWAS Coordination Unit to liaise with National Task 
Forces, 
 protection and support of victims, 
 awareness raising, 
 cooperation between border control agencies, and  
 data collection by ECOWAS countries” (Fong, p. 7). 
 
2. The Human Trafficking Act, 2005 (Act 694): Given assent on the 5th of December, 
2005, The Human Trafficking Act (the Act) is an act of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Ghana, which sets out the penalties related to the crime of human 
trafficking.  The Act defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring, trading or receipt of persons within and across national 
borders by 
(a) the use of threats, force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, 
deception, the abuse of power or exploitation of vulnerability, or 
(b) giving or receiving payments and benefits to achieve consent” (The 
Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2005).  The definition is interesting 
in that human trafficking is not interpreted as necessarily cross-border 
in nature, rather the law provides a broader definition, inclusive of 
intra-state trafficking. 
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The Act goes further and states that, 
Exploitation shall include at the minimum, induced prostitution and 
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, salary or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
 
Placement for sale, bonded placement, temporary placement, 
placement as service where exploitation by someone else is the 
motivating factor shall also constitute trafficking. 
 
Where children are trafficked, the consent of the child, parents or 
guardian of the child cannot be used as a defence in prosecution under 
this Act, regardless of whether or not there is evidence of abuse of 
power, fraud or deception on the part of the trafficker or whether the 
vulnerability of the child was taken advantage of (The Parliament of the 
Republic of Ghana, 2005). 
  
On paper, this Act is very far-reaching and encompasses many of the key 
definitional elements seen within other agreement to curb human trafficking, 
such as the Palermo Protocol.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
181 
 
Bibliography 
Interviews 
Agbseye, J. (2007, January 17). Principle Collector of Customs, Sampa Border Post. 
 
Kani, I. (2007, January 17). Station Commander, Sampa Border Post. 
 
Korkor, D. (2007, January). Government Official, Suyani District. 
 
Kpobi, F. (2007, January 15). Regional Director, Ghana Immigration Service (Sunyani).  
 
News Articles 
Aboa, A., & Murphy, P. (2004, September 6). Displaced Ivory Coast farmers want land back. 
Reuters News . 
 
Agence France Presse. (2004, December 24). Death toll in murder of Ivory Coast villagers drops 
to 10. 
 
All Africa News. (2004, October 19). Côte d'Ivoire: Market Traders Fear Further Brutal Police 
Raids. 
 
Balint-Kurti, D. (2004, August 12). Muslims Face Persecution in Ivory Coast. Associated Press 
Newswires . 
 
BBC News Africa. (2011, February 11). Egypt protests: Key moments in unrest. Retrieved March 
22, 2011, from BBC News Africa: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12425375 
 
BBC News Africa. (2011, March 25). Ivory Coast: One million refugees feared, UNHCR says. 
Retrieved March 25, 2011, from BBC : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12866067 
 
Ghana News Agency. (2009, November 5). Minister appeals for more British investment in 
Brong-Ahafo. 
182 
 
Ghana News Agency. (2010, November 8). Revenue team tours border posts in Brong Ahafo. 
Retrieved February 25, 2011, from Ghana News Now: 
http://www.ghananewsnow.com/2010/11/08/revenue-team-tours-border-posts-in-brong-
ahafo/ 
 
Ghanaian Chronicle. (2004, March 31). Rice Market Under Seige. 
 
GHP. (2004, April 02). Rice Smuggling On The Increase. 
 
Lewis, A. (2011, January 14). Tunisia protests: Cyber war mirrors unrest on streets. Retrieved 
March 22, 2011, from BBC News Africa: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12180954 
 
Oumar, S. (2004, August 7). Survivors recount mass killing / Accounts back U.N. findings of a 
massacre in Ivory Coast. Houston Chronicle . 
 
Oved, M. C. (2010, October 8). Child labour still key ingredient to chocolate industry. Retrieved 
from The Globe and Mail: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-
mideast/child-labour-still-key-ingredient-to-chocolate-industry-report/article1749279/ 
 
Perkins, A. (2010, January 14). Are mobile phones Africa's silver bullet? Retrieved March 21, 
2011, from The Guardian: Katrine Project: http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/katine-
chronicles-blog/2010/jan/14/mobile-phones-africa 
 
Rice, X. (2007, March 20). Kenya sets world first with money transfers by mobile. Retrieved 
March 20, 2011, from The Guardian: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/mar/20/kenya.mobilephones 
 
Sacks, E. (2011, January 31). China blocks 'Egypt' from Internet searches, concerned anti-Hosni 
Mubarak riots could inspire unrest. Retrieved March 22, 2011, from NY Daily News: 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-31/news/27738472_1_internet-censors-global-
times-northwestern-chinese-region 
 
183 
 
Smith, D. (2009, October 22). Africa calling: mobile phone usage sees record rise after huge 
investment. Retrieved March 22, 2011, from Guardian: Global Development: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/oct/22/africa-mobile-phones-usage-rise 
 
The Ghanaian Chronicle. (2002, October 16). Ivorian ministers, soldiers flee to Ghana. 
 
UN Integrated News Service. (2004, November 24). Côte d'Ivoire: Business As Ususal for Core 
Cocoa Sector Even After Unrest. 
 
Written Sources 
Adepoju, A. (2005, September). Migration in West Africa: A paper prepared for the Policy 
Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on Internatinal Migration. 
Retrieved 12 26, 2010, from Commission mondiale sur les migrations internationales (CMMI): 
http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS8.pdf 
 
Adjaye, J. (1989). Asantehene Agyeman Prempe I and British Colonization of Asante: A 
Reassessment. The International Jounral of African Historical Studies , 22 (2), 223-249. 
Adloff, R. (1964). West Africa: the French-speaking nations, yesterday and today. New York: 
Holt, Reinhart and Winston. 
 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (1981, June). African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. Retrieved June 17, 2010, from African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html 
 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (1990). African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. Retrieved June 17, 2010, from African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/child_en.html 
 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2003, July 11). Protocol to the African 
Charter On Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa . Retrieved June 17, 
2010, from African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/women_en.html 
 
184 
 
Akindès, F. (2004). The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire. Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
 
Allot, A. (1969). Boundaries and the Law in Africa. In C. G. Widstrand, African Boundary 
Problems (pp. 9-21). Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktrycheri Aktiebolag. 
 
Amoako, K. Y. (2005, March 23). Accelerating Development in Africa: The Power of 
Regionalism. Retrieved August 2007, from United Nations Economic Commission for Africa: 
http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/speeches/amoako/2005/032305speech_amoako.htm 
 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities (Revised ed.). London: Verso. 
 
Anderson, M. (1996). Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Arnett, E. (1993). Native Administration in West Africa: A Comparison of French and British 
Policy. Journal of the Royal African Society , 32 (128), 240-251. 
 
Asiwaju, A. (1996). Borderlands in Africa: A Comparative Research Perspective with Particular 
Reference to Western Europe. In P. Nugent, & A. I. Asiwaju, African Boundaries: Barriers, 
Conduits, Opportunities (pp. 253-265). London: Pinter Press. 
 
Asiwaju, A. (1976). Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta 
before 1945. The Journal of African History , 17 (4), 557-596. 
 
Austin, G. (1996). 'No Elders Were Present': Commoners and Private Ownership in Asante 
1807-96. The Journal of African History , 37 (1), 1-30. 
 
Baafri, A. A. (2010, February 1). Country to Establish Database on Human Trafficking. Retrieved 
January 3, 2011, from ECPAT International: 
http://wwwecpat.net/EI/resource_newsclippings.asp?id=910 
 
185 
 
Bach, D. (1999). L'Afrique, son intégration, ses frontières. Marchés tropicaux et 
Méditerrannéeans , 952-954. 
 
Bach, D. (2004). The Dilemmas of Regionalization. In A. Adebajo, & I. Rashid, West Africa's 
Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (pp. 69-90). Boulder: Lynne Reinner 
Press. 
 
Bach, D. (2005). The Global Politics of Regionalism: Africa. In M. Farrell, B. Hettne, & L. Van 
Langenhove, Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice (pp. 171-186). London: Pluto 
Books. 
 
Bayart, J.-F. (1993). The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York: Longman. 
Bickford-Smith, V. (2004). The Betrayal of Creole Elites, 1880-1920. In S. Hawkins, & P. D. 
Morgan, Black Experience and the Empire (pp. 194-227). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Boahen, A. (1987). African Perspectives on Colonialism. London: James Curry Ltd. 
 
Boahen, A. (1990). General History of Africa Vol. II: African Under Colonial Domination 1880-
1935. California: James Curry Ltd. 
 
Boahen, A. (1974). Politics in Ghana 1800-1874. In J. Ajayi, & M. Crowder, History of West 
Africa (Vol. II, pp. 167-261). London: Longman Press. 
 
Boas, M., & Huser, A. (2006). Child labour and cocoa production in West Africa. Fafo. 
 
Boatang, M. (2011, January 13). Ghana: Percent of Irregular Migrants Are From Brong-Ahafo. 
Ghanaian Chronicle . 
 
Boone, C. (2003). Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and 
Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press. 
 
Boutros-Gali, B. (1972). Les Conflits de Frontières en Afrique: Etude et Documents. Paris: 
Editions Techniques et Economiques. 
186 
 
Bratton, M. & van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa. World Politics, 46, 453-489 
 
Breslin, S., & Hook, G. D. (2002). Microregionalism and World Order: Concepts, Approaches 
and Implications. In S. Breslin, & G. D. Hook, Microregionalism and World Order (pp. 1-22). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Brownlie, I. (1979). African Boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopedia. London: C. Hurst 
and Company. 
 
Bruce, N. (1931). Leg. Co. Debates, 1931-2. In G. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: 
Documents of Ghana History (pp. 380-385). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
 
Cameron, S. (2008). Trafficking of women for prostitution. In S. Cameron, & E. Newman, 
Trafficking in Humans: Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions (pp. 80-110). Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press. 
 
Cammack, D. (2007). The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What role for donors? 
Development Policy Review, 25 (5), 99-614. 
 
Center for Migration Studies of New York. (2001, March). Migration World Magazine. Ivory 
Coast Increasingly Hostile to Foreign Labor , 29 (3), p. 9. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2010). Cöte d'Ivoire. Retrieved February 17, 2011, from CIA World 
Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2010). Country Comparison: GDP. Retrieved February 12, 2011, 
from CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Ghana&countryCode=gh&regionCode=af&r
ank=99#gh 
 
CEPS. (2006). CEPS About Us. Retrieved February 24, 2011, from CEPS: 
http://www.ghanacustoms.gov.gh/about_us.htm 
187 
 
Chabal, P. (1986). Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chafer, T. (2002). The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Sucessful Decolonization? 
Oxford: Berg Press. 
 
Clapham, C. (2005). Boundaries and states in the New African Order. In D. Bach, 
Regionalization in Africa: Integration and Disintegration (pp. 53-). Oxford: James Curry Ltd. 
 
Clapham, C. (1994). Review: The "Longue Durée" of the African State. African Affairs , 93 (372), 
433-439. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2004). Child Soldier Use: 2003 - A Briefing for the 
4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. London: Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2009). Child Soldiers Global Report 2008. London: 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 
 
Connolly, W. E. (1993). The Terms of Political Discourse. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Crocker, W. (1947). On Governing Colonies: Being an Outline of the Real Issues and a 
Comparison of the British, French and Belgian Approach to Them. Woking: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd. 
 
Crook, R. (1997). Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition 
in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d'Ivoire. African Affairs , 96 (383), 215-243. 
 
Crowder, M. (1977). West Africa: An Introduction to its History. London: Longman. 
 
Cullen-DuPont. (2009). Human Trafficking. New York: Infobase Publishing. 
 
Danquah, J. (1944). The Akan Doctrine of God. London: Lutterworth Press. 
188 
 
Dickson, K. (1966). Trade Patterns in Ghana at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century. 
Geographical Review , 56 (3), 417-431. 
 
Dimier, V. (2004). Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques. Brussels: 
Université de Bruxelles. 
 
Donnan, H., & Wilson, T. M. (1999). Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State. Oxford: 
Berg Press. 
 
Dowdon, R. (2009). Africa: altered states, ordinary miracles. London: Portobello. 
ECPAT International. (2007). Confronting the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 
Africa. Bangkok: ECPAT International. 
 
Ekberg, G. (2004). The Swedish Law That Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services: Best 
Practices for Prevention of Prostitution and Trafficking in Human Beings. Violence Against 
Women , 10 (10), 1187-1218. 
 
Farley, M., Cotton, A., Lynne, J., Zumbeck, S., Spiwak, F., Reyes, M. E., et al. (2004). Prostitution 
and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
Journal of Trauma Practice , 2 (3 & 4), 33-74. 
 
Farrell, M., Hettne, B., & Van Langenhove, L. (2005). Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and 
Practice. London: Pluto Press. 
 
FitzGibbon, K. (2003). Modern-Day Slavery? The Scope of trafficking in persons in Africa. 
African Security Review , 12 (1), 81-89. 
 
Flowers, R. B. (2001). The Sex Trade Industry's Worldwide Exploitation of Children. Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science , 575, 147-157. 
 
Fong, J. (n.d.). Literature review on Trafficking in West and East Africa. Retrieved 11 20, 2010, 
from www.childtrafficking.com: 
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/gaatw_04_final_0708.pdf 
189 
 
Francis, D. J. (2006). Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems. Ashgate. 
 
Fuller, F. (2000). Diaries, 1913 - 1919: Ashanti. In T. Williamson, & A. Kirk-Greene, Gold Coast 
Diaries: Chronicles of Political Officers in West Africa, 1900 - 1919 (pp. 121-141). Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Fynn, J. K. (1971). Asante and Its Neighbours, 1700 - 1807. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press. 
 
Gann, L. H., & Duignan, P. (1978). The Rulers of British Africa: 1870 - 1914. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Ghana Immigration Service. (2010). Retrieved February 25, 2011, from Ghana Immigration 
Service: http://www.ghanaimmigration.org/index.htm 
 
Ghana Statistical Service. (n.d.). Population Estimates. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from 
http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/Brong-Ahafo.html 
 
Gifford, P., & Weiskel, T. C. (1971). African Education in a Colonial Context: French and British 
Styles. In P. Gifford, & W. Louis, France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule 
(pp. 663-711). London: Yale University Press. 
 
Gocking, R. S. (2005). The History of Ghana. Wesstport: Greenwood Press. 
 
Goodhand, J. (2008). War, Peace and the Places in Between: Why Borderlands are Central. In 
M. Pugh, N. Cooper & M. Turner, Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy 
of Peacebuilding (pp.225-244). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian. 
 
Government of Ghana. (n.d.). Brong-Ahafo Region. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1216:introductio
n&catid=34:brong-ahafo&Itemid=187 
 
Grant, J. A., & Söderbaum, F. (2003). The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate Press. 
190 
 
Griffiths, I. L. (1995). The African Inheritance. London: Routledge. 
 
Hargreaves, J. (1974). The European Partition of West Africa. In J. Ajayi, & M. Crowder, History 
of West Africa (Vol. II, pp. 402-423). London: Longman. 
 
Hargreaves, J. (1967). West Africa: The Former French States. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
 
Harrison, C. (2003). France and Islam in West Africa: 1860 - 1960. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Herbst, J. (2000). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (1998). The New Regionalism Approach. Politeia , 17 (3), 6-21. 
 
Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (2000). The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and 
Development (Vol. IV). London: MacMillan Press. 
 
Heussler, R. (1971). British Rule in Africa. In P. Gifford, & W. Louis, France and Britain in Africa: 
Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (pp. 571-592). London: Yale University Press. 
 
Hollis, M. (2000). The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford Univesrity Press. 
 
Iliffe, J. (1995). Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
International Labour Organization. (2006). C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 
1999. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm 
 
Irwin, G. W. (1975). Precolonial African Diplomacy: The Example of Asante. The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies , 8 (1). 
191 
 
Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982). Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood. World Politics, 35 (1), 1-24. 
 
Katzenellenbogen, S. (1996). It Didn't Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in 
the Setting of Africa's Colonial Boundaries. In P. Nugent, & A. I. Asiwaju, African Boundaries: 
Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities (pp. 21-34). London: Pinter Press. 
 
Killingray, D. (1979). The Idea of a British Imperial African Army. The Journal of African History , 
20 (3), 421-436. 
 
Kimani, M. (2008, April). Better health at the click of a button: Information technology helps 
Rwandan clinics reach out. Africa Renewal , 22 (1), p. 5. 
 
Kirk-Greene, A. (1980). The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa. 
African Affairs , 79 (314), 25-44. 
 
Koné, M. (2001). Gaining Rights of Access to Land in West-Central Côte d’Ivoire. London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development. 
 
Kopytoff, I. (1987). The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
 
Kraxberger, B. M. (2007). Failed States: Temporary Obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or 
Fundamental Holes in the World Political Map? Third World Quarterly, 28 (6), 1055-1071. 
 
Kwankye, S. O., Anarfi, J. K., Tagoe, C. A., & Castaldo, A. (2009). Independent North-South Child 
Migration in Ghana: The Decision Making Process. Brighton: Development Research Centre on 
Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. 
 
LeVine, V. T. (2004). Politics in Francophone Africa. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Press. 
 
Levtzion, N. (1973). Ancient Ghana and Mali. Suffolk: Richard Clay Ltd. 
 
192 
 
MacIntyre. (1998). A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge. 
 
Mair, L. P. (1936). Native Policies in Africa. London: Routledge. 
 
Mees, H. (2009, February 3). Does Legalizing Prostitution Work? Retrieved from Global Policy 
Innovations Program: http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000107/ 
 
Metcalfe, G. E. (1964). Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807 - 1959. 
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
 
Miller, J. (1965). The Nature of Politics. London: Pelican Books. 
 
Moore, D. (2001). Neoliberal Globalisation and the Triple Crisis of 'Modernisation' in Africa: 
Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa. Third World Quarterly, 22 
(6), 909-929. 
 
New Zealand Ministry of Justice. (2008). Health, Safety and Well-being. Retrieved November 
15, 2010, from New Zealand Ministry of Justice: http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-
consultation/legislation/prostitution-law-review-committee/publications/plrc-report/4-health-
safety-and-well-being 
 
New Zealand Ministry of Justice. (2008). Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on 
the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 . Wellington: Ministry of Justice. 
 
Nugent, P. (1996). Arbitrary Lines and People's Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial 
Boundaries. In P. Nugent, & A. I. Asiwaju, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and 
Opportunities (pp. 35-67). London: Pinter Press. 
 
Nugent, P. (2002). Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The 
Lie of the Borderlands Since 1914. Oxford: James Curry. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (1998). "Whether From Reason or Prejudice": Taking money for bodily services. 
The Journal of Legal Studies , 27 (2), 693-724. 
193 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2002). Capabilities and Social Justice. International Studies Review , 4 (2), 123-
135. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (1993). Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. In M. Nussbaum, & A. 
Sen, The Quality of Life (pp. 242-269). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women’s Capabilities and Social Justice. Journal of Human 
Development, 1 (2), 221-247. 
 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. (1996). Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. 52nd Sess., 
Agenda Item 20(b) . U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/100. 
 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (1957, April 30). 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/slavetrade.htm 
 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2011, March 25). Escalating 
violence fuels dramatic rise in displacement in Côte d'Ivoire. Retrieved March 25, 2011, from 
UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c950a9.html 
 
Okpara, E. E. (1986). Rural-Urban Migration and Urban Employment Opportunities in Nigeria. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 11  (1), 67-74. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary. (n.d.). Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved January 25, 2007, from 
http://www.oed.com 
 
 
194 
 
Payson Centre for International Development and Technology Transfer. (2010, September 30). 
Fourth Annual Report: Oversight of Public and Private Initiatives to Eliminate the Worst Forms 
of Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Retrieved from 
http://www.childlabor-payson.org/Final%20Fourth%20Annual%20Report.pdf 
 
Pitcher, A., Moran, M., Johnston, M. (2009). Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism 
in Africa. African Studies Review, 52 (1), 125-157. 
 
Potterat, J. J., Brewer, D. D., Muth, S. Q., Rothenberg, R. B., Woodhouse, D. E., Muth, J. B., et 
al. (2004). Mortality in a Long-term Open Cohort of Prostitute Women. American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 159 (8), 778-785. 
 
Potts, D. (1995). Shall We Go Home? Increasing Urban Poverty in African Cities and Migration 
Processes. The Geographical Journal, 161 (3), 245-264. 
 
Potts, D., Mutambirwa, C. (1990). Rural-Urban Linkages in Contemporary Harare: Why 
Migrants Need Their Land. Journal of Southern African Studies, 16 (4), 677-698. 
 
Rabe, M. (2003). Are you out when you are not in? Revisiting ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ as social 
researchers. African Sociological Review , 7 (2), 149-161. 
 
Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Reindorf, C. C. (1996). The History of Gold Coast and Asante. Accra: Ghana University Press. 
 
Reno, W. (1997). War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States. 
Comparative Politics, 29 (4), 493-510. 
 
Sabatier, P. (1985). Did Africans Really Learn to be French? The Francophone Elite of the École 
William Ponty. In G. W. Johnson, Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism 
(pp. 179-185). London: Greenwood Press. 
 
195 
 
Schulz, M., Söderbaum, F., & Ojendal, J. (2001). Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A 
Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes. London: Zed Books. 
Schwab, P. (2004). Designing West Africa: Prelude to 21st-Century Calamity. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Bethany: Yale 
University Press.  
 
Shaw, T. M. (2000). New Regionalisms in Africa in the New Millennium: Comparative 
Perspectives on Renaissancem Realisms and/or Regressions. New Political Economy , 5 (3), 
399-414. 
 
Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, R. (1973). Peace and Palaver: International Relations in Pre-Colonial West Africa. The 
Journal of African History , 14 (4), 599-621. 
 
SocialBakers. (2011, March 22). Tunisia Facebook Statistics. Retrieved March 22, 2011, from 
SocialBakers: http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/tunisia 
 
Söderbaum, F. (2005). Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism. 
In M. Farrell, B. Hettne, & L. Van Langenhove, Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and 
Practice (pp. 87-103). Sidmouth: Pluto Books. 
 
Söderbaum, F. (2003). Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism. In F. Söderbaum, & T. M. 
Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism (pp. 1-21). Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Söderbaum, F. (2002). The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa. Göteborg: 
Göteborg University. 
 
Söderbaum, F. (2000). The Role of the Regional Factor in West Africa. In B. Hettne, A. Intotai, & 
O. Sunkel, The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development, Volume 4 (pp. 
121-143). Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
196 
 
Söderbaum, F. (2001). Turbulent Regionalization in West Africa. In M. Schulz, F. Söderbaum, & 
J. Ojendal, Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors 
and Processes (pp. 61-81). London: Zed Books. 
 
Söderbaum, F., & Taylor, I. (2008). Afro-regions: The dynamics of cross-border micro-
regionalism in Africa. Stockholm: Elanders Sverige AB. 
 
Söderbaum, F., & Taylor, I. (2007). Micro-regionalism in West Africa: Evidence from Two Case 
Studies. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab AB. 
 
Spielvogel, J. (2008). Western Civilization: Since 1789, Volume C. Belmont: Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
 
Stary, B. (1999). Cross-Border Trade in West Africa: The Ghana-Côte d'Ivoire Frontier. In D. 
Bach, Regionalisation in Africa: Integration & Disintegration (pp. 169-177). James Curry Ltd.: 
Bloomington. 
 
Strassoldo, R. (1989). Border studies: the state of the art in Europe. In A. Asiwaju, & P. Adeniyi, 
Borderlands in Africa: A Multi-Disciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa. 
Lagos: University of Lagos Press. 
 
Sundstrom, L. (1965). The Exchange Economy in Pre-Colonial Tropical Africa. London: Hurst & 
Co. 
 
Svendsen, K. (1969). The Economics of the Boundaries in West, Central and East Africa. In C. 
Widstrand, African Boundary Problems (pp. 32-62). Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri 
Aktiebolag. 
 
Taylor, I. (2002). The Maputo Development Corridor: Whose Corridor? Whose Development? 
In S. Breslin, & G. D. Hook, Microregionalism and World Order (pp. 144-165). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
 
197 
 
Taylor, I. (2005). Globalisation Studies and the Developing World: Making International 
Political Economy Truly Global. Third World Quarterly, 26 (7), 1025-1042. 
 
Taylor, I. & Williams, P. (2008). Political culture, state elites and regional security in West 
Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (2), 137-149. 
 
The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana. (2005, December 5). Human Trafficking Act (2005). 
Retrieved January 23, 2011, from The Protection Project: 
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Ghana_Human-Trafficking-
Act_2005.pdf 
 
The Washington Post. (2005). The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy, 149, 56-65. 
 
Thomas, R. (1973). Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of the Northern Territories 
of the Gold Coast, 1906-1927. The Journal of African History , 14 (1), 79-103. 
 
Touval, S. (1972). The Boundaries of Independent Africa. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
U.S. Department of State. (2010). 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington: U.S. 
Department of State. 
 
UNICEF. (2008, August 26). Convention on the Rights of the Child. Retrieved February 26, 2010, 
from http://www.unicef.org/crc/ 
United Nations International Telecommunications Union. (2009). Measuring the Information 
Society: The ICT Development Index. Geneva: International Telecommunications Union. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008). Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons: 
Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings. New York: United Nations. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols. Retrieved February 20, 2010, from 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html 
 
198 
 
United Nations Population Division (2009). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision 
Population Database. Retrieved July 28, 2011, from 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/unup/index_panel3.html. 
 
West African Borders and Initiatives. (2003-2006). L'Iniative WABI. Retrieved September 26, 
2008, from WABI: 
http://www.afriquefrontieres.org/images/pdf/apropos/initiative_aproposde-wabi.pdf 
 
West African Borders and Integration. (2005). Atlas: transport et télécommunication II. 
Retrieved March 23, 2009, from WABI: 
http://www.afriquefrontieres.org/images/pdf/doc/fr/atlas_fra_20-44.pdf 
 
West African Borders and Integration. (2003-2006). L'Iniative WABI. Retrieved September 26, 
2008, from WABI: 
http://www.afriquefrontieres.org/images/pdf/apropos/initiative_aproposde-wabi.pdf 
 
Wilks, I. (1995). Forests of Gold: Essays on the Akan and the Kingdom of Asante. Athens: Ohio 
University Press. 
 
Wilks, I. (1961). The Northern Factor in Ashanti History. Accra: University College of Ghana. 
 
Wingfield, R. (1957). The Story of Old Ghana, Melle and Songhai. London: Cambridge Univeristy 
Press. 
 
Woods, D. (2003). The tragedy of the cocoa-pod: rent-seeking and ethnic conflict in Ivory 
Coast. Journal of Modern African Studies , 41 (4), 641-655. 
 
Young, C. (1997). The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
 
